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Abstract: This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and
animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes
and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a
sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to
show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following
consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This
is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the
brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed
just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.
"Could a machine think?" On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely
brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since
it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
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What psychological and philosophical significance should we
attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human
cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it
useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak"
or "cautious" AI (Artificial Intelligence). According to weak
AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the
mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it
enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous
and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer
is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the
appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the
sense that computers given the right programs can be literally
said to understand and have other cognitive states. In strong
AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states,
the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test
psychological explanations; rather, the programs are them-
selves the explanations.
I have no objection to the claims of weak AI, at least as far
as this article is concerned. My discussion here will be
directed at the claims I have defined as those of strong AI,
specifically the claim that the appropriately programmed
computer literally has cognitive states and that the programs
thereby explain human cognition. When I hereafter refer to
AI, I have in mind the strong version, as expressed by these
two claims.
1 will consider the work of Roger Schank and his colleagues
at Yale (Schank & Abelson 1977), because I am more familiar
with it than I am with any other similar claims, and because it
provides a very clear example of the sort of work I wish to
examine. But nothing that follows depends upon the details of
Schank's programs. The same arguments would apply to
Winograd's SHRDLU (Winograd 1973), Weizenbaum's
ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1965), and indeed any Turing machine
simulation of human mental phenomena.
Very briefly, and leaving out the various details, one can
describe Schank's program as follows: the aim of the program
is to simulate the human ability to understand stories. It is
characteristic of human beings' story-understanding capacity
that they can answer questions about the story even though
the information that they give was never explicitly stated in
the story. Thus, for example, suppose you are given the
following story: "A man went into a restaurant and ordered a
hamburger. When the hamburger arrived it was burned to a
crisp, and the man stormed out of the restaurant angrily,
without paying for the hamburger or leaving a tip." Now, if
you are asked "Did the man eat the hamburger?" you will
presumably answer, "No, he did not." Similarly, if you are
given the following story: "A man went into a restaurant and
ordered a hamburger; when the hamburger came he was very
pleased with it; and as he left the restaurant he gave the
waitress a large tip before paying his bill, ' and you are asked
the question, "Did the man eat the hamburger?, ' you will
presumably answer, "Yes, he ate the hamburger." Now
Schank's machines can similarly answer questions about
restaurants in this fashion. To do this, they have a "repre-
sentation" of the sort of information that human beings have
about restaurants, which enables them to answer such
questions as those above, given these sorts of stories. When the
machine is given the story and then asked the question, the
machine will print out answers of the sort that we would
expect human beings to give if told similar stories. Partisans of
strong AI claim that in this question and answer sequence the
machine is not only simulating a human ability but also
1. that the machine can literally be said to understand the
story and provide the answers to questions, and
2. that what the machine and its program do explains the
human ability to understand the story and answer questions
about it.
Both claims seem to me to be totally unsupported by
Schank's1 work, as I will attempt to show in what follows.
One way to test any theory of the mind is to ask oneself
what it would be like if my mind actually worked on the
principles that the theory says all minds work on. Let us apply
this test to the Schank program with the following Ce-
dankenexperiment. Suppose that I'm locked in a room and
given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore
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(as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written
or spoken, and that I'm not even confident that I could
recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing distinct from,
say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me,
Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now
suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing I
am given a second batch of Chinese script together with a set
of rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch.
The rules are in English, and I understand these rules as well
as any other native speaker of English. They enable me to
correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal
symbols, and all that "formal " means here is that I can
identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose
also that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together
with some instructions, again in English, that enable me to
correlate elements of this third batch with the first two
batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain
Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to
certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown
to me, the people who are giving me all of these symbols call
the first batch "a script, ' they call the second batch a "story, "
and they call the third batch "questions." Furthermore, they
call the symbols I give them back in response to the third
batch "answers to the questions," and the set of rules in
English that they gave me, they call "the program." Now just
to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also
give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then
ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give
them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while
I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating
the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at
writing the programs that from the external point of view -
that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room
in which I am locked - my answers to the questions are
absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese
speakers. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I
don't speak a word of Chinese. Let us also suppose that my
answers to the English questions are, as they no doubt would
be, indistinguishable from those of other native English
speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English
speaker. From the external point of view - from the point of
view of someone reading my "answers" - the answers to the
Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good.
But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, I produce the
answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As
far as the Chinese is concerned, I simply behave like a
computer; I perform computational operations on formally
specified elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, I am
simply an instantiation of the computer program.
Now the claims made by strong AI are that the
programmed computer understands the stories and that the
program in some sense explains human understanding. But
we are now in a position to examine these claims in light of
our thought experiment.
1. As regards the first claim, it seems to me quite obvious in
the example that I do not understand a word of the Chinese
stories. I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable
from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any
formal program you like, but I still understand nothing. For
the same reasons, Schank's computer understands nothing of
any stories, whether in Chinese, English, or whatever, since in
the Chinese case the computer is me, and in cases where the
computer is not me, the computer has nothing more than I
have in the case where I understand nothing.
2. As regards the second claim, that the program explains
human understanding, we can see that the computer and its
program do not provide sufficient conditions of understand-
ing since the computer and the program are functioning, and
there is no understanding. But does it even provide a
necessary condition or a significant contribution to under-
standing? One of the claims made by the supporters of strong
AI is that when I understand a story in English, what I am
doing is exactly the same - or perhaps more of the same - as
what I was doing in manipulating the Chinese symbols. It is
simply more formal symbol manipulation that distinguishes
the case in English, where I do understand, from the case in
Chinese, where I don't. I have not demonstrated that this
claim is false, but it would certainly appear an incredible
claim in the example. Such plausibility as the claim has
derives from the supposition that we can construct a program
that will have the same inputs and outputs as native speakers,
and in addition we assume that speakers have some level of
description where they are also instantiations of a program.
On the basis of these two assumptions we assume that even if
Schank's program isn't the whole story about understanding,
it may be part of the story. Well, I suppose that is an
empirical possibility, but not the slightest reason has so far
been given to believe that it is true, since what is suggested -
though certainly not demonstrated - by the example is that
the computer program is simply irrelevant to my understand-
ing of the story. In the Chinese case I have everything that
artificial intelligence can put into me by way of a program,
and I understand nothing; in the English case I understand
everything, and there is so far no reason at all to suppose that
my understanding has anything to do with computer
programs, that is, with computational operations on purely
formally specified elements. As long as the program is
defined in terms of computational operations on purely
formally defined elements, what the example suggests is that
these by themselves have no interesting connection with
understanding. They are certainly not sufficient conditions,
and not the slightest reason has been given to suppose that
they are necessary conditions or even that they make a
significant contribution to understanding. Notice that the
force of the argument is not simply that different machines
can have the same input and output while operating on
different formal principles - that is not the point at all.
Rather, whatever purely formal principles you put into the
computer, they will not be sufficient for understanding, since
a human will be able to follow the formal principles without
understanding anything. No reason whatever has been
offered to suppose that such principles are necessary or even
contributory, since no reason has been given to suppose that
when I understand English I am operating with any formal
program at all.
Well, then, what is it that I have in the case of the English
sentences that I do not have in the case of the Chinese
sentences? The obvious answer is that I know what the former
mean, while I haven't the faintest idea what the latter mean.
But in what does this consist and why couldn't we give it to a
machine, whatever it is? I will return to this question later,
but first I want to continue with the example.
I have had the occasions to present this example to several
workers in artifical intelligence, and, interestingly, they do
not seem to agree on what the proper reply to it is. I get a
surprising variety of replies, and in what follows I will
consider the most common of these (specified along with their
geographic origins).
But first I want to block some common misunderstandings
about "understanding": in many of these discussions one finds
a lot of fancy footwork about the word "understanding. " My
critics point out that there are many different degrees of
understanding; that "understanding" is not a simple two-
place predicate; that there are even different kinds and levels
of understanding, and often the law of excluded middle
doesn't even apply in a straightforward way to statements of
the form "x understands y "; that in many cases it is a matter
for decision and not a simple matter of fact whether x
understands y; and so on. To all of these points I want to say:
of course, of course. But they have nothing to do with the
418 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
points at issue. There are clear cases in which "understand-
ing" literally applies and clear cases in which it does not
apply; and these two sorts of cases are all I need for this
argument.2 I understand stories in English; to a lesser degree I
can understand stories in French; to a still lesser degree,
stories in German; and in Chinese, not at all. My car and my
adding machine, on the other hand, understand nothing: they
are not in that line of business. We often attribute "under-
standing" and other cognitive predicates by metaphor and
analogy to cars, adding machines, and other artifacts, but
nothing is proved by such attributions. We say, "The door
knows when to open because of its photoelectric cell," "The
adding machine knows how (understands how, is able) to do
addition and subtraction but not division," and "The ther-
mostat perceives chances in the temperature." The reason we
make these attributions is quite interesting, and it has to do
with the fact that in artifacts we extend our own intention-
ality;3 our tools are extensions of our purposes, and so we find
it natural to make metaphorical attributions of intentionality
to them; but I take it no philosophical ice is cut by such
examples. The sense in which an automatic door "under-
stands instructions" from its photoelectric cell is not at all the
sense in which I understand English. If the sense in which
Schank's programmed computers understand stories is
supposed to be the metaphorical sense in which the door
understands, and not the sense in which I understand English,
the issue would not be worth discussing. But Newell and
Simon (1963) write that the kind of cognition they claim for
computers is exactly the same as for human beings. I like the
straightforwardness of this claim, and it is the sort of claim I
will be considering. I will argue that in the literal sense the
programmed computer understands what the car and the
adding machine understand, namely, exactly nothing. The
computer understanding is not just (like my understanding of
German) partial or incomplete; it is zero.
Now to the replies:
I. The systems reply (Berkeley). "While it is true that the
individual person who is locked in the room does not
understand the story, the fact is that he is merely part of a
whole system, and the system does understand the story. The
person has a large ledger in front of him in which are written
the rules, he has a lot of scratch paper and pencils for doing
calculations, he has 'data banks' of sets of Chinese symbols.
Now, understanding is not being ascribed to the mere
individual; rather it is being ascribed to this whole system of
which he is a part."
My response to the systems theory is quite simple: let the
individual internalize all of these elements of the system. He
memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data banks of
Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in his head.
The individual then incorporates the entire system. There
isn't anything at all to the system that he does not encompass.
We can even get rid of the room and suppose he works
outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing of the
Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there
isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't
understand, then there is no way the system could understand
because the system is just a part of him.
Actually I feel somewhat embarrassed to give even this
answer to the systems theory because the theory seems to me
so implausible to start with. The idea is that while a person
doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of
that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is
not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the
grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible. Still, I
think many people who are committed to the ideology of
strong AI will in the end be inclined to say something very
much like this; so let us pursue it a bit further. According to
one version of this view, while the man in the internalized
Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
systems example doesn't understand Chinese in the sense that
a native Chinese speaker does (because, for example, he
doesn't know that the story refers to restaurants and
hamburgers, etc.), still "the man as a formal symbol manip-
ulation system" really does understand Chinese. The subsys-
tem of the man that is the formal symbol manipulation
system for Chinese should not be confused with the subsystem
for English.
So there are really two subsystems in the man; one
understands English, the other Chinese, and "it's just that the
two systems have little to do with each other." But, I want to
reply, not only do they have little to do with each other, they
are not even remotely alike. The subsystem that understands
English (assuming we allow ourselves to talk in this jargon of
"subsystems" for a moment) knows that the stories are about
restaurants and eating hamburgers, he knows that he is being
asked questions about restaurants and that he is answering
questions as best he can by making various inferences from
the content of the story, and so on. But the Chinese system
knows none of this. Whereas the English subsystem knows
that "hamburgers" refers to hamburgers, the Chinese subsys-
tem knows only that "squiggle squiggle" is followed by
"squoggle squoggle." All he knows is that various formal
symbols are being introduced at one end and manipulated
according to rules written in English, and other symbols are
going out at the other end. The whole point of the original
example was to argue that such symbol manipulation by itself
couldn't be sufficient for understanding Chinese in any literal
sense because the man could write "squoggle squoggle " after
"squiggle squiggle" without understanding anything in
Chinese. And it doesn't meet that argument to postulate
subsystems within the man, because the subsystems are no
better off than the man was in the first place; they still don't
have anything even remotely like what the English-speaking
man (or subsystem) has. Indeed, in the case as described, the
Chinese subsystem is simply a part of the English subsystem, a
part that engages in meaningless symbol manipulation
according to rules in English.
Let us ask ourselves what is supposed to motivate the
systems reply in the first place; that is, what independent
grounds are there supposed to be for saying that the agent
must have a subsystem within him that literally understands
stories in Chinese? As far as I can tell the only grounds are
that in the example I have the same input and output as
native Chinese speakers and a program that goes from one to
the other. But the whole point of the examples has been to try
to show that that couldn't be sufficient for understanding, in
the sense in which I understand stories in English, because a
person, and hence the set of systems that go to make up a
person, could have the right combination of input, output,
and program and still not understand anything in the relevant
literal sense in which I understand English. The only
motivation for saying there must be a subsystem in me that
understands Chinese is that I have a program and I can pass
the Turing test; I can fool native Chinese speakers. But
precisely one of the points at issue is the adequacy of the
Turing test. The example shows that there could be two
"systems," both of which pass the Turing test, but only one of
which understands; and it is no argument against this point to
say that since they both pass the Turing test they must both
understand, since this claim fails to meet the argument that
the system in me that understands English has a great deal
more than the system that merely processes Chinese. In short,
the systems reply simply begs the question by insisting
without argument that the system must understand
Chinese.
Furthermore, the systems reply would appear to lead to
consequences that are independently absurd. If we are to
conclude that there must be cognition in me on the grounds
that I have a certain sort of input and output and a program
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in between, then it looks like all sorts of noncognitive
subsystems are going to turn out to be cognitive. For example,
there is a level of description at which my stomach does
information processing, and it instantiates any number of
computer programs, but I take it we do not want to say that it
has any understanding [cf. Pylyshyn: "Computation and
Cognitition" BBS 3(1) 1980]. But if we accept the systems
reply, then it is hard to see how we avoid saying that stomach,
heart, liver, and so on, are all understanding subsystems, since
there is no principled way to distinguish the motivation for
saying the Chinese subsystem understands from saying that
the stomach understands. It is, by the way, not an answer to
this point to say that the Chinese system has information as
input and output and the stomach has food and food products
as input and output, since from the point of view of the agent,
from my point of view, there is no information in either the
food or the Chinese - the Chinese is just so many meaningless
squiggles. The information in the Chinese case is solely in the
eyes of the programmers and the interpreters, and there is
nothing to prevent them from treating the input and output
of my digestive organs as information if they so desire.
This last point bears on some independent problems in
strong AI, and it is worth digressing for a moment to explain
it. If strong AI is to be a branch of psychology, then it must be
able to distinguish those systems that are genuinely mental
from those that are not. It must be able to distinguish the
principles on which the mind works from those on which
nonmental systems work; otherwise it will offer us no
explanations of what is specifically mental about the mental.
And the mental-nonmental distinction cannot be just in the
eye of the beholder but it must be intrinsic to the systems;
otherwise it would be up to any beholder to treat people as
nonmental and, for example, hurricanes as mental if he likes.
But quite often in the AI literature the distinction is blurred in
ways that would in the long run prove disastrous to the claim
that AI is a cognitive inquiry. McCarthy, for example, writes,
"Machines as simple as thermostats can be said to have
beliefs, and having beliefs seems to be a characteristic of most
machines capable of problem solving performance" (McCar-
thy 1979). Anyone who thinks strong AI has a chance as a
theory of the mind ought to ponder the implications of that
remark. We are asked to accept it as a discovery of strong AI
that the hunk of metal on the wall that we use to regulate the
temperature has beliefs in exactly the same sense that we, our
spouses, and our children have beliefs, and furthermore that
"most" of the other machines in the room - telephone, tape
recorder, adding machine, electric light switch, - also have
beliefs in this literal sense. It is not the aim of this article to
argue against McCarthy's point, so I will simply assert the
following without argument. The study of the mind starts
with such facts as that humans have beliefs, while thermo-
stats, telephones, and adding machines don't. If you get a
theory that denies this point you have produced a counter-
example to the theory and the theory is false. One gets the
impression that people in AI who write this sort of thing think
they can get away with it because they don't really take it
seriously, and they don't think anyone else will either. I
propose for a moment at least, to take it seriously. Think hard
for one minute about what would be necessary to establish
that that hunk of metal on the wall over there had real beliefs,
beliefs with direction of fit, propositional content, and
conditions of satisfaction; beliefs that had the possibility of
being strong beliefs or weak beliefs; nervous, anxious, or
secure beliefs; dogmatic, rational, or superstitious beliefs;
blind faiths or hesitant cogitations; any kind of beliefs. The
thermostat is not a candidate. Neither is stomach, liver,
adding machine, or telephone. However, since we are taking
the idea seriously, notice that its truth would be fatal to strong
AI's claim to be a science of the mind. For now the mind is
everywhere. What we wanted to know is what distinguishes
the mind from thermostats and livers. And if McCarthy were
right, strong AI wouldn't have a hope of telling us that.
II. The Robot Reply (Yale). "Suppose we wrote a different
kind of program from Schank's program. Suppose we put a
computer inside a robot, and this computer would not just
take in formal symbols as input and give out formal symbols
as output, but rather would actually operate the robot in such
a way that the robot does something very much like
perceiving, walking, moving about, hammering nails, eating,
drinking - anything you like. The robot would, for example,
have a television camera attached to it that enabled it to 'see,'
it would have arms and legs that enabled it to 'act,' and all of
this would be controlled by its computer 'brain.' Such a robot
would, unlike Schank's computer, have genuine understand-
ing and other mental states."
The first thing to notice about the robot reply is that it
tacitly concedes that cognition is not soley a matter of formal
symbol manipulation, since this reply adds a set of causal
relation with the outside world [cf. Fodor: "Methodological
Solipsism" BBS 3(1) 1980]. But the answer to the robot reply is
that the addition of such "perceptual" and "motor" capacities
adds nothing by way of understanding, in particular, or
intentionality, in general, to Schank's original program. To
see this, notice that the same thought experiment applies to
the robot case. Suppose that instead of the computer inside
the robot, you put me inside the room and, as in the original
Chinese case, you give me more Chinese symbols with more
instructions in English for matching Chinese symbols to
Chinese symbols and feeding back Chinese symbols to the
outside. Suppose, unknown to me, some of the Chinese
symbols that come to me come from a television camera
attached to the robot and other Chinese symbols that I am
giving out serve to make the motors inside the robot move the
robot's legs or arms. It is important to emphasize that all I am
doing is manipulating formal symbols: I know none of these
other facts. I am receiving "information" from the robot's
"perceptual" apparatus, and I am giving out "instructions" to
its motor apparatus without knowing either of these facts. I
am the robot's homunculus, but unlike the traditional homun-
culus, I don't know what's going on. I don't understand
anything except the rules for symbol manipulation. Now in
this case I want to say that the robot has no intentional states
at all; it is simply moving about as a result of its electrical
wiring and its program. And furthermore, by instantiating
the program I have no intentional states of the relevant type.
All I do is follow formal instructions about manipulating
formal symbols.
III. The brain simulator reply (Berkeley and M.I.T.).
"Suppose we design a program that doesn't represent infor-
mation that we have about the world, such as the information
in Schank's scripts, but simulates the actual sequence of
neuron firings at the synapses of the brain of a native Chinese
speaker when he understands stories in Chinese and gives
answers to them. The machine takes in Chinese stories and
questions about them as input, it simulates the formal
structure of actual Chinese brains in processing these stories,
and it gives out Chinese answers as outputs. We can even
imagine that the machine operates, not with a single serial
program, but with a whole set of programs operating in
parallel, in the manner that actual human brains presumably
operate when they process natural language. Now surely in
such a case we would have to say that the machine understood
the stories; and if we refuse to say that, wouldn't we also have
to deny that native Chinese speakers understood the stories?
At the level of the synapses, what would or could be different
about the program of the computer and the program of the
Chinese brain?"
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Before countering this reply I want to digress to note that it
is an odd reply for any partisan of artificial intelligence (or
functionalism, etc.) to make: I thought the whole idea of
strong AI is that we don't need to know how the brain works
to know how the mind works. The basic hypothesis, or so I
had supposed, was that there is a level of mental operations
consisting of computational processes over formal elements
that constitute the essence of the mental and can be realized
in all sorts of different brain processes, in the same way that
any computer program can be realized in different computer
hardwares: on the assumptions of strong AI, the mind is to the
brain as the program is to the hardware, and thus we can
understand the mind without doing neurophysiology. If we
had to know how the brain worked to do AI, we wouldn't
bother with AI. However, even getting this close to the
operation of the brain is still not sufficient to produce
understanding. To see this, imagine that instead of a mono-
lingual man in a room shuffling symbols we have the man
operate an elaborate set of water pipes with valves connecting
them. When the man receives the Chinese symbols, he looks
up in the program, written in English, which valves he has to
turn on and off. Each water connection corresponds to a
synapse in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged
up so that after doing all the right firings, that is after turning
on all the right faucets, the Chinese answers pop out at the
output end of the series of pipes.
Now where is the understanding in this system? It takes
Chinese as input, it simulates the formal structure of the
synapses of the Chinese brain, and it gives Chinese as output.
But the man certainly doesn't understand Chinese, and
neither do the water pipes, and if we are tempted to adopt
what I think is the absurd view that somehow the conjunction
of man and water pipes understands, remember that in
principle the man can internalize the formal structure of the
water pipes and do all the "neuron firings" in his imagination.
The problem with the brain simulator is that it is simulating
the wrong things about the brain. As long as it simulates only
the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings at the
synapses, it won't have simulated what matters about the
brain, namely its causal properties, its ability to produce
intentional states. And that the formal properties are not
sufficient for the causal properties is shown by the water pipe
example: we can have all the formal properties carved off
from the relevant neurobiological causal properties.
IV. The combination reply (Berkeley and Stanford).
"While each of the previous three replies might not be
completely convincing by itself as a refutation of the Chinese
room counterexample, if you take all three together they are
collectively much more convincing and even decisive. Imag-
ine a robot with a brain-shaped computer lodged in its cranial
cavity, imagine the computer programmed with all the
synapses of a human brain, imagine the whole behavior of the
robot is indistinguishable from human behavior, and now
think of the whole thing as a unified system and not just as a
computer with inputs and outputs. Surely in such a case we
would have to ascribe intentionality to the system."
I entirely agree that in such a case we would find it rational
and indeed irresistible to accept the hypothesis that the robot
had intentionality, as long as we knew nothing more about it.
Indeed, besides appearance and behavior, the other elements
of the combination are really irrelevant. If we could build a
robot whose behavior was indistinguishable over a large range
from human behavior, we would attribute intentionality to it,
pending some reason not to. We wouldn't need to know in
advance that its computer brain was a formal analogue of the
human brain.
But I really don't see that this is any help to the claims of
strong AI; and here's why: According to strong AI, instan-
tiating a formal program with the right input and output is a
sufficient condition of, indeed is constitutive of, intentional-
ity. As Newell (1979) puts it, the essence of the mental is the
operation of a physical symbol system. But the attributions of
intentionality that we make to the robot in this example have
nothing to do with formal programs. They are simply based
on the assumption that if the robot looks and behaves
sufficiently like us, then we would suppose, until proven
otherwise, that it must have mental states like ours that cause
and are expressed by its behavior and it must have an inner
mechanism capable of producing such mental states. If we
knew independently how to account for its behavior without
such assumptions we would not attribute intentionality to it,
especially if we knew it had a formal program. And this is
precisely the point of my earlier reply to objection II.
Suppose we knew that the robot's behavior was entirely
accounted for by the fact that a man inside it was receiving
uninterpreted formal symbols from the robot's sensory recep-
tors and sending out uninterpreted formal symbols to its
motor mechanisms, and the man was doing this symbol
manipulation in accordance with a bunch of rules. Further-
more, suppose the man knows none of these facts about the
robot, all he knows is which operations to perform on which
meaningless symbols. In such a case we would regard the
robot as an ingenious mechanical dummy. The hypothesis
that the dummy has a mind would now be unwarranted and
unnecessary, for there is now no longer any reason to ascribe
intentionality to the robot or to the system of which it is a part
(except of course for the man's intentionality in manipulating
the symbols). The formal symbol manipulations go on, the
input and output are correctly matched, but the only real
locus of intentionality is the man, and he doesn't know any of
the relevant intentional states; he doesn't, for example, see
what comes into the robot's eyes, he doesn't intend to move
the robot's arm, and he doesn't understand any of the
remarks made to or by the robot. Nor, for the reasons stated
earlier, does the system of which man and robot are a
part.
To see this point, contrast this case with cases in which we
find it completely natural to ascribe intentionality to
members of certain other primate species such as apes and
monkeys and to domestic animals such as dogs. The reasons
we find it natural are, roughly, two: we can't make sense of
the animal's behavior without the ascription of intentionality,
and we can see that the beasts are made of similar stuff to
ourselves - that is an eye, that a nose, this is its skin, and so on.
Given the coherence of the animal's behavior and the
assumption of the same causal stuff underlying it, we assume
both that the animal must have mental states underlying its
behavior, and that the mental states must be produced by
mechanisms made out of the stuff that is like our stuff. We
would certainly make similar assumptions about the robot
unless we had some reason not to, but as soon as we knew that
the behavior was the result of a formal program, and that the
actual causal properties of the physical substance were
irrelevant we would abandon the assumption of intentional-
ity. [See "Cognition and Consciousness in Nonhuman
Species" BBS 1(4) 1978.]
There are two other responses to my example that come up
frequently (and so are worth discussing) but really miss the
point.
V. The other minds reply (Yale). "How do you know that
other people understand Chinese or anything else? Only by
their behavior. Now the computer can pass the behavioral
tests as well as they can (in principle), so if you are going to
attribute cognition to other people you must in principle also
attribute it to computers."
This objection really is only worth a short reply. The
problem in this discussion is not about how I know that other
people have cognitive states, but rather what it is that I am
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attributing to them when I attribute cognitive states to them.
The thrust of the argument is that it couldn't be just
computational processes and their output because the compu-
tational processes and their output can exist without the
cognitive state. It is no answer to this argument to feign
anesthesia. In "cognitive sciences" one presupposes the reality
and knowability of the mental in the same way that in
physical sciences one has to presuppose the reality and
knowability of physical objects.
VI. The many mansions reply (Berkeley). "Your whole
argument presupposes that AI is only about analogue and
digital computers. But that just happens to be the present
state of technology. Whatever these causal processes are that
you say are essential for intentionality (assuming you are
right), eventually we will be able to build devices that have
these causal processes, and that will be artificial intelligence.
So your arguments are in no way directed at the ability of
artificial intelligence to produce and explain cognition."
I really have no objection to this reply save to say that it in
effect trivializes the project of strong AI by redefining it as
whatever artificially produces and explains cognition. The
interest of the original claim made on behalf of artificial
intelligence is that it was a precise, well defined thesis: mental
processes are computational processes over formally defined
elements. I have been concerned to challenge that thesis. If
the claim is redefined so that it is no longer that thesis, my
objections no longer apply because there is no longer a
testable hypothesis for them to apply to.
Let us now return to the question I promised I would try to
answer: granted that in my original example I understand the
English and I do not understand the Chinese, and granted
therefore that the machine doesn't understand either English
or Chinese, still there must be something about me that makes
it the case that I understand English and a corresponding
something lacking in me that makes it the case that I fail to
understand Chinese. Now why couldn't we give those
somethings, whatever they are, to a machine?
I see no reason in principle why we couldn't give a machine
the capacity to understand English or Chinese, since in an
important sense our bodies with our brains are precisely such
machines. But I do see very strong arguments for saying that
we could not give such a thing to a machine where the
operation of the machine is defined solely in terms of
computational processes over formally defined elements; that
is, where the operation of the machine is defined as an
instantiation of a computer program. It is not because I am
the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to
understand English and have other forms of intentionality (I
am, I suppose, the instantiation of any number of computer
programs), but as far as we know it is because I am a certain
sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e. chemical and
physical) structure, and this structure, under certain condi-
tions, is causally capable of producing perception, action,
understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena.
And part of the point of the present argument is that only
something that had those causal powers could have that
intentionality. Perhaps other physical and chemical processes
could produce exactly these effects; perhaps, for example,
Martians also have intentionality but their brains are made of
different stuff. That is an empirical question, rather like the
question whether photosynthesis can be done by something
with a chemistry different from that of chlorophyll.
But the main point of the present argument is that no
purely formal model will ever be sufficient by itself for
intentionality because the formal properties are not by
themselves constitutive of intentionality, and they have by
themselves no causal powers except the power, when instan-
tiated, to produce the next stage of the formalism when the
machine is running. And any other causal properties that
particular realizations of the formal model have, are irrele-
vant to the formal model because we can always put the same
formal model in a different realization where those causal
properties are obviously absent. Even if, by some miracle,
Chinese speakers exactly realize Schank's program, we can
put the same program in English speakers, water pipes, or
computers, none of which understand Chinese, the program
notwithstanding.
What matters about brain operations is not the formal
shadow cast by the sequence of synapses but rather the actual
properties of the sequences. All the arguments for the strong
version of artificial intelligence that I have seen insist on
drawing an outline around the shadows cast by cognition and
then claiming that the shadows are the real thing.
By way of concluding I want to try to state some of the
general philosophical points implicit in the argument. For
clarity I will try to do it in a question and answer fashion, and
I begin with that old chestnut of a question:
"Could a machine think?"
The answer is, obviously, yes. We are precisely such
machines.
"Yes, but could an artifact, a man-made machine,
think?"
Assuming it is possible to produce artificially a machine
with a nervous system, neurons with axons and dendrites, and
all the rest of it, sufficiently like ours, again the answer to the
question seems to be obviously, yes. If you can exactly
duplicate the causes, you could duplicate the effects. And
indeed it might be possible to produce consciousness, inten-
tionality, and all the rest of it using some other sorts of
chemical principles than those that human beings use. It is, as
I said, an empirical question.
"OK, but could a digital computer think?"
If by "digital computer" we mean anything at all that has a
level of description where it can correctly be described as the
instantiation of a computer program, then again the answer
is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any
number of computer programs, and we can think.
"But could something think, understand, and so on solely in
virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program?
Could instantiating a program, the right program of course,
by itself be a sufficient condition of understanding?"
This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually
confused with one or more of the earlier questions, and the
answer to it is no.
"Why not?"
Because the formal symbol manipulations by themselves
don't have any intentionality; they are quite meaningless;
they aren't even symbol manipulations, since the symbols
don't symbolize anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have
only a syntax but no semantics. Such intentionality as
computers appear to have is solely in the minds of those who
program them and those who use them, those who send in the
input and those who interpret the output.
The aim of the Chinese room example was to try to show
this by showing that as soon as we put something into the
system that really does have intentionality (a man), and we
program him with the formal program, you can see that the
formal program carries no additional intentionality. It adds
nothing, for example, to a man's ability to understand
Chinese.
Precisely that feature of AI that seemed so appealing - the
distinction between the program and the realization - proves
fatal to the claim that simulation could be duplication. The
distinction between the program and its realization in the
hardware seems to be parallel to the distinction between the
level of mental operations and the level of brain operations.
And if we could describe the level of mental operations as a
formal program, then it seems we could describe what was
essential about the mind without doing either introspective
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psychology or neurophysiology of the brain. But the equation,
"mind is to brain as program is to hardware" breaks down at
several points, among them the following three:
First, the distinction between program and realization has
the consequence that the same program could have all sorts of
crazy realizations that had no form of intentionality. Weizen-
baum (1976, Ch. 2), for example, shows in detail how to
construct a computer using a roll of toilet paper and a pile of
small stones. Similarly, the Chinese story understanding
program can be programmed into a sequence of water pipes,
a set of wind machines, or a monolingual English speaker,
none of which thereby acquires an understanding of Chinese.
Stones, toilet paper, wind, and water pipes are the wrong kind
of stuff to have intentionality in the first place - only
something that has the same causal powers as brains can have
intentionality - and though the English speaker has the right
kind of stuff for intentionality you can easily see that he
doesn't get any extra intentionality by memorizing the
program, since memorizing it won't teach him Chinese.
Second, the program is purely formal, but the intentional
states are not in that way formal. They are defined in terms of
their content, not their form. The belief that it is raining, for
example, is not defined as a certain formal shape, but as a
certain mental content with conditions of satisfaction, a
direction of fit (see Searle 1979), and the like. Indeed the
belief as such hasn't even got a formal shape in this syntactic
sense, since one and the same belief can be given an indefinite
number of different syntactic expressions in different linguis-
tic systems.
Third, as I mentioned before, mental states and events are
literally a product of the operation of the brain, but the
program is not in that way a product of the computer.
"Well if programs are in no way constitutive of mental
processes, why have so many people believed the converse?
That at least needs some explanation."
I don't really know the answer to that one. The idea that
computer simulations could be the real thing ought to have
seemed suspicious in the first place because the computer isn't
confined to simulating mental operations, by any means. No
one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm fire
will burn the neighborhood down or that a computer
simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched. Why on
earth would anyone suppose that a computer simulation of
understanding actually understood anything? It is sometimes
said that it would be frightfully hard to get computers to feel
pain or fall in love, but love and pain are neither harder nor
easier than cognition or anything else. For simulation, all you
need is the right input and output and a program in the
middle that transforms the former into the latter. That is all
the computer has for anything it does. To confuse simulation
with duplication is the same mistake, whether it is pain, love,
cognition, fires, or rainstorms.
Still, there are several reasons why AI must have seemed -
and to many people perhaps still does seem - in some way to
reproduce and thereby explain mental phenomena, and I
believe we will not succeed in removing these illusions until
we have fully exposed the reasons that give rise to them.
First, and perhaps most important, is a confusion about the
notion of "information processing": many people in cognitive
science believe that the human brain, with its mind, does
something called "information processing, " and analogously
the computer with its program does information processing;
but fires and rainstorms, on the other hand, don't do
information processing at all. Thus, though the computer can
simulate the formal features of any process whatever, it
stands in a special relation to the mind and brain because
when the computer is properly programmed, ideally with the
same program as the brain, the information processing is
identical in the two cases, and this information processing is
really the essence of the mental. But the trouble with this
argument is that it rests on an ambiguity in the notion of
"information." In the sense in which people "process infor-
mation" when they reflect, say, on problems in arithmetic or
when they read and answer questions about stories, the
programmed computer does not do "information processing."
Rather, what it does is manipulate formal symbols. The fact
that the programmer and the interpreter of the computer
output use the symbols to stand for objects in the world is
totally beyond the scope of the computer. The computer, to
repeat, has a syntax but no semantics. Thus, if you type into
the computer "2 plus 2 equals?" it will type out "4." But it has
no idea that "4" means 4 or that it means anything at all. And
the point is not that it lacks some second-order information
about the interpretation of its first-order symbols, but rather
that its first-order symbols don't have any interpretations as
far as the computer is concerned. All the computer has is
more symbols. The introduction of the notion of "information
processing" therefore produces a dilemma: either we construe
the notion of "information processing" in such a way that it
implies intentionality as part of the process or we don't. If the
former, then the programmed computer does not do infor-
mation processing, it only manipulates formal symbols. If the
latter, then, though the computer does information process-
ing, it is only doing so in the sense in which adding machines,
typewriters, stomachs, thermostats, rainstorms, and hurri-
canes do information processing; namely, they have a level of
description at which we can describe them as taking infor-
mation in at one end, transforming it, and producing
information as output. But in this case it is up to outside
observers to interpret the input and output as information in
the ordinary sense. And no similarity is established between
the computer and the brain in terms of any similarity of
information processing.
Second, in much of AI there is a residual behaviorism or
operationalism. Since appropriately programmed computers
can have input-output patterns similar to those of human
beings, we are tempted to postulate mental states in the
computer similar to human mental states. But once we see
that it is both conceptually and empirically possible for a
system to have human capacities in some realm without
having any intentionality at all, we should be able to
overcome this impulse. My desk adding machine has calcu-
lating capacities, but no intentionality, and in this paper I
have tried to show that a system could have input and output
capabilities that duplicated those of a native Chinese speaker
and still not understand Chinese, regardless of how it was
programmed. The Turing test is typical of the tradition in
being unashamedly behavioristic and operationalistic, and I
believe that if AI workers totally repudiated behaviorism and
operationalism much of the confusion between simulation
and duplication would be eliminated.
Third, this residual operationalism is joined to a residual
form of dualism; indeed strong AI only makes sense given the
dualistic assumption that, where the mind is concerned, the
brain doesn't matter. In strong AI (and in functionalism, as
well) what matters are programs, and programs are indepen-
dent of their realization in machines; indeed, as far as AI is
concerned, the same program could be realized by an
electronic machine, a Cartesian mental substance, or a
Hegelian world spirit. The single most surprising discovery
that I have made in discussing these issues is that many AI
workers are quite shocked by my idea that actual human
mental phenomena might be dependent on actual physical-
chemical properties of actual human brains. But if you think
about it a minute you can see that I should not have been
surprised; for unless you accept some form of dualism, the
strong AI project hasn't got a chance. The project is to
reproduce and explain the mental by designing programs, but
unless the mind is not only conceptually but empirically
independent of the brain you couldn't carry out the project,
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3 423
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
for the program is completely independent of any realization.
Unless you believe that the mind is separable from the brain
both conceptually and empirically - dualism in a strong
form - you cannot hope to reproduce the mental by writing
and running programs since programs must be independent
of brains or any other particular forms of instantiation. If
mental operations consist in computational operations on
formal symbols, then it follows that they have no interesting
connection with the brain; the only connection would be that
the brain just happens to be one of the indefinitely many
types of machines capable of instantiating the program. This
form of dualism is not the traditional Cartesian variety that
claims there are two sorts of substances, but it is Cartesian in
the sense that it insists that what is specifically mental about
the mind has no intrinsic connection with the actual proper-
ties of the brain. This underlying dualism is masked from us
by the fact that AI literature contains frequent fulminations
against "dualism"; what the authors seem to be unaware of is
that their position presupposes a strong version of dualism.
"Could a machine think?" My own view is that only a
machine could think, and indeed only very special kinds of
machines, namely brains and machines that had the same
causal powers as brains. And that is the main reason strong AI
has had little to tell us about thinking, since it has nothing to
tell us about machines. By its own definition, it is about
programs, and programs are not machines. Whatever else
intentionality is, it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as
likely to be as causally dependent on the specific biochem-
istry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis, or any other
biological phenomena. No one would suppose that we could
produce milk and sugar by running a computer simulation of
the formal sequences in lactation and photosynthesis, but
where the mind is concerned many people are willing to
believe in such a miracle because of a deep and abiding
dualism: the mind they suppose is a matter of formal
processes and is independent of quite specific material causes
in the way that milk and sugar are not.
In defense of this dualism the hope is often expressed that
the brain is a digital computer (early computers, by the way,
were often called "electronic brains"). But that is no help. Of
course the brain is a digital computer. Since everything is a
digital computer, brains are too. The point is that the brain's
causal capacity to produce intentionality cannot consist in its
instantiating a computer program, since for any program you
like it is possible for something to instantiate that program
and still not have any mental states. Whatever it is that the
brain does to produce intentionality, it cannot consist in
instantiating a program since no program, by itself, is
sufficient for intentionality.
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NOTES
1. I am not, of course, saying that Schank himself is committed to
these claims.
2. Also, "understanding " implies both the possession of mental
(intentional) states and the truth (validity, success) of these states. For
the purposes of this discussion we are concerned only with the
possession of the states.
3. Intentionality is by definition that feature of certain mental
states by which they are directed at or about objects and states of
affairs in the world. Thus, beliefs, desires, and intentions are
intentional states; undirected forms of anxiety and depression are
not. For further discussion see Searle (1979c).
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Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols
Searle claims that the apparently commonsensical programs of the
Yale AI project really don't display meaningful understanding of text.
For him, the computer processing a story about a restaurant visit is just
a Chinese symbol manipulator blindly applying uncomprehended rules
to uncomprehended text. What is missing, Searle says, is the presence
of intentional states.
Searle is misguided in this criticism in at least two ways. First of all, it
is no trivial matter to write rules to transfrom the "Chinese symbols" of
a story text into the "Chinese symbols" of appropriate answers to
questions about the story. To dismiss this programming feat as mere
rule mongering is like downgrading a good piece of literature as
something that British Museum monkeys can eventually produce. The
programmer needs a very crisp understanding of the real work to write
the appropriate rules. Mediocre rules produce feeble-minded output,
and have to be rewritten. As rules are sharpened, the output gets more
and more convincing, so that the process of rule development is
convergent. This is a characteristic of the understanding of a content
area, not of blind exercise within it.
Ah, but Searle would say that such understanding is in the program-
mer and not in the computer. Well, yes, but what's the issue? Most
precisely, the understanding is in the programmer's rule set, which the
computer exercises. No one I know of (at Yale, at least) has claimed
autonomy for the computer. The computer is not even necessary to the
representational theory; it is just very, very convenient and very, very
vivid.
But just suppose that we wanted to claim that the computer itself
understood the story content. How could such a claim be defended,
given that the computer is merely crunching away on statements in
program code and producing other statements in program code which
(following translation) are applauded by outside observers as being
correct and perhaps even clever. What kind of understanding is that? It
is, I would assert, very much the kind of understanding that people
display in exposure to new content via language or other symbol
systems. When a child learns to add, what does he do except apply
rules? Where does "understanding" enter? Is it understanding that the
results of addition apply independent of content, so that m + n - p
means that if you have m things and you assemble them with n things,
then you'll have p things? But that's a rule, too. Is it understanding that
the units place can be translated into pennies, the tens place into
dimes, and the hundreds place into dollars, so that additions of
numbers are isomorphic with additions of money? But that's a rule
connecting rule systems. In general, it seems that as more and more
rules about a given content are incorporated, especially if they connect
with other content domains, we have a sense that understanding is
increasing. At what point does a person graduate from "merely"
manipulating rules to "really" understanding?
Educationists would love to know, and so would I, but I would be
willing to bet that by the Chinese symbol test, most of the people
reading this don't really understand the transcendental number e, or
economic inflation, or nuclear power plant safety, or how sailboats can
sail upwind. (Be honest with yourself!) Searle's agrument itself, sallying
forth as it does into a symbol-laden domain that is intrinsically difficult
to "understand," could well be seen as mere symbol manipulation. His
main rule is that if you see the Chinese symbols for "formal computa-
tional operations," then you output the Chinese symbols for "no
understanding at all."
Given the very commmon exercise in human affairs of linguistic
interchange in areas where it is not demonstrable that we know what
we are talking about, we might well be humble and give the computer
the benefit of the doubt when and if it performs as well as we do. If we
424 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
credit people with understanding by virtue of their apparently compe-
tent verbal performances, we might extend the same courtesy to the
machine. It is a conceit, not an insight, to give ourselves more credit for
a comparable performance.
But Searle airily dismisses this "other minds" argument, and still
insists that the computer lacks something essential. Chinese symbol
rules only go so far, and for him, if you don't have everything, you don't
have anything. I should think rather that if you don't have everything,
you don't have everything. But in any case, the missing ingredient for
Searle is his concept of intentionality. In his paper, he does not justify
why this is the key factor. It seems more obvious that what the
manipulator of Chinese symbols misses is extensional validity. Not to
know that the symbol for "menu" refers to that thing out in the world
that you can hold and fold and look at closely is to miss some real
understanding of what is meant by menu. I readily acknowledge the
importance of such sensorimotor knowledge. The understanding of
how a sailboat sails upwind gained through the feel of sail and rudder is
certainly valid, and is not the same as a verbal explanation.
Verbal-conceptual computer programs lacking sensorimotor con-
nection with the world may well miss things. Imagine the following piece
of a story: "John told Harry he couldn't find the book. Harry rolled his
eyes toward the ceiling." Present common sense inference models
can make various predictions about Harry's relation to the book and its
unfindability. Perhaps he loaned it to John, and therefore would be
upset that it seemed lost. But the unique and nondecomposable
meaning of eye rolling is hard for a model to capture except by a
clumsy, concrete dictionary entry. A human understander, on the other
hand, can imitate Harry's eye roll overtly or in imagination and
experience holistically the resigned frustration that Harry must feel. It is
important to explore the domain of examples like this.
But why instead is "intentionality" so important for Searle? If we
recite his litany, "hopes, fears, and desires," we don't get the point. A
computer or a human certainly need not have hopes or fears about the
customer in order to understand a story about a restaurant visit. And
inferential use of these concepts is well within the capabilities of
computer understanding models. Goal-based inferences, for example,
are a standard mechanism in programs of the Yale Al project. Rather,
the crucial state of "intentionality" for knowledge is the appreciation of
the conditions for its falsification. In what sense does the computer
realize that the assertion, "John read the menu" might or might not be
true, and that there are ways in the real world to find out?
Well, Searle has a point there, although I do not see it as the trump
card he thinks he is playing. The computer operates in a gullible
fashion: it takes every assertion to be true. There are thus certain
knowledge problems that have not been considered in artificial intelli-
gence programs for language understanding, for example, the ques-
tion of what to do when a belief about the world is contradicted by
data: should the belief be modified, or the data called into question?
These questions have been discussed by psychologists in the context
of human knowledge-handling proclivities, but the issues are beyond
present Al capability. We shall have to see what happens in this area.
The naivete of computers about the validity of what we tell them is
perhaps touching, but it would hardly seem to justify the total scorn
exhibited by Searle. There are many areas of knowledge within which
questions of falsifiability are quite secondary - the understanding of
literary fiction, for example. Searle has not made convincing his case
for the fundamental essentiality of intentionality in understanding. My
Chinese symbol processor, at any rate, is not about to output the
symbol for "surrender."
by Ned Block
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute ol Technology,
Cambridge, Mass. 02139
What intuitions about homunculi don't show
Searle's argument depends for its force on intuitions that certain
entities do not think. There are two simple objections to his argument
that are based on general considerations about what can be shown by
intuitions that something can't think.
First, we are willing, and rightly so, to accept counterintuitive
consequences of claims for which we have substantial evidence. It
once seemed intuitively absurd to assert that the earth was whirling
through space at breakneck speed, but in the face of the evidence for
the Copernican view, such an intuition should be (and eventually was)
rejected as irrelevant to the truth of the matter. More relevantly, a
grapefruit-sized head-enclosed blob of gray protoplasm seems, at
least at first blush, a most implausible seat of mentality. But if your
intuitions still balk at brains as seats of mentality, you should ignore
your intuitions as irrelevant to the truth of the matter, given the
remarkable evidence for the role of the brain in our mental life. Searle
presents some alleged counterintuitive consequences of the view of
cognition as formal symbol manipulation. But his argument does not
even have the right form, for in order to know whether we should reject
the doctrine because of its alleged counterintuitive consequences, we
must know what sort of evidence there is in favor of the doctrine. If the
evidence for the doctrine is overwhelming, then incompatible intuitions
should be ignored, just as should intuitions that the brain couldn't be
the seat of mentality. So Searle's argument has a missing premise to
the effect that the evidence isn't sufficient to overrule the intuitions.
Well, is such a missing premise true?I think that anyone who takes a
good undergraduate cognitive psychology course would see enough
evidence to justify tentatively disregarding intuitions of the sort that
Searle appeals to. Many theories in the tradition of thinking as formal
symbol manipulation have a moderate (though admittedly not over-
whelming) degree of empirical support.
A second point against Searle has to do with another aspect of the
logic of appeals to intuition. At best, intuition reveals facts about our
concepts (at worst, facts about a motley of factors such as our
prejudices, ignorance, and, still worse, our lack of imagination - as
when people accepted the deliverance of intuition that two straight
lines cannot cross twice). So even if we were to accept Searle's appeal
to intuitions as showing that homunculus heads that formally manipu-
late symbols do not think, what this would show is that our formal
symbol-manipulation theories do not provide a sufficient condition for
the application of our ordinary intentional concepts. The more interest-
ing issue, however, is whether the homunculus head's formal symbol
manipulation falls in the same scientific natural kind (see Putnam
1975a) as our intentional processes. If so, then the homunculus head
does think in a reasonable scientific sense of the term - and so much
the worse for the ordinary concept. Moreover, if we are very
concerned with ordinary intentional concepts, we can give sufficient
conditions for their application by building in ad hoc conditions
designed to rule out the putative counterexamples. A first stab (inade-
quate, but improvable - see Putnam 1975b, p. 435; Block 1978, p.
292) would be to add the condition that in order to think, realizations of
the symbol-manipulating system must not have operations mediated by
entities that themselves have symbol manipulation typical of intentional
systems. The ad hocness of such a condition is not an objection to it,
given that what we are trying to do is "reconstruct" an everyday
concept out of a scientific one; we can expect the everyday concept to
be scientifically characterizable only in an unnatural way. (See Fodor's
commentary on Searle, this issue.) Finally, there is good reason for
thinking that the Putnam-Kripke account of the semantics of "thought"
and other intentional terms is correct. If so, and if the formal symbol
manipulation of the homunculus head falls in the same natural kind as
our cognitive processes, then the homunculus head does think, in the
ordinary sense as well as in the scientific sense of the term.
The upshot of both these points is that the real crux of the debate
rests on a matter that Searle does not so much as mention: what the
evidence is for the formal symbol-manipulation point of view.
Recall that Searle's target is the doctrine that cognition is formal
symbol manipulation, that is, manipulation of representations by mech-
anisms that take account only of the forms (shapes) of the representa-
tions. Formal symbol-manipulation theories of cognition postulate a
variety of mechanisms that generate, transform, and compare repre-
sentations. Once one sees this doctrine as Searle's real target, one
can simply ignore his objections to Schank. The idea that a machine
programmed a la Schank has anything akin to mentality is not worth
taking seriously, and casts as much doubt on the symbol-manipulation
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theory of thought as Hitler casts on doctrine favoring a strong
executive branch of government. Any plausibility attaching to the idea
that a Schank machine thinks would seem to derive from a crude
Turing test version of behaviorism that is anathema to most who view
cognition as formal symbol manipulation.1
Consider a robot akin to the one sketched in Searle's reply II
(omitting features that have to do with his criticism of Schank). It
simulates your input-output behavior by using a formal symbol-manipu-
lation theory of the sort just sketched of your cognitive processes
(together with a theory of your noncognitive mental processes, a
qualification omitted from now on). Its body is like yours except that
instead of a brain it has a computer equipped with a cognitive theory
true of you. You receive an input: "Who is your favorite philosopher?"
You cogitate a bit and reply "Heraclitus." If your robot doppelganger
receives the same input, a mechansim converts the input into a
description of the input. The computer uses its description of your
cognitive mechanisms to deduce a description of the product of your
cogitation. This description is then transmitted to a device that trans-
forms the description into the noise "Heraclitus."
While the robot just described behaves just as you would given any
input, it is not obvious that it has any mental states. You cogitate in
response to the question, but what goes on in the robot is manipulation
of descriptions of your cogitation so as to produce the same response.
It isn't obvious that the manipulation of descriptions of cogitation in this
way is itself cogitation.
My intuitions agree with Searle about this kind of case (see Block,
forthcoming), but I have encountered little agreement on the matter. In
the absence of widely shared intuition, I ask the reader to pretend to
have Searle's and my intuition on this question. Now I ask another
favor, one that should be firmly distinguished from the first: take the
leap from intuition to fact (a leap that, as I argued in the first four
paragraphs of this commentary, Searle gives us no reason to take).
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the robot described above
does not in fact have intentional states.
What I want to point out is that even if we grant Searle all this, the
doctrine that cognition is formal symbol manipulation remains utterly
unscathed. For it is no part of the symbol-manipulation view of
cognition that the kind of manipulation attributed to descriptions of our
symbol-manipulating cognitive processes is itself a cognitive process.
Those who believe formal symbol-manipulation theories of intentional-
ity must assign intentionality to anything of which the theories are true,
but the theories cannot be expected to be true of devices that use
them to mimic beings of which they are true.
Thus far, I have pointed out that intuitions that Searle's sort of
homunculus head does not think do not challenge the doctrine that
thinking is formal symbol manipulation. But a variant of Searle's
example, similar to his in its intuitive force, but that avoids the criticism I
just sketched, can be described.
Recall that it is the aim of cognitive psychology to decompose
mental processes into combinations of processes in which mecha-
nisms generate representations, other mechanisms transform repre-
sentations, and still other mechanisms compare representations, issu-
ing reports to still other mechanisms, the whole network being appro-
priately connected to sensory input transducers and motor output
devices. The goal of such theorizing is to decompose these processes
to the point at which the mechanisms that carry out the operations
have no internal goings on that are themselves decomposable into
symbol manipulation by still further mechanisms. Such ultimate mecha-
nisms are described as "primitive," and are often pictured in flow
diagrams as "black boxes" whose realization is a matter of "hard-
ware" and whose operation is to be explained by the physical
sciences, not psychology. (See Fodor 1968; 1980; Dennet 1975)
Now consider an ideally completed theory along these lines, a
theory of your cognitive mechanisms. Imagine a robot whose body is
like yours, but whose head contains an army of homunculi, one for
each black box. Each homunculus does the symbol-manipulating job of
the black box he replaces, transmitting his "output" to other homunculi
by telephone in accordance with the cognitive theory. This homunculi
head is just a variant of one that Searle uses, and it completely avoids
the criticism I sketched above, because the cognitive theory it imple-
ments is actually true of it. Call this robot the cognitive homunculi head.
(The cognitive homunculi head is discussed in more detail in Block
1978, pp. 305-10.) I shall argue that even if you have the intuition that
the cognitive homunculi head has no intentionality, you should not
regard this intuition as casting doubt on the truth of symbol-manipula-
tion theories of thought.
One line of argument against the cognitive homunculi head is that its
persuasive power may be due to a "not seeing the forest for the trees"
illusion (see Lycan's commentary, this issue, and Lycan, forthcoming).
Another point is that brute untutored intuition tends to balk at assigning
intentionality to any physical system, including Searle's beloved brains.
Does Searle really think that it is an initially congenial idea that a hunk
of gray jelly is the seat of his intentionality? (Could one imagine a less
likely candidate?) What makes gray jelly so intuitively satisfying to
Searle is obviously his knowledge that brains are the seat of our
intentionality. But here we see the difficulty in relying on considered
intuitions, namely that they depend on our beliefs, and among the
beliefs most likely to play a role in the case at hand are precisely our
doctrines about whether the formal symbol-manipulation theory of
thinking is true or false.
Let me illustrate this and another point via another example (Block
1978, p. 291). Suppose there is a part of the universe that contains
matter that is infinitely divisible. In that part of the universe, there are
intelligent creatures much smaller than our elementary particles who
decide to devote the next few hundred years to creating out of their
matter substances with the chemical and physical characteristics
(except at the subelementary particle level) of our elements. The build
hordes of space ships of different varieties about the sizes of our
electrons, protons, and other elementary particles, and fly the ships in
such a way as to mimic the behavior of these elementary particles. The
ships contain apparatus to produce and detect the type of radiation
elementary particles give off. They do this to produce huge (by our
standards) masses of substances with the chemical and physical
characteristics of oxygen, carbon, and other elements. You go off on
an expedition to that part of the universe, and discover the "oxygen"
and "carbon." Unaware of its real nature, you set up a colony, using
these "elements" to grow plants for food, provide "air" to breathe,
and so on. Since one's molecules are constantly being exchanged with
the environment, you and other colonizers come to be composed
mainly of the "matter" made of the tiny people in space ships.
If any intuitions about homunculi heads are clear, it is clear that
coming to be made of the homunculi-infested matter would not affect
your mentality. Thus we see that intuition need not balk at assigning
intentionality to a being whose intentionality owes crucially to the
actions of internal homunculi. Why is it so obvious that coming to be
made of homunculi-infested matter would not affect our sapience or
sentience? I submit that it is because we have all absorbed enough
neurophysiology to know that changes in particles in the brain that do
not affect the brain's basic (electrochemical) mechanisms do not
affect mentality.
Our intuitions about the mentality of homunculi heads are obviously
influenced (if not determined) by what we believe. If so, then the burden
of proof lies with Searle to show that the intuition that the cognitive
homunculi head has no intentionality (an intuition that I and many others
do not share) is not due to doctrine hostile to the symbol-manipulation
account of intentionality.
In sum, an argument such as Searle's requires a careful examination
of the source of the intuition that the argument depends on, an
examination Searle does not begin.
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1. While the crude version of behaviorism is refuted by well-known arguments,
there is a more sophisticated version that avoids them; however, it can be refuted
using an example akin to the one Searle uses against Schank. Such an example is
sketched in Block 1978, p. 294, and elaborated in Block, forthcoming
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by Bruce Bridgeman
Psychology Board of Studies. University of California. Santa Crux, Calif. 95064
Brains + programs - minds
There are two sides to this commentary, the first that machines can
embody somewhat more than Searle imagines, and the other that
humans embody somewhat less. My conclusion will be that the two
systems can in principle achieve similar levels of function.
My response to Searle's Gedankenexperiment is a variant of the
"robot reply": the robot simply needs more information, both environ-
mental and a priori, than Searle is willing to give to it. The robot can
internalize meaning only if it can receive information relevant to a
definition of meaning, that is, information with a known relationship to
the outside world. First it needs some Kantian innate ideas, such as the
fact that some input lines (for instance, inputs from the two eyes or
from locations in the same eye) are topographically related to one
another. In biological brains this is done with labeled lines. Some of the
inputs, such as visual inputs, will be connected primarily with spatial
processing programs while others such as auditory ones will be more
closely related to temporal processing. Further, the system will be built
to avoid some input strings (those representing pain, for example) and
to seek others (water when thirsty). These properties and many more
are built into the structure of human brains genetically, but can be built
into a program as a data base just as well. It may be that the
homunculus represented in this program would not know what's going
on, but it would soon learn, becuase it has all of the information
necessary to construct a representation of events in the outside
world.
My super robot would learn about the number five, for instance, in
the same way that a child does, by interaction with the outside world
where the occurrence of the string of symbols representing "five" in its
visual or auditory inputs corresponds with the more direct experience
of five of something. The fact that numbers can be coded in the
computer in more economical ways is no more relevant than the fact
that the number five is coded in the digits of a child's hand. Both a priori
knowledge and environmental knowledge could be made similar in
quantity and quality to that available to a human.
Now I will try to show that human intentionality is not as qualitatively
different from machine states as it might seem to an introspectionist.
The brain is similar to a computer program in that it too receives only
strings of input and produces only strings of output. The inputs are
small O.1-volt signals entering in great profusion along afferent nerves,
and the outputs are physically identical signals leaving the central
nervous system on efferent nerves. The brain is deaf, dumb, and blind,
so that the electrical signals (and a few hormonal messages which
need not concern us here) are the only ways that the brain has of
knowing about its world or acting upon it.
The exception to this rule is the existing information stored in the
brain, both that given in genetic development and that added by
experience. But it too came without intentionality of the sort that Searle
seems to require, the genetic information being received from long
strings of DNA base sequences (clearly there is no intentionality here),
and previous inputs being made up of the same streams of 0.1-volt
signals that constitute the present input. Now it is clear that no neuron
receiving any of these signals or similar signals generated inside the
brain has any idea of what is going on. The neuron is only a humble
machine which receives inputs and generates outputs as a function of
the temporal and spatial relations of the inputs, and its own structural
properties. To assert any further properties of brains is the worst sort
of dualism.
Searle grants that humans have intentionality, and toward the end of
his article he also admits that many animals might have intentionality
also. But how far down the phylogenetic scale is he willing to go [see
"Cognition and Consciousness in Nonhuman Species" BBS 1(4)
19781? Does a single-celled animal have intentionality? Clearly not, for
it is only a simple machine which receives physically identifiable inputs
and "automatically" generates reflex outputs. The hydra with a few
dozen neurons might be explained in the same way, a simple nerve
network with inputs and outputs that are restricted, relatively easy to
understand, and processed according to fixed patterns. Now what
about the mollusc with a few hundred neurons, the insect with a few
thousand, the amphibian with a few million, or the mammal with
billions? To make his argument convincing, Searle needs a criterion for
a dividing line in his implicit dualism.
We are left with a human brain that has an intention-free, genetically
determined structure, on which are superimposed the results of storms
of tiny nerve signals. From this we somehow introspect an intentionality
that cannot be assigned to machines. Searle uses the example of
arithmetic manipulations to show how humans "understand" some-
thing that machines don't. I submit that neither humans nor machines
understand numbers in the sense Searle intends. The understanding of
numbers greater than about five is always an illusion, for humans can
deal with larger numbers only by using memorized tricks rather than
true understanding. If I want to add 27 and 54, I don't use some direct
numerical understanding or even a spatial or electrical analogue in my
brain. Instead, I apply rules that I memorized in elementary school
without really knowing what they meant, and combine these rules with
memorized facts of addition of one-digit numbers to arrive at an
answer without understanding the numbers themselves. Though I have
the feeling that I am performing operations on numbers, in terms of the
algorithms I use there is nothing numerical about it. In the same way I
can add numbers in the billions, although neither I nor anyone else has
any concept of what these numbers mean in terms of perceptually
meaningful quantities. Any further understanding of the number system
that I possess is irrelevant, for it is not used in performing simple
computations.
The illusion of having a consciousness of numbers is similar to the
illusion of having a full-color, well focused visual field; such a concept
exists in our consciousness, but the physiological reality falls far short
of the introspection. High-quality color information is available only in
about the central thirty degrees of the visual field, and the best spatial
information in only one or two degrees. I suggest that the feeling of
intentionality is a cognitive illusion similar to the feeling of the high-
quality visual image. Consciousness is a neurological system like any
other, with functions such as the long-term direction of behavior
(intentionality?), access to long-term memories, and several other
characteristics that make it a powerful, though limited-capacity,
processor of biologically useful information.
All of Searle's replies to his Gedankenexperiment are variations on
the theme that I have described here, that an adequately designed
machine could include intentionality as an emergent quality even
though individual parts (transistors, neurons, or whatever) have none.
All of the replies have an element of truth, and their shortcomings are
more in their failure to communicate the similarity of brains and
machines to Searle than in any internal weaknesses. Perhaps the most
important difference between brains and machines lies not in their
instantiation but in their history, for humans have evolved to perform a
variety of poorly understood functions including reproduction and
survival in a complex social and ecological context. Programs, being
designed without extensive evolution, have more restricted goals and
motivations.
Searle's accusation of dualism in Al falls wide of the mark because
the mechanist does not insist on a particular mechanism in the
organism, but only that "mental" processes be represented in a
physical system when the system is functioning. A program lying on a
tape spool in a corner is no more conscious than a brain preserved in a
glass jar, and insisting that the program if read into an appropriate
computer would function with intentionality asserts only that the
adequate machine consists of an organization imposed on a physical
substrate. The organization is no more mentalisitc than the substrate
itself. Artificial intelligence is about programs rather than machines only
becuase the process of organizing information and inputs and outputs
into an information system has been largely solved by digital
computers. Therefore, the program is the only step in the process left
to worry about.
Searle may well be right that present programs (as in Schank &
Abelson 1977) do not instantiate intentionality according to his defini-
tion. The issue is not whether present programs do this but whether it is
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3 427
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
possible in principle to build machines that make plans and achieve
goals. Searle has given us no evidence that this is not possible.
by Arthur C. Danto
Department of Philosophy. Columbia University. New York, N. Y. 10027
The use and mention of terms and the
simulation of linguistic understanding
In the ballet Coppelia, a dancer mimics a clockwork dancing doll
simulating a dancer. The imitating movements, dancing twice removed,
are predictably "mechanical," given the discrepancies of outward
resemblance between clockwork dancers and real ones. These
discrepancies may diminish to zero with the technological progress of
clockwork, until a dancer mimicking a clockwork dancer simulating a
dancer may present a spectacle of three indiscernible dancers
engaged in a pas de trois. By behavioral criteria, nothing would enable
us to identify which is the doll, and the lingering question of whether the
clockwork doll is really dancing or only seeming to seems merely
verbal - unless we adopt a criterion of meaning much favored by
behaviorism that makes the question itself nonsensical.
The question of whether machines instantiate mental predicates has
been cast in much the same terms since Turing, and by tacit appeal to
outward indiscernibility the question of whether machines understand is
either dissolved or trivialized. It is in part a protest against assimilating
the meaning of mental predicates to mere behavioral criteria - an
assimilation of which Abelson and Schank are clearly guilty, making
them behaviorists despite themselves - that animates Searle's effort to
mimic a clockwork thinker simulating understanding; to the degree that
he instantiates the same program it does and fails to understand what
is understood by those whom the machine is designed to simulate -
even if the output of the three of them cannot be discriminated - then
the machine itself fails to understand. The argumentation is pictur-
esque, and may not be compelling for those resolved to define (such
terms as) "understanding" by outward criteria. So I shall recast
Searle's thesis in logical terms which must force his opponents either
to concede machines do not understand or else, in order to maintain
they might understand, to abandon the essentially behaviorist theory of
meaning for mental predicates.
Consider, as does Searle, a language one does not understand but
that one can in a limited sense be said to read. Thus I cannot read
Greek with understanding, but I know the Greek letters and their
associated phonetic values, and am able to pronounce Greek words.
Milton's daughters were able to read aloud to their blind father from
Greek, Latin, and Hebrew texts though they had no idea what they
were saying. And they could, as can I, answer certain questions about
Greek words, if only how many letters there are, what their names are,
and how they sound when voiced. Briefly, in terms of the distinction
logicians draw between the use and mention of a term, they knew, as I
know, such properties of Greek words as may be identified by
someone who is unable to use Greek words in Greek sentences. Let us
designate these as M-properties, in contrast to U-properties, the latter
being those properties one must know in order to use Greek (or any)
words. The question then is whether a machine programmed to
simulate understanding is restricted to M-properties, that is, whether
the program is such that the machine cannot use the words it
otherwise may be said to manipulate under M-rules and M-laws. If so,
the machine exercises its powers over what we can recognize in the
words of a language we do not understand, without, as it were, thinking
in that language. There is some evidence that in fact the machine
operates pretty much by pattern recognition, much in the manner of
Milton's unhappy daughters.
Now I shall suppose it granted that we cannot define the U-
properties of words exhaustively through their M-properties. If this is
true, Schank's machines, restricted to M-properties, cannot think in the
languages they simulate thinking in. One can ask whether it is possible
for the machines to exhibit the output they do exhibit if all they have is
M-competence. If not, then they must have some sort of U-
competence. But the difficulty with putting the question thus is that
there are two ways in which the output can be appreciated: as showing
understanding or as only seeming to, and as such the structure of the
problem is of a piece with the structure of the mind-body problem in the
following respect. Whatever outward behavior, even of a human being,
we would want to describe with a psychological (or mental) predicate -
say that the action of raising an arm was performed - has a physical
description that is true whether or not the psychological description is
true - for example, that the arm went up. The physical description then
underdetermines the distinction between bodily movements and
actions, or between actions and bodily movements that exactly resem-
ble them. So whatever outward behavior takes a (psychological)
^-predicate takes a (physical) ^-predicate that underdetermines
whether the former is true or false of what the latter is true of. So we
cannot infer from a ^-description whether or not a ^-description
applies. To be sure, we can ruthlessly define *-terms as 4>-terms, in
which case the inference is easy but trivial, but then we cannot any
longer, as Schank and Abelson wish to do, explain outward behavior
with such concepts as understanding. In any case, the distinction
between M-properties and U-properties is exactly parallel: anything by
way of output we would be prepared to describe in U-terms has an
M-description true of it, which underdetermines whether the U-descrip-
tion is true or not.
So no pattern of outputs entails that language is being used, nor
hence that the source of the output understands, inasmuch as it may
have been cleverly designed to emit a pattern exhaustively describable
in M-terms. The problem is perfectly Cartesian. We may worry about
whether any of our fellows is an automaton. The question is whether
the Schank machine (SAM) is so programmed that only M-properties
apply to its output. Then, however closely (exactly) it simulates what
someone with understanding would show in his behavior, not one step
has been taken toward constructing a machine that understands. And
Searle is really right. For while U-competence cannot be defined in
M-terms, an M-specified simulation can be given of any U-perfor-
mance, however protracted and intricate. The simulator will only show,
not have, the properties of the U-performance. The performances may
be indiscriminable, but one constitutes a use of language only if that
which emits it in fact uses language. But it cannot be said, to use
language if its program, as it were, is written solely in M-terms.
The principles on the basis of which a user of language structures a
story or text are so different from the principles on the basis of which
one could predict, from certain M-properties, what further M-properties
to expect, that even if the outputs are indiscernible, the principles must
be discernible. And to just the degree that they deviate does a
program employing the latter sorts of principles fail to simulate the
principles employed in understanding stories or texts. The degree of
deviation determines the degree to which the strong claims of Al are
false. This is all the more the case if the M-principles are not to be
augmented with U-principles.
Any of us can predict what sounds a person may make when he
answers certain questions that he understands, but that is because we
understand where he is going. If we had to develop the ability to predict
sounds only on the basis of other sounds, we might attain an
astounding congruence with what our performance would have been if
we knew what was going on. Even if no one could tell we didn't,
understanding would be nil. On the other hand, the question remains as
to whether the Schank machine uses words. If it does, Searle has failed
as a simulator of something that does not simulate but genuinely
possesses understanding. If he is right, there is a pretty consequence.
M-properties yield, as it were, pictures of words: and machines, if they
encode propositions, do so pictorially.
by Daniel Dennett
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif. 94305
The milk of human intentionality
I want to distinguish Searle's arguments, which I consider sophistry,
from his positive view, which raises a useful challenge to Al, if only
becuase it should induce a more thoughtful formulation of Al's founda-
tions. First, I must support the charge of sophistry by diagnosing,
briefly, the tricks with mirrors that give his case a certain spurious
plausibility. Then I will comment briefly on his positive view.
Searle's form of argument is a familiar one to philosophers: he has
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constructed what one might call an intuition pump, a device for
provoking a family of intuitions by producing variations on a basic
thought experiment. An intuition pump is not, typically, an engine of
discovery, but a persuader or pedagogical tool - a way of getting
people to see things your way once you've seen the truth, as Searle
thinks he has. I would be the last to disparage the use of intuition
pumps - I love to use them myself - but they can be abused. In this
instance I think Searle relies almost entirely on ill-gotton gains: favor-
able intuitions generated by misleadingly presented thought experi-
ments.
Searle begins with a Schank-style Al task, where both the input and
output are linguistic objects, sentences of Chinese. In one regard,
perhaps, this is fair play, since Schank and others have certainly
allowed enthusiastic claims of understanding for such programs to
pass their lips, or go uncorrected; but from another point of view it is a
cheap shot, since it has long been a familiar theme within Al circles that
such programs - I call them bedridden programs since their only
modes of perception and action are linguistic - tackle at best a severe
truncation of the interesting task of modeling real understanding. Such
programs exhibit no "language-entry" and "language-exit" transitions,
to use Wilfrid Sellars's terms, and have no capacity for non linguistic
perception or bodily action. The shortcomings of such models have
been widely recognized for years in Al; for instance, the recognition
was implicit in Winograd's decision to give SHRDLU something to do in
order to have something to talk about. "A computer whose only input
and output was verbal would always be blind to the meaning of what
was written" (Dennett 1969, p. 182). The idea has been around for a
long time. So, many if not all supporters of strong Al would simply
agree with Searle that in his initial version of the Chinese room, no one
and nothing could be said to understand Chinese, except perhaps in
some very strained, elliptical, and attenuated sense. Hence what
Searle calls "the robot reply (Yale)" is no surprise, though its coming
from Yale suggests that even Schank and his school are now attuned
to this point.
Searle's response to the robot reply is to revise his thought
experiment, claiming it will make no difference. Let our hero in the
Chinese room also (unbeknownst to him) control the nonlinguistic
actions of, and receive the perceptual informings of, a robot. Still
(Searle asks you to consult your intuitions at this point) no one and
nothing will really understand Chinese. But Searle does not dwell on
how vast a difference this modification makes to what we are being
asked to imagine.
Nor does Searle stop to provide vivid detail when he again revises
his thought experiment to meet the "systems reply." The systems reply
suggests, entirely correctly in my opinion, that Searle has confused
different levels of explanation (and attribution). / understand English;
my brain doesn't - nor, more particularly, does the proper part of it (if
such can be isolated) that operates to "process" incoming sentences
and to execute my speech act intentions. Searle's portrayal and
discussion of the systems reply is not sympathetic, but he is prepared
to give ground in any case; his proposal is that we may again modify
his Chinese room example, if we wish, to accommodate the objection.
We are to imagine our hero in the Chinese room to "internalize all of
these elements of the system" so that he "incorporates the entire
system." Our hero is now no longer an uncomprehending sub-personal
part of a supersystem to which understanding of Chinese might be
properly attributed, since there is no part of the supersystem external
to his skin. Still Searle insists (in another plea for our intuitional support)
that no one - not our hero or any other person he may in some
metaphysical sense now be a part of - can be said to understand
Chinese.
But will our intuitions support Searle when we imagine this case in
detail? Putting both modifications together, we are to imagine our hero
controlling both the linguisitc and nonlinguistic behavior of a robot who
is - himslef! When the Chinese words for "Hands up! This is a stickup!"
are intoned directly in his ear, he will uncomprehendingly (and at
breathtaking speed) hand simulate the program, which leads him to do
things (what things - is he to order himself in Chinese to stimulate his
own motor neurons and then obey the order?) that lead to his handing
over his own wallet while begging for mercy, in Chinese, with his own
lips. Now is it at all obvious that, imagined this way, no one in the
situation understands Chinese? In point of fact, Searle has simply not
told us how he intends us to imagine this case, which we are licensed
to do by his two modifications. Are we to suppose that if the words had
been in English, our hero would have responded (appropriately) in his
native English? Or is he so engrossed in his massive homuncular task
that he responds with the (simulated) incomprehension that would be
the program-driven response to this bit of incomprehensible ("to the
robot") input? If the latter, our hero has taken leave of his English-
speaking friends for good, drowned in the engine room of a Chinese-
speaking "person" inhabiting his body. If the former, the situation is
drastically in need of further description by Searle, for just what he is
imagining is far from clear. There are several radically different
alternatives - all so outlandishly unrealizable as to caution us not to
trust our gut reactions about them in any case. When we imagine our
hero "incorporating the entire system" are we to imagine that he
pushes buttons with his fingers in order to get his own arms to move?
Surely not, since all the buttons are now internal. Are we to imagine that
when he responds to the Chinese for "pass the salt, please" by getting
his hand to grasp the salt and move it in a certain direction, he doesn't
notice that this is what he is doing? In short, could anyone who became
accomplished in this imagined exercise fail to become fluent in Chinese
in the process? Perhaps, but it all depends on details of this, the only
crucial thought experiment in Searle's kit, that Searle does not
provide.
Searle tells us that when he first presented versions of this paper to
Al audiences, objections were raised that he was prepared to meet, in
part, by modifying his thought experiment. Why then did he not present
us, his subsequent audience, with the modified thought experiment in
the first place, instead of first leading us on a tour of red herrings?
Could it be because it is impossible to tell the doubly modified story in
anything approaching a cogent and detailed manner without provoking
the unwanted intuitions? Told in detail, the doubly modified story
suggests either that there are two people, one of whom understands
Chinese, inhabiting one body, or that one English-speaking person
has, in effect, been engulfed within another person, a person who
understands Chinese (among many other things).
These and other similar considerations convince me that we may
turn our backs on the Chinese room at least until a better version is
deployed. In its current state of disrepair I can get it to pump my
contrary intuitions at least as plentifully as Searle's. What, though, of
his positive view? In the conclusion of his paper, Searle observes: "No
one would suppose that we could produce milk and sugar by running a
computer simulation of the formal sequences in lactation and photo-
synthesis, but where the mind is concerned many people are willing to
believe in such a miracle." I don't think this is just a curious illustration
of Searle's vision; I think it vividly expresses the feature that most
radically distinguishes his view from the prevailing winds of doctrine.
For Searle, intentionality is rather like a wonderful substance secreted
by the brain the way the pancreas secretes insulin. Brains produce
intentionality, he says, whereas other objects, such as computer
programs, do not, even if they happen to be designed to mimic the
input-output behavior of (some) brain. There is, then, a major disagree-
ment about what the product of the brain is. Most people in Al (and
most functionalists in the philosophy of mind) would say that its product
is something like control: what a brain is for is for governing the right,
appropriate, intelligent input-output relations, where these are deemed
to be, in the end, relations between sensory inputs and behavioral
outputs of some sort. That looks to Searle like some sort of behavior-
ism, and he will have none of it. Passing the Turing test may be prima
facie evidence that something has intentionality - really has a mind -
but "as soon as we knew that the behavior was the result of a formal
program, and that the actual causal properties of the physical
substance were irrelevant we would abandon the assumption of
intentionality."
So on Searle's view the "right" input-output relations are symptom-
atic but not conclusive or criterial evidence of intentionality; the proof of
the pudding is in the presence of some (entirely unspecified) causal
properties that are internal'to the operation of the brain. This internality
needs highlighting. When Searle speaks of causal properties one may
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think at first that those causal properties crucial for intentionality are
those that link the activities of the system (brain or computer) to the
things in the world with which the system interacts - including,
preeminently, the active, sentient body whose behavior the system
controls. But Searle insists that these are not the relevant causal
properties. He concedes the possibility in principle of duplicating the
input-output competence of a human brain with a "formal program,"
which (suitably attached) would guide a body through the world exactly
as that body's brain would, and thus would acquire all the relevant
extra systemic causal properties of the brain. But such a brain
substitute would utterly fail to produce intentionality in the process,
Searle holds, becuase it would lack some other causal properties of
the brain's internal operation.'
How, though, would we know that it lacked these properties, if all we
knew was that it was (an implementation of) a formal program? Since
Searle concedes that the operation of anything - and hence a human
brain - can be described in terms of the execution of a formal
program, the mere existence of such a level of description of a system
would not preclude its having intentionality. It seems that it is only when
we can see that the system in question is only the implementation of a
formal program that we can conclude that it doesn't make a little
intentionality on the side. But nothing could be only the implementation
of a formal program; computers exude heat and noise in the course of
their operations - why not intentionality too?
Besides, which is the major product and which the byproduct?
Searle can hardly deny that brains do in fact produce lots of reliable
and appropriate bodily control. They do this, he thinks, by producing
intentionality, but he concedes that something - such as a computer
with the right input-output rules - could produce the control without
making or using any intentionality. But then control is the main product
and intentionality just one (no doubt natural) means of obtaining it. Had
our ancestors been nonintentional mutants with mere control systems,
nature would just as readily have selected them instead. (I owe this
point to Bob Moore.) Or, to look at the other side of the coin, brains
with lots of intentionality but no control competence would be produc-
ers of an ecologically irrelevant product, which evolution would not
protect. Luckily for us, though, our brains make intentionality; if they
didn't, we'd behave just as we now do, but of course we wouldn't
mean it!
Surely Searle does not hold the view I have just ridiculed, although it
seems as if he does. He can't really view intentionality as a marvelous
mental fluid, so what is he trying to get at? I think his concern with
internal properties of control systems is a misconceived attempt to
capture the interior point of view of a conscious agent. He does not
see how any mere computer, chopping away at a formal program,
could harbor such a point of view. But that is because he is looking too
deep. It is just as mysterious if we peer into the synapse-filled jungles of
the brain and wonder where consciousness is hiding. It is not at that
level of description that a proper subject of consciousness will be
found. That is the systems reply, which Searle does not yet see to be a
step in the right direction away from his updated version of elan vital.
Note
1. For an intuition pump involving exactly this case - a prosthetic brain - but
designed to pump contrary intuitions, see "Where Am I?" in Dennett (1978).
by John C. Eccles
Ca a la Gra, Contra (Locarno) CH-6611, Switzerland
A dualist-interactionist perspective
Searle clearly states that the basis of his critical evaluation of Al is
dependent on two propositions. The first is: "Intentionality in human
beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain." He
supports this proposition by an unargued statement that it "is an
empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental
processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are
sufficient for intentionality" (my italics).
This is a dogma of the psychoneural identity theory, which is one
variety of the materialist theories of the mind. There is no mention of
the alternative hypothesis of dualist interactionism that Popper and I
published some time ago (1977) and that I have further developed
more recently (Eccles 1978; 1979). According to that hypothesis
intentionality is a property of the self-conscious mind (World 2 of
Popper), the brain being used as an instrument in the realization of
intentions. I refer to Fig. E 7-2 of Popper and Eccles (1977), where
intentions appear in the box (inner senses) of World 2, with arrows
indicating the flow of information by which intentions in the mind cause
changes in the liaison brain and so eventually in voluntary movements.
I have no difficulty with proposition 2, but I would suggest that 3, 4,
and 5 be rewritten with "mind" substituted for "brain." Again the
statement: "only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of
machines . . . with internal causal powers equivalent to those of
brains" is the identity theory dogma. I say dogma becuase it is
unargued and without empirical support. The identity theory is very
weak empirically, being merely a theory of promise.
So long as Searle speaks about human performance without regard-
ing intentionality as a property of the brain, I can appreciate that he has
produced telling arguments against the strong Al theory. The story of
the hamburger with the Gectankenexperiment of the Chinese symbols
is related to Premack's attempts to teach the chimpanzee Sarah a
primitive level of human language as expressed in symbols [See
Premack:"Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?" BBS 1(4)
1978]. The criticism of Lenneberg (1975) was that, by conditioning,
Sarah had learnt a symbol game, using symbols instrumentally, but had
no idea that it was related to human language. He trained high school
students with the procedures described by Premack, closely replicat-
ing Premack's study. The human subjects were quickly able to obtain
considerably lower error scores than those reported for the chimpan-
zee. However, they were unable to translate correctly a single one of
their completed sentences into English. In fact, they did not understand
that there was any correspondence between the plastic symbols and
language; instead they were under the impression that their task was to
solve puzzles.
I think this simple experiment indicates a fatal flaw in all the Al work.
No matter how complex the performance instantiated by the computer,
it can be no more than a triumph for the computer designer in
simulation. The Turing machine is a magician's dream - or nightmare!
It was surprising that after the detailed brain-mind statements of the
abstract, I did not find the word "brain" in Searle's text through the
whole of his opening three pages of argument, where he uses mind,
mental states, human understanding, and cognitive states exactly as
would be done in a text on dualist interactionism. Not until "the robot
reply" does brain appear as "computer 'brain.' " However, from "the
brain simulator reply" in the statements and criticisms of the various
other replies, brain, neuron firings, synapses, and the like are profusely
used in a rather naive way. For example "imagine the computer
programmed with all the synapses of a human brain" is more than I can
do by many orders of magnitude! So "the combination reply" reads
like fantasy - and to no purpose!
I agree that it is a mistake to confuse simulation with duplication. But
I do not object to the idea that the distinction between the program and
its realization in the hardware seems to be parallel to the distinction
between the mental operations and the level of brain operations.
However, Searle believes that the equation "mind is to brain as
program is to hardware" breaks down at several points. I would prefer
to substitute programmer for program, because as a dualist interac-
tionist I accept the analogy that as conscious beings we function as
programmers of our brains. In particular I regret Searle's third argu-
ment: "Mental states and events are literally a product of the operation
of the brain, but the program is not in that way a product of the
computer," and so later we are told "whatever else intentionality is, it is
a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be causally dependent
on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis,
or any other biological phenomenon." I have the feeling of being
transported back to the nineteenth century, where, as derisorily
recorded by Sherrington (1950): "the oracular Professor Tyndall,
presiding over the British Association at Belfast, told his audience that
as the bile is a secretion of the liver, so the mind is a secretion of the
brain."
In summary, my criticisms arise from fundamental differences in
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respect of beliefs in relation to the brain-mind problem. So long as
Searle is referring to human intentions and performances without
reference to the brain-mind problem, I can appreciate the criticisms
that he marshals against the Al beliefs that an appropriately
programmed computer is a mind literally understanding and having
other cognitive states. Most of Searle's criticisms are acceptable for
dualist interactionism. It is high time that strong Al was discredited.
by J. A. Fodor
Department of Psychology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass. 02139
Searle on what only brains can do
1. Searle is certainly right that instantiating the same program that the
brain does is not, in and of itself, a sufficent condition for having those
propositional attitudes characteristic of the organism that has the
brain. If some people in Al think that it is, they're wrong. As for the
Turing test, it has all the usual difficulties with predictions of "no
difference"; you can't distinguish the truth of the prediction from the
insensitivity of the test instrument.1
2. However, Searle's treatment of the "robot reply" is quite uncon-
vincing. Given that there are the right kinds of causal linkages between
the symbols that the device manipulates and things in the world -
including the afferent and efferent transducers of the device - it is quite
unclear that intuition rejects ascribing propositional attitudes to it. All
that Searle's example shows is that the kind of causal linkage he
imagines - one that is, in effect, mediated by a man sitting in the head
of a robot - is, unsurprisingly, not the right kind.
3. We don't know how to say what the right kinds of causal linkage
are. This, also, is unsurprising since we don't know how to answer the
closely related question as to what kinds of connection between a
formula and the world determine the interpretation under which the
formula is employed. We don't have an answer to this question for any
symbolic system; a fortiori, not for mental representations. These
questions are closely related because, given the mental representation
view, it is natural to assume that what makes mental states intentional
is primarily that they involve relations to semantically interpreted mental
objects; again, relations of the right kind.
4. It seems to me that Searle has misunderstood the main point
about the treatment of intentionality in representational theories of the
mind; this is not surprising since proponents of the theory - especially
in Al - have been notably unlucid in expounding it. For the record, then,
the main point is this: intentional properties of propositional attitudes
are viewed as inherited from semantic properties of mental representa-
tions (and not from the functional role of mental representations,
unless "functional role" is construed broadly enough to include
symbol-world relations). In effect, what is proposed is a reduction of
the problem what makes mental states intentional to the problem what
bestows semantic properties on (fixes the interpretation of) a symbol.
This reduction looks promising because we're going to have to answer
the latter question anyhow (for example, in constructing theories of
natural languages); and we need the notion of mental representation
anyhow (for example, to provide appropriate domains for mental
processes).
It may be worth adding that there is nothing new about this strategy.
Locke, for example, thought (a) that the intentional properties of
mental states are inherited from the semantic (referential) properties of
mental representations; (b) that mental processes are formal (associa-
tive); and (c) that the objects from which mental states inherit their
intentionality are the same ones over which mental processes are
defined: namely ideas. It's my view that no serious alternative to this
treatment of propositional attitudes has ever been proposed.
5. To say that a computer (or a brain) performs formal operations
on symbols is not the same thing as saying that it performs operations
on formal (in the sense of "uninterpreted") symbols. This equivocation
occurs repeatedly in Searle's paper, and causes considerable confu-
sion. If there are mental representations they must, of course, be
interpreted objects; it is because they are interpreted objects that
mental states are intentional. But the brain might be a computer for all
that.
6. This situation - needing a notion of causal connection, but not
knowing which notion of causal connection is the right one - is entirely
familiar in philosophy. It is, for example, extremely plausible that "a
perceives b" can be true only where there is the right kind of causal
connection between a and b. And we don't know what the right kind of
causal connection is here either.
Demonstrating that some kinds of causal connection are the wrong
kinds would not, of course, prejudice the claim. For example, suppose
we interpolated a little man between a and b, whose function it is to
report to a on the presence of b. We would then have (inter alia) a sort
of causal link from a to b, but we wouldn't have the sort of causal link
that is required for a to perceive b. It would, of course, be a fallacy to
argue from the fact that this causal linkage fails to reconstruct
perception to the conclusion that no causal linkage would succeed.
Searle's argument against the "robot reply" is a fallacy of precisely
that sort.
7. It is entirely reasonable (indeed it must be true) that the right kind
of causal relation is the kind that holds between our brains and our
transducer mechanisms (on the one hand) and between our brains and
distal objects (on the other). It would not begin to follow that only our
brains can bear such relations to transducers and distal objects; and it
would also not follow that being the same sort of thing our brain is (in
any biochemical sense of "same sort") is a necessary condition for
being in that relation; and it would also not follow that formal manipula-
tions of symbols are not among the links in such causal chains. And,
even if our brains are the only sorts of things that can be in that
relation, the fact that they are might quite possibly be of no particular
interest; that would depend on why it's true.2
Searle gives no clue as to why he thinks the biochemistry is
important for intentionality and, prima facie, the idea that what counts
is how the organism is connected to the world seems far more
plausible. After all, it's easy enough to imagine, in a rough and ready
sort of way, how the fact that my thought is causally connected to a
tree might bear on its being a thought about a tree. But it's hard to
imagine how the fact that (to put it crudely) my thought is made out of
hydrocarbons could matter, except on the unlikely hypothesis that only
hydrocarbons can be causally connected to trees in the way that
brains are.
8. The empirical evidence for believing that "manipulation of
symbols" is involved in mental processes derives largely from the
considerable success of work in linguistics, psychology, and Al that
has been grounded in that assumption. Little of the relevant data
concerns the simulation of behavior or the passing of Turing tests,
though Searle writes as though all of it does. Searle gives no indication
at allot how the facts that this work accounts for are to be explained if
not on the mental-processes-are-formal-processes view. To claim that
there is no argument that symbol manipulation is necessary for mental
processing while systematically ignoring all the evidence that has been
alleged in favor of the claim strikes me as an extremely curious
strategy on Searle's part.
9. Some necessary conditions are more interesting than others.
While connections to the world and symbol manipulations are both
presumably necessary for intentional processes, there is no reason (so
far) to believe that the former provide a theoretical domain for a
science; wheras, there is considerable a posteriori reason to suppose
that the latter do. If this is right, it provides some justification for Al
practice, if not for Al rhetoric.
10. Talking involves performing certain formal operations on
symbols: stringing words together. Yet, not everything that can string
words together can talk. It does not follow from these banal observa-
tions that what we utter are uninterpreted sounds, or that we don't
understand what we say, or that whoever talks talks nonsense, or that
only hydrocarbons can assert - similaly, mutatis mutandis, if you
substitue "thinking" for "talking."
Notes
1.1 assume, for simplicity, that there is only one program that the brain
instantiates (which, of course, there isn't). Notice, by the way, that even passing
the Turing test requires doing more than just manipulating symbols. A device that
can't run a typewriter can't play the game.
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2. For example, it might be that, in point of physical fact, only things that have
the same simultaneous values of weight, density, and shade of gray that brains
have can do the things that brains can. This would be surprising, but it's hard to
see why a psychologist should care much. Not even if it turned out - still in point of
physical fact - that brains are the only things that can have that weight, density,
and color. If that's dualism, I imagine we can live with it.
by John Haugeland
Center tor Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Stanford, Calif. 94305
Programs, causal powers, and intentionality
Searle is in a bind. He denies that any Turing test for intelligence is
adequate - that is, that behaving intelligently is a sufficent condition for
being intelligent. But he dare not deny that creatures physiologically
very different from people might be intelligent nonetheless - smart
green saucer pilots, say. So he needs an intermediate criterion: not so
specific to us as to rule out the aliens, yet not so dissociated from
specifics as to admit any old object with the right behavior. His
suggestion is that only objects (made of stuff) with "the right causal
powers" can have intentionality, and hence, only such objects can
genuinely understand anything or be intelligent. This suggestion,
however, is incompatible with the main argument of his paper.
Ostensibly, that argument is against the claim that working accord-
ing to a certain program can ever be sufficient for understanding
anything - no matter how cleverly the program is contrived so as to
make the relevant object (computer, robot, or whatever) behave as if\\
understood. The crucial move is replacing the central processor
(c.p.u.) with a superfast person - whom we might as well call "Searle's
demon." And Searle argues that an English-speaking demon could
perfectly well follow a program for simulating a Chinese speaker,
without itself understanding a word of Chinese.
The trouble is that the same strategy will work as well against any
specification of "the right causal powers." Instead of manipulating
formal tokens according to the specifications of some computer
program, the demon will manipulate physical states or variables
according to the specification of the "right" causal interactions. Just to
be concrete, imagine that the right ones are those powers that our
neuron tips have to titillate one another with neurotransmitters. The
green aliens can be intelligent, even though they're based on silicon
chemistry, because their (silicon) neurons have the same power of
intertitillation. Now imagine covering each of the neurons of a Chinese
criminal with a thin coating, which has no effect, except that it is
impervious to neurotransmitters. And imagine further that Searle's
demon can see the problem, and comes to the rescue; he peers
through the coating at each neural tip, determines which transmitter (if
any) would have been emitted, and then massages the adjacent tips in
a way that has the same effect as if they had received that transmitter.
Basically, instead of replacing the c.p.u., the demon is replacing the
neurotransmitters.
By hypothesis, the victim's behavior is unchanged; in particular, she
still acts as if she understood Chinese. Now, however, none of her
neurons has the right causal powers - the demon has them, and he still
understands only English. Therefore, having the right causal powers
(even while embedded in a system such that the exercise of these
powers leads to "intelligent" behavior) cannot be sufficient for under-
standing. Needless to say, a corresponding variation will work, what-
ever the relevant causal powers are.
None of this should come as a surprise. A computer program just is
a specification of the exercise of certain causal powers: the powers to
manipulate various formal tokens (physical objects or states of some
sort) in certain specified ways, depending on the presence of certain
other such tokens. Of course, it is a particular way of specifying causal
exercises of a particular sort - that's what gives the "computational
paradigm" its distinctive character. But Searle makes no use of this
particularity; his argument depends only on the fact that causal powers
can be specified independently of whatever it is that has the power.
This is precisely what makes it possible to interpose the demon, in both
the token-interaction (program) and neuron-interaction cases.
There is no escape in urging that this is a "dualistic" view ot causal
powers, not intrinisically connected with "the actual properties" of
physical objects. To speak of causal powers in any way that allows for
generalization (to green aliens, for example) is ipso facto to abstract
from the particulars of any given "realization." The point is indepen-
dent of the example - it works just as well for photosynthesis. Thus,
flesh-colored plantlike organisms on the alien planet might photosyn-
thesize (I take it, in a full and literal sense) so long as they contain some
chemical (not necessarily chlorophyll) that absorbs light and uses the
energy to make sugar and free oxygen out of carbon dioxide (or silicon
dioxide?) and water. This is what it means to specify photosynthesis as
a causal power, rather than just a property that is, by definition,
idiosyncratic to chlorophyll. But now, of course, the demon can enter,
replacing both chlorophyll and its alien substitute: he devours photons,
and thus energized, makes sugar from CO2 and H2O. It seems to me
that the demon is photosynthesizing.
Let's set aside the demon argument, however. Searle also suggests
that "there is no reason to suppose" that understanding (or intention-
ality) "has anything to do with" computer programs. This too, I think,
rests on his failure to recognize that specifying a program is (in a
distinctive way) specifying a range of causal powers and interactions.
The central issue is what differentiates original intentionality from
derivative intentionality. The former is intentionality that a thing (system,
state, process) has "in its own right"; the latter is intentionality that is
"borrowed from" or "conferred by" something else. Thus (on stan-
dard assumptions, which I will not question here), the intentionality of
conscious thought and perception is original, whereas the intentionality
(meaning) of linguistic tokens is merely conferred upon them by
language users - that is, words don't have any meaning in and of
themselves, but only in virtue of our giving them some. These are
paradigm cases; many other cases will fall clearly on one side or the
other, or be questionable, or perhaps even marginal. No one denies
that if Al systems don't have original intentionality, then they at least
have derivative intentionality, in a nontrivial sense - because they have
nontrivial interpretations. What Searle objects to is the thesis, held by
many, that good-enough Al systems have (or will eventually have)
original intentionality.
Thought tokens, such as articulate beliefs and desires, and linguistic
tokens, such as the expressions of articulate beliefs and desires, seem
to have a lot in common - as pointed out, for example, by Searle
(1979c). In particular, except for the original/derivative distinction, they
have (or at least appear to have) closely parallel semantic structures
and variations. There must be some other principled distinction
between them, then, in virtue of which the former can be originally
intentional, but the latter only derivatively so. A conspicuous candidate
for this distinction is that thoughts are semantically active, whereas
sentence tokens, written out, say, on a page, are semantically inert.
Thoughts are constantly interacting with one another and the world, in
ways that are semantically appropriate to their intentional content. The
causal interactions of written sentence tokens, on the other hand, do
not consistently reflect their content (except when they interact with
people).
Thoughts are embodied in a "system" that provides "normal
channels" for them to interact with the world, and such that these
normal interactions tend to maximize the "fit" between them and the
world; that is, via perception, beliefs tend toward the truth; and, via
action, the world tends toward what is desired. And there are channels
of interaction among thoughts (various kinds of inference) via which
the set of them tends to become more coherent, and to contain more
consequences of its members. Naturally, other effects introduce
aberrations and "noise" into the system; but the normal channels tend
to predominate in the long run. There are no comparable channels of
interaction for written tokens. In fact, (according to this same standard
view), the only semantically sensitive interactions that written tokens
ever have are with thoughts; insofar as they tend to express truths, it is
because they express beliefs, and insofar as they tend to bring about
their own satisfaction conditions, it is because they tend to bring about
desires. Thus, the only semantically significant interactions that written
tokens have with the world are via thoughts; and this, the suggestion
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goes, is why their intentionality is derivative.
The interactions that thoughts have among themselves (within a
single "system") are particularly important, for it is in virtue of these
that thought can be subtle and indirect, relative to its interactions with
the world - that is, not easily fooled or thwarted. Thus, we tend to
consider more than the immediately present evidence in making
judgments, and more than the immediately present options in making
plans. We weigh desiderata, seek further information, try things to see
if they'll work, formulate general maxims and laws, estimate results and
costs, go to the library, cooperate, manipulate, scheme, test, and
reflect on what we're doing. All of these either are or involve a lot of
thought-thought interaction, and tend, in the long run to broaden and
improve the "fit" between thought and world. And they are typical as
manifestations both of intelligence and of independence.
I take it for granted that all of the interactions mentioned are, in
some sense, causal - hence, that it is among the system's "causal
powers" that it can have (instantiate, realize, produce) thoughts that
interact with the world and each other in these ways. It is hard to tell
whether these are the sorts of causal powers that Searle has in mind,
both because he doesn't say, and because they don't seem terribly
similar to photosynthesis and lactation. But, in any case, they strike me
as strong candidates for the kinds of powers that would distinguish
systems with intentionality - that is, original intentionality - from those
without. The reason is that these are the only powers that consistently
reflect the distinctively intentional character of the interactors: namely,
their "content" or "meaning" (except, so to speak, passively, as in the
case of written tokens being read). That is, the power to have states
that are semantically active is the "right" causal power for intentionali-
ty.
It is this plausible claim that underlies the thesis that (sufficiently
developed) Al systems could actually be intelligent, and have original
intentionality. For a case can surely be made that their "representa-
tions" are semantically active (or, at least, that they would be if the
system were built into a robot). Remember, we are conceding them at
least derivative intentionality, so the states in question do have a
content, relative to which we can gauge the "semantic appropriate-
ness" of their causal interactions. And the central discovery of all
computer technology is that devices can be contrived such that,
relative to a certain interpretation, certain of their states will always
interact (causally) in semantically appropriate ways, so long as the
devices perform as designed electromechanically - that is, these
states can have "normal channels" of interaction (with each other and
with the world) more or less comparable to those that underlie the
semantic activity of thoughts. This point can hardly be denied, so long
as it is made in terms of the derivative intentionality of computing
systems; but what it seems to add to the archetypical (and "inert")
derivative intentionality of, say, written text is, precisely, semantic
activity. So, if (sufficiently rich) semantic activity is what distinguishes
original from derivative intentionality (in other words, it's the "right"
causal power), then it seems that (sufficiently rich) computing systems
can have original intentionality.
Now, like Searle, I am inclined to dispute this conclusion; but for
entirely different reasons. I don't believe there is any conceptual
confusion in supposing that the right causal powers for original
intentionality are the ones that would be captured by specifying a
program (that is, a virtual machine). Hence, I don't think the above
plausibility argument can be dismissed out of hand ("no reason to
suppose," and so on); nor can I imagine being convinced that, no
matter how good Al got, it would still be "weak" - that is, would not
have created a "real" intelligence - because it still proceeded by
specifying programs. It seems to me that the interesting question is
much more nitty-gritty empirical than that: given that programs might
be the right way to express the relevant causal structure, are they in
tact so? It is to this question that I expect the answer is no. In other
words, I don't much care about Searle's demon working through a
program for perfect simulation of a native Chinese speaker - not
because there's no such demon, but because there's no such
program. Or rather, whether there is such a program, and if not, why
not, are, in my view, the important questions.
by Douglas R. Hofstadter
Computer Science Department. Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 47405
Reductionism and religion
This religious diatribe against Al, masquerading as a serious scientific
argument, is one of the wrongest, most infuriating articles I have ever
read in my life. It is matched in its power to annoy only by the famous
article "Minds, Machines, and Godel" by J. R. Lucas (1961).
Searle's trouble is one that I can easily identify with. Like me, he has
deep difficulty in seeing how mind, soul, " I , " can come out of brain,
cells, atoms. To show his puzzlement, he gives some beautiful para-
phrases of this mystery. One of my favorites is the water-pipe
simulation of a brain. It gets straight to the core of the mind-body
problem. The strange thing is that Searlesimply dismisses any possibil-
ity of such a system's being conscious with a hand wave of "absurd."
(I actually think he radically misrepresents the complexity of such a
water-pipe system both to readers and in his own mind, but that is a
somewhat separable issue.)
The fact is, we have to deal with a reality of nature - and realities of
nature sometimes are absurd. Who would have believed that light
consists of spinning massless wave particles obeying an uncertainty
principle while traveling through a curved four-dimensional universe?
The fact that intelligence, understanding, mind, consciousness, soul all
do spring from an unlikely source - an enormously tangled web of cell
bodies, axons, synapses, and dendrites - is absurd, and yet undeni-
able. How this can create an " I " is hard to understand, but once we
accept that fundamental, strange, disorienting fact, then it should seem
no more weird to accept a water-pipe " I . "
Searle's way of dealing with this reality of nature is to claim he
accepts it - but then he will not accept its consequences. The main
consequence is that "intentionality" - his name for soul - is an
outcome of formal processes. I admit that I have slipped one extra
premise in here: that physical processes are formal, that is, rule
governed. To put it another way, the extra premise is that there is no
intentionality at the level of particles. (Perhaps I have misunderstood
Searle. He may be a mystic and claim that there is intentionality at that
level. But then how does one explain why it seems to manifest itself in
consciousness only when the particles are arranged in certain special
configurations - brains - but not, say, in water-pipe arrangements of
any sort and size?) The conjunction of these two beliefs seems to me
to compel one to admit the possibility of all the hopes of artificial
intelligence, despite the fact that it will always baffle us to think of
ourselves as, at bottom, formal systems.
To people who have never programmed, the distinction between
levels of a computer system - programs that run "on" other programs
or on hardware - is an elusive one. I believe Searle doesn't really
understand this subtle idea, and thus blurs many distinctions while
creating other artificial ones to take advantage of human emotional
responses that are evoked in the process of imagining unfamiliar
ideas.
He begins with what sounds like a relatively innocent situation: a man
in a room with a set of English instructions ("bits of paper") for
manipulating some Chinese symbols. At first, you think the man is
answering questions (although unbeknown to him) about restaurants,
using Schankian scripts. Then Searle casually slips in the idea that this
program can pass the Turing test! This is an incredible jump in
complexity - perhaps a millionfold increase if not more. Searle seems
not to be aware of how radically it changes the whole picture to have
that "little" assumption creep in. But even the initial situation, which
sounds plausible enough, is in fact highly unrealistic.
Imagine a human being, hand simulating a complex Al program,
such as a script-based "understanding" program. To digest a full
story, to go through the scripts and to produce the response, would
probably take a hard eight-hour day for a human being. Actually, of
course, this hand-simulated program is supposed to be passing the
Turing test, not just answering a few stereotyped questions about
restaurants. So let's jump up to a week per question, since the
program would be so complex. (We are being unbelievably generous
to Searle.)
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Now Searle asks you to identify with this poor slave of a human (he
doesn't actually ask you to identify with him - he merely knows you will
project yourself onto this person, and vicariously experience the
indescribably boring nightmare of that hand simulation). He knows your
reaction will be: "This is not understanding the story - this is some sort
of formal process!" But remember: any time some phenomenon is
looked at on a scale a million times different from its familiar scale, it
doesn't seem the same! When I imagine myself feeling my brain running
a hundred times too slowly (of course that is paradoxical but it is what
Searle wants me to do), then of course it is agonizing, and presumably I
would not even recognize the feelings at all. Throw in yet another
factor of a thousand and one cannot even imagine what it would feel
like.
Now this is what Searle is doing. He is inviting you to identify with a
nonhuman which he lightly passes off as a human, and by doing so he
asks you to participate in a great fallacy. Over and over again he uses
this ploy, this emotional trickery, to get you to agree with him that
surely, an intricate system of water pipes can't think! He forgets to tell
you that a water-pipe simulation of the brain would take, say, a few
trillion water pipes with a few trillion workers standing at faucets turning
them when needed, and he forgets to tell you that to answer a question
it would take a year or two. He forgets to tell you, because if you
remembered that, and then on your own, imagined taking a movie and
speeding it up a million times, and imagined changing your level of
description of the thing from the faucet level to the pipe-cluster level,
and on through a series of ever higher levels until you reached some
sort of eventual symbolic level, why then you might say, "Hey, when I
imagine what this entire system would be like when perceived at this
time scale and level of description, I can see how it might be conscious
after all!"
Searle is representative of a class of people who have an instinctive
horror of any "explaining away" of the soul. I don't know why certain
people have this horror while others, like me, find in reductionism the
ultimate religion. Perhaps my lifelong training in physics and science in
general has given me a deep awe at seeing how the most substantial
and familiar of objects or experiences fades away, as one approaches
the infinitesimal scale, into an eerily insubstantial ether, a myriad of
ephemeral swirling vortices of nearly incomprehensible mathematical
activity. This in me evokes a kind of cosmic awe. To me, reductionism
does not "explain away"; rather, it adds mystery. I know that this
journal is not the place for philosophical and religious commentary, yet
it seems to me that what Searle and I have is, at the deepest level, a
religious disagreement, and I doubt that anything I say could ever
change his mind. He insists on things he calls "causal intentional
properties" which seem to vanish as soon as you analyze them, find
rules for them, or simulate them. But what those things are, other than
epiphenomena, or "innocently emergent" qualities, I don't know.
by B. Libet
Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, Calif. 94143
Mental phenomena and behavior
Searle states that the main argument of his paper is directed at
establishing his second proposition, that "instantiating a computer
program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality" (that is,
of a mental state that includes beliefs, desires, and intentions). He
accomplishes this with a Gedankenexperiment to show that even "a
human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the
relevant intentionality"; that is, Searle shows, in a masterful and
convincing manner, that the behavior of the appropriately programmed
computer could transpire in the absence of a cognitive mental state. I
believe it is also possible to establish the proposition by means of an
argument based on simple formal logic.
We start with the knowledge that we are dealing with two different
systems: system A is the computer, with its appropriate program;
system B is the human being, particularly his brain. Even if system A
could be arranged to behave and even to look like system B, in a
manner that might make them indistinguishable to an external observ-
er, system A must be at least internally different from B. If A and B were
identical, they would both be human beings and there would be no
thesis to discuss.
Let us accept the proposal that, on an input-output basis, system A
and system B could be made to behave alike, properties that we may
group together under category X. The possession of the relevant
mental states (including understanding, beliefs, desires, intentions, and
the like) may be called property Y. We know that system B has
property Y. Remembering that systems A and B are known to be
different, it is an error in logic to argue that because systems A and B
both have property X, they must also both have property Y.
The foregoing leads to a more general proposition - that no
behavior of a computer, regardless of how successful it may be in
simulating human behavior, is ever by itself sufficient evidence of any
mental state. Indeed, Searle also appears to argue for this more
general case when, later in the discussion, he notes: (a) To get
computers to feel pain or fall in love would be neither harder nor easier
than to get them to have cognition, (b) "For simulation, all you need is
the right input and output and a program in the middle that transforms
the former into the latter." And, (c) "to confuse simulation with
duplication is the same mistake, whether it is pain, love, cognition." On
the other hand, Searle seems not to maintain this general proposition
with consistency. In his discussion of "IV. The combination reply" (to
his analytical example or thought experiment), Searle states: "If we
could build a robot whose behavior was indistinguishable over a large
range from human behavior, we would . . . find it rational and indeed
irresistible to . . . attribute intentionality to it, pending some reason not
to." On the basis of my argument, one would not have to know that the
robot had a formal program (or whatever) that accounts for its
behavior, in order not to have to attribute intentionality to it. All we need
to know is that the robot's internal control apparatus is not made in the
same way and out of the same stuff as is the human brain, to reject the
thesis that the robot must possess the mental states of intentionality,
and so on.
Now, it is true that neither my nor Searle's argument excludes the
possibility that an appropriately programmed computer could also
have mental states (property Y); the argument merely states it is not
warranted to propose that the robot must have mental states (Y).
However, Searle goes on to contribute a valuable analysis of why so
many people have believed that computer programs do impart a kind
of mental process or state to the computer. Searle notes that, among
other factors, a residual behaviorism or operationalism underlies the
willingness to accept input-output patterns as sufficient for postulating
human mental states in appropriately programmed computers. I would
add that there are still many psychologists and perhaps philosophers
who are similarly burdened with residual behaviorism or operationalism
even when dealing with criteria for existence of a conscious subjective
experience in human subjects (see Libet 1973; 1979).
by William G. Lycan
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210
The functionalist reply (Ohio State)
Most versions of philosophical behaviorism have had the consequence
that if an organism or device D passes the Turing test, in the sense of
systematically manifesting all the same outward behavioral dispositions
that a normal human does, the Dhas all the same sorts of contentful or
intentional states that humans do. In light of fairly obvious counterex-
amples to this thesis, materialist philosophers of mind have by and
large rejected behaviorism in favor of a more species-chauvinistic
view: D's manifesting all the same sorts of behavioral dispositions we
do does not alone suffice for D's having intentional states; it is
necessary in addition that D produce behavior from stimuli in roughly
the way that we do - that D's inner functional organization be not unlike
ours and that D process the stimulus input by analogous inner
procedures. On this "functionalist" theory, to be in a mental state of
such and such a kind is to incorporate a functional component or
system of components of type so and so which is in a certain
distinctive state of its own. "Functional components" are individuated
according to the roles they play within their owners' overall functional
organization.1
Searle offers a number of cases of entities that manifest the
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behavioral dispositions we associate with intentional states but that *
rather plainly do not have any such states.2 I accept his intuitive
judgments about most of these cases. Searle plus rule book plus pencil
and paper presumably does not understand Chinese, nor does Searle
with memorized rule book or Searle with TV camera or the robot with
Searle inside. Neither my stomach nor Searle's liver nor a thermostat
nor a light switch has beliefs and desires. But none of these cases is a
counterexample to the functionalist hypothesis. The systems in the
former group are pretty obviously not functionally isomorphic at the
relevant level to human beings who do understand Chinese; a native
Chinese carrying on a conversation is implementing procedures of his
own, not those procedures that would occur in a mockup containing
the cynical, English-speaking, American-acculturated homuncular
Searle. Therefore they are not counterexamples to a functionalist
theory of language understanding, and accordingly they leave it open
that a computer that was functionally isomorphic to a real Chinese
speaker would indeed understand Chinese also. Stomachs, thermo-
stats, and the like, because of their brutish simplicity, are even more
clearly dissimilar to humans. (The same presumably is true of Schank's
existing language-understanding programs.)
I have hopes for a sophisticated version of the "brain simulator" (or
the "combination" machine) that Searle illustrates with his plumbing
example. Imagine a hydraulic system of this type that does replicate,
perhaps not the precise neuroanatomy of a Chinese speaker, but all
that is relevant of the Chinese speaker's higher functional organization;
individual water pipes are grouped into organ systems precisely
analogous to those found in the speaker's brain, and the device
processes linguistic input in just the way that the speaker does. (It does
not merely simulate or describe this processing.) Moreover, the system
is automatic and does all this without the intervention of Searle or any
other deus in machina. Under these conditions and given a suitable
social context, I think it would be plausible to accept the functionalist
consequence that the hydraulic system does understand Chinese.
Searle's paper suggest two objections to this claim. First, "where is
the understanding in this system?" All Searle sees is pipes and valves
and flowing water. Reply: Looking around the fine detail of the system's
hardware, you are too small to see that the system is understanding
Chinese sentences. If you were a tiny, cell-sized observer inside a real
Chinese speaker's brain, all you would see would be neurons stupidly,
mechanically transmitting electrical charge, and in the same tone you
would ask, "Where is the understanding in this system?" But you would
be wrong in concluding that the system you were observing did not
understand Chinese; in like manner you may well be wrong about the
hydraulic device.3
Second, even if a computer were to replicate all of the Chinese
speaker's relevant functional organization, all the computer is really
doing is performing computational operations on formally specified
elements. A purely formally or syntactically characterized element has
no meaning or content in itself, obviously, and no amount of mindless
syntactic manipulation of it will endow it with any. Reply: The premise is
correct, and I agree it shows that no computer has or could have
intentional states merely in virtue of performing syntactic operations on
formally characterized elements. But that does not suffice to prove that
no computer can have intentional states at all. Our brain states do not
have the contents they do just in virtue of having their purely formal
properties either;4 a brain state described "syntactically" has no
meaning or content on its own. In virtue of what, then, do brain states
(or mental states however construed) have the meanings they do?
Recent theory advises that the content of a mental representation is
not determined within its owner's head (Putnam 1975a; Fodor 1980);
rather, it is determined in part by the objects in the environment that
actually figure in the representation's etiology and in part by social and
contextual factors of several other sorts (Stich, in preparation). Now,
present-day computers live in highly artificial and stifling environments.
They receive carefully and tendentiously preselected input; their soft-
ware is adventitiously manipulated by uncaring programmers; and they
are isolated in laboratories and offices, deprived of any normal
interaction within a natural or appropriate social setting.5 For this
reason and several others, Searle is surely right in saying that present-
day computers do not really have the intentional states that we
fancifully incline toward attributing to them. But nothing Searle has said
impugns the thesis that if a sophisticated future computer not only
replicated human functional organization but harbored its inner repre-
sentations as a result of the right sort of causal history and had also
been nurtured within a favorable social setting, we might correctly
ascribe intentional states to it. This point may or may not afford lasting
comfort to the Al community.
Notes
LThis characterization is necessarily crude and vague. For a very useful
survey of different versions of functionalism and their respective foibles, see
Block (1978); I have developed and defended what I think is the most promising
version of functionalism in Lycan (forthcoming).
2. For further discussion of cases of this kind, see Block (forthcoming).
3. A much expanded version of this reply appears in section 4 of Lycan
(forthcoming).
4.1 do not understand Searle's positive suggestion as to the source of
intentionality in our own brains. What "neurobiological causal properties"?
5. As Fodor (forthcoming) remarks, SHRDLU as we interpret him is the victim
of a Cartesian evil demon; the "blocks" he manipulates do not exist in reality.
by John McCarthy
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Stanford University. Stanford, Calif. 94305
Beliefs, machines, and theories
John Searle's refutation of the Berkeley answer that the system
understands Chinese proposes that a person (call him Mr. Hyde) carry
out in his head a process (call it Dr. Jekyll) for carrying out a written
conversation in Chinese. Everyone will agree with Searle that Mr. Hyde
does not understand Chinese, but I would contend, and I suppose his
Berkeley interlocutors would also, that provided certain other condi-
tions for understanding are met, Dr. Jekyll understands Chinese. In
Robert Louis Stevenson's story, it seems assumed that Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde time-share the body, while in Searle's case, one interprets a
program specifying the other.
Searle's dismissal of the idea that thermostats may be ascribed
belief is based on a misunderstanding. It is not a pantheistic notion that
all machinery including telephones, light switches, and calculators
believe. Belief may usefully be ascribed only to systems about which
someone's knowledge can best be expressed by ascribing beliefs that
satisfy axioms such as those in McCarthy (1979). Thermostats are
sometimes such systems. Telling a child, "If you hold the candle under
the thermostat, you will fool it into thinking the room is too hot, and it
will turn off the furnace" makes proper use of the child's repertoire of
intentional concepts.
Formalizing belief requires treating simple cases as well as more
interesting ones. Ascribing beliefs to thermostats is analogous to
including 0 and 1 in the number system even though we would not need
a number system to treat the null set or sets with just one element;
indeed we wouldn't even need the concept of set.
However, a program that understands should not be regarded as a
theory of understanding any more than a man who understands is a
theory. A program can only be an illustration of a theory, and a useful
theory will contain much more than an assertion that "the following
program understands about restaurants." I can't decide whether this
last complaint applies to Searle or just to some of the Al researchers
he criticizes.
by John C Marshall
Neuropsychology Unit, University Department of Clinicat Neurology, The Radclifle
Infirmary, Oxford, England
Artificial intelligence—the real thing?
Searle would have us believe that the present-day inhabitants of
respectable universities have succumbed to the Faustian dream.
(Mephistopheles: "What is it then?" Wagner: "A man is in the
making.") He assures us, with a straight face, that some contemporary
scholars think that "an appropriately programmed computer really is a
mind," that such artificial creatures "literally have cognitive states."
The real thing indeed! But surely no one could believe this? I mean, if
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someone did, then wouldn't he want to give his worn-out IBM a decent
burial and say Kaddish for it? And even if some people at Yale,
Berkeley, Stanford, and so forth do instantiate these weird belief
states, what conceivable scientific interest could that hold? Imagine
that they were right, and that their computers really do perceive,
understand, and think. All that our Golem makers have done on
Searle's story is to create yet another mind. If the sole aim is to
"reproduce" (Searle's term, not mine) mental phenomena, there is
surely no need to buy a computer.
Frankly, I just don't care what some members of the Al community
think about the ontological status of their creations. What I do care
about is whether anyone can produce principled, revealing accounts
of, say, the perception of tonal music (Longuet-Higgins 1979), the
properties of stereo vision (Marr & Poggio 1979), and the parsing of
natural language sentences (Thorne 1968). Everyone that I know who
tinkers around with computers does so because he has an attractive
theory of some psychological capacity and wishes to explore certain
consequences of the theory algorithmically. Searle refers to such
activity as "weak Al," but I would have thought that theory construction
and testing was one of the stronger enterprises that a scientist could
indulge in. Clearly, there must be some radical misunderstanding here.
The problem appears to lie in Searle's (or his Al informants') strange
use of the term 'theory.' Thus Searle writes in his shorter abstract:
"According to strong Al, appropriately programmed computers literal-
ly have cognitive states, and therefore the programs are psychological
theories." Ignoring momentarily the "and therefore," which introduces
a simple non sequitur, how could a program be a theory? As Moor
(1978) points out, a theory is (at least) a collection of related
propositions which may be true or false, whereas a program is (or was)
a pile of punched cards. For all I know, maybe suitably switched-on
computers do "literally" have cognitive states, but even if they did, how
could that possibly licence the inference that the program per se was a
psychological theory? What would one make of an analogous claim
applied to physics rather than psychology? "Appropriately
programmed computers literally have physical states, and therefore
the programs are theories of matter" doesn't sound like a valid
inference to me. Moor's exposition of the distinction between program
and theory is particularly clear and thus worth quoting at some length:
A program must be interpreted in order to generate a theory. In the
process of interpreting, it is likely that some of the program will be
discarded as irrelevant since it will be devoted to the technicalities of
making the program acceptable to the computer. Moreover, the
remaining parts of the program must be organized in some coherent
fashion with perhaps large blocks of the computer program taken to
represent specific processes. Abstracting a theory from the
program is not a simple matter, for different groupings of the
program can generate different theories. Therefore, to the extent
that a program, understood as a model, embodies one theory, it
may well embody many theories. (Moor 1978, p. 215)
Searle reports that some of his informants believe that running
programs are other minds, albeit artificial ones; if that were so, would
these scholars not attempt to construct theories of artificial minds, just
as we do for natural ones? Considerable muddle then arises when
Searle's informants ignore their own claim and use the terms 'repro-
duce' and 'explain' synonymously: "The project is to reproduce and
explain the mental by designing programs." One can see how hope-
lessly confused this is by transposing the argument back from
computers to people. Thus I have noticed that many of my daughter's
mental states bear a marked resemblance to my own; this has arisen,
no doubt, because part of my genetic plan was used ot build her
hardware and because I have shared in the responsibility of program-
ming her. All well and good, but it would be straining credulity to regard
my daughter as "explaining" me, as being a "theory" of me.
What one would like is an elucidation of the senses in which
programs, computers and other machines do and don't figure in the
explanation of behavior (Cummins 1977; Marshall 1977). It is a pity that
Searle disregards such questions in order to discuss the everyday use
of mental vocabulary, an enterprise best left to lexicographers. Searle
writes: "The study of the mind starts with such facts as that humans
have beliefs, while thermostats, telephones, and adding machines
don't." Well, perhaps it does start there, but that is no reason to
suppose it must finish there. How would such an "argument" fare in
natural philosophy? "The study of physics starts with such facts as that
tables are solid objects without holes in them, whereas Gruyere
cheese. . . ." Would Searle now continue that "If you get a theory that
denies this point, you have produced a counterexample to the theory
and the theory is wrong"? Of course a thermostat's "belief" that the
temperature should be a little higher is not the same kind of thing as my
"belief" that it should. It would be totally uninteresting if they were the
same. Surely the theorist who compares the two must be groping
towards a deeper parallel; he has seen an analogy that may illuminate
certain aspects of the control and regulation of complex systems. The
notion of positive and negative feedback is what makes thermostats
so appealing to Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin, to Claude Bernard
and Walter Cannon, to Norbert Wiener and Kenneth Craik. Contempla-
tion of governors and thermostats has enabled them to see beyond
appearances to a level at which there are profound similarities
between animals and artifacts (Marshall 1977). It is Searle, not the
theoretician, who doesn't really take the enterprise seriously. Accord-
ing to Searle, "what we wanted to know is what distinguishes the mind
from thermostats and livers," Yes, but that is not all; we also want to
know at what levels of description there are striking resemblances
between disparate phenomena.
In the opening paragraphs of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (1651, p.
8) gives clear expression to the mechanist's philosophy:
Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by
the art of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated, that it
can make an artificial animal. . . . For what is the heart but a spring,
and the nerves so many strings; and joints so many wheels giving
motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?
What is the notion of "imitation" that Hobbes is using here? Obviously
not the idea of exact imitation or copying. No one would confuse a
cranial nerve with a piece of string, a heart with the mainspring of a
watch, or an ankle with a wheel. There is no question of trompe I'oeil.
The works of the scientist are not in that sense reproductions of
nature; rather they are attempts to see behind the phenomenological
world to a hidden reality. It was Galileo, of course, who articulated this
paradigm most forcefully: sculpture, remarks Galileo,
is "closer to nature" than painting in that the material substratum
manipulated by the sculptor shares with the matter manipulated by
nature herself the quality of three-dimensionality. But does this fact
rebound to the credit of sculpture? On the contrary, says Galileo, it
greatly "diminishes its merit": What will be so wonderful in imitating
sculptress Nature by sculpture itself?" And he concludes: "The most
artistic imitation is that which represents the three-dimensional by its
opposite, which is the plane." (Panofsky 1954, p. 97)
Galileo summarizes his position in the following words: "The further
removed the means of imitation are from the thing to be imitated, the
more worthy of admiration the imitation will be" (Panofsky 1954). In a
footnote to the passage, Panofsky remarks on "the basic affinity
between the spirit of this sentence and Galileo's unbounded admiration
for Aristarchus and Copernicus 'because they trusted reason rather
than sensory experience" (Panofsky 1954).
Now Searle is quite right in pointing out that in Al one seeks to model
cognitive states and their consequences (the real thing) by a formal
syntax, the interpretation of which exists only the eye of the beholder.
Precisely therein lies the beauty and significance of the enterprise - to
try to provide a counterpart for each substantive distinction with a
syntactic one. This is essentially to regard the study of the relationships
between physical transactions and symbolic operations as an essay in
cryptanalysis (Freud 1895; Cummins 1977). The interesting question
then arises as to whether there is a unique mapping between the
formal elements of the system and their "meanings" (Householder
1962).
Searle, however, seems to be suggesting that we abandon entirely
both the Galilean and the "linguistic" mode in order merely to copy
cognitions. He would apparently have us seek mind only in "neurons
with axons and dendrites," although he admits, as an empirical
possibility, that such objects might "produce consciousness, intention-
ality and all the rest of it using some other sorts of chemical principles
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than human beings use." But this admission gives the whole game
away. How would Searle know that he had built a silicon-based mind
(rather than our own carbon-based mind) except by having an appro-
priate abstract (that is, nonmaterial) characterization of what the two
life forms hold in common? Searle finesses this problem by simply
"attributing" cognitive states to himself, other people, and a variety of
domestic animals: "In 'cognitive sciences' one presupposes the reality
and knowability of the mental in the same way that in physical sciences
one has to presuppose the reality and knowability of physical objects."
But this really won't do: we are, after all, a long way from having any
very convincing evidence that cats and dogs have "cognitive states" in
anything like Searle's use of the term |See "Cognition and Conscious-
ness in Nonhuman Species" BBS 1(4) 1978].
Thomas Huxley (1874, p. 156) poses the question in his paraphrase
of Nicholas Malebranche's orthodox Cartesian line: "What proof is
there that brutes are other than a superior race of marionettes, which
eat without pleasure, cry without pain, desire nothing, know nothing,
and only simulate intelligence as a bee simulates a mathematician?"
Descartes' friend and correspondent, Marin Mersenne, had little doubt
about the answer to this kind of question. In his discussion of the
perceptual capacities of animals he forthrightly denies mentality to the
beasts:
Animals have no knowledge of these sounds, but only a representa-
tion, without knowing whether what they apprehend is a sound or a
color or something else; so one can say that they do not act so
much as are acted upon, and that the objects make an impression
upon their senses from which their action necessarily follows, as the
wheels of a clock necessarily follow the weight or spring which
drives them. (Mersenne 1636)
For Mersenne, then, the program inside animals is indeed an uninter-
preted calculus, a syntax without a semantics |See Fodor: "Methodo-
logical Solipsism" BBS 3(1) 1980|. Searle, on the other hand, seems to
believe that apes, monkeys, and dogs do "have mental states"
because they "are made of similar stuff to ourselves" and have eyes, a
nose, and skin. I fail to see how the datum supports the conclusion.
One might have thought that some quite intricate reasoning and subtle
experimentation would be required to justify the ascription of intention-
ality to chimpanzees (Marshall 1971: Woodruff & Premack 1979). That
chimpanzees look quite like us is a rather weak fact on which to build
such a momentous conclusion.
When Jacques de Vaucanson - the greatest of all Al theorists - had
completed his artificial duck he showed it, in all its naked glory of
wood, string, steel, and wire. However much his audience may have
preferred a more cuddly creature, Vaucanson firmly resisted the
temptation to clothe it:
Perhaps some Ladies, or some People, who only like the Outside of
Animals, had rather have seen the whole cover'd; that is the Duck
with Feathers. But besides, that I have been desir'd to make every
thing visible; I wou'd not be thought to impose upon the Spectators
by any conceal'd or juggling Contrivance (Fryer & Marshall 1979).
For Vaucanson, the theory that he has embodied in the model duck is
the real thing.
Ackno wledgmen t
I thank Dr. J. Loew for his comments on earlier versions of this work.
by Grover Maxwell
Center tor Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
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Intentionality: Hardware, not software
It is a rare and pleasant privilege to comment on an article that surely is
destined to become, almost immediately, a classic. But, alas, what
comments are called for? Following BBS instructions, I'll resist the very
strong temptation to explain how Searle makes exactly the right central
points and supports them with exactly the right arguments; and I shall
leave it to those who, for one reason or another, still disagree with his
central contentions to call attention to a few possible weaknesses,
perhaps even a mistake or two, in the treatment of some of his ancillary
claims. What I shall try to do, is to examine, briefly - and therefore
sketchily and inadequately - what seem to me to be some implications
of his results for the overall mind-body problem.
Quite prudently, in view of the brevity of his paper, Searle leaves
some central issues concerning mind-brain relations virtually
untouched. In particular, his main thrust seems compatible with interac-
tionism, with epiphenomenalism, and with at least some versions of the
identity thesis. It does count, very heavily, against eliminative material-
ism, and , equally importantly, it reveals "functionalism" (or "functional
materialism") as it is commonly held and interpreted (by, for example,
Hilary Putnam and David Lewis) to be just another variety of eliminative
materialism (protestations to the contrary notwithstanding). Searle
correctly notes that functionalism of this kind (and strong Al, in general)
is a kind of dualism. But it is not a mental-physical dualism; it is a
form-content dualism, one, moreover, in which the form is the thing and
content doesn't matter! (See Fodor: "Methodological Solipsism" BBS
3(1) 1980.]
Now I must admit that in order to find these implications in Searle's
results I have read into them a little more than they contain explicity.
Specifically, I have assumed that intentional states are genuinely
mental in the what-is-it-like-to-be-a-bat? sense of "mental" (Nagel
1974) as well as, what I suppose is obvious, that eliminative material-
ism seeks to "eliminate" the genuinely mental in this sense. But it
seems to me that it does not take much reading between the lines to
see that Searle is sympathetic to my assumptions. For example, he
does speak of "genuinely mental Isystems]," and he says (in Searle
1979c) that he believes that "only beings capable of conscious states
are capable of Intentional states" (my italics), although he says that he
does not know how to demonstrate this. (How, indeed, could anyone
demonstrate such a thing? How could one demonstrate that fire
burns?)
The argument that Searle gives for the conclusion that only
machines can think (can have intentional states) appears to have two
suppressed premisses: (1) intentional states must always be causally
produced, and (2) any causal network (with a certain amount of
organization and completeness, or some such condition) is a machine.
I accept for the purposes of this commentary his premises and his
conclusion. Next I want to ask: what kind of hardware must a thinking
machine incorporate? (By "thinking machine" I mean of course a
machine that has genuinely mental thoughts: such a machine, I
contend, will also have genuinely mental states or events instantiating
sensations, emotions, and so on in all of their subjective, qualitative,
conscious, experiential richness.) To continue this line of investigation,
I want to employ an "event ontology," discarding substance
metaphysics altogether. (Maxwell 1978, provides a sketch of some of
the details and of the contentions that contemporary physics, quite
independently of philosophy of mind, leads to such an ontology.) An
event is (something like) the instancing of a property or the instancing
(concrete realization) of a state. A causal network, then, consists
entirely of a group of events and the causal links that interconnect
them. A fortiori, our "machine" will consist entirely of events and
causal connections. In other words, the hardware of this machine (or of
any machine, for example, a refrigerator) consists of its constituent
events and the machine consists of nothing else (except the causal
linkages). Our thinking machine in the only form we know it today is
always a brain (or if you prefer, an entire human or other animal body),
which, as we have explained, is just a certain causal network of events.
The mind-brain identity theory in the version that I defend says that
some of the events in this network are (nothing but) genuinely mental
events (instances of intentional states, or of pains, or the like).
Epiphenomenalism says that the mental events "dangle" from the main
net (the brain) by causal connections which are always one way (from
brain to dangler). (Epiphenomenalism is, I believe, obviously, though
contingently, false.) Interactionism says that there are causal connec-
tions in both directions but that the mental events are somehow in a
different realm from the brain events. (How come a "different realm" -
or whatever? Question: Is there a real difference between interaction-
ism and identity theory in an event ontology?)
Assuming that Searle would accept the event ontology, if no more
than for the sake of discussion, would he say that mental events, in
general, and instances of intentional states, in particular, are parts of
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the machine, or is it his position that they are just products of the
machine? That is, would Searle be inclined to accept the identity thesis,
or would he lean toward either epiphenomenalism or interactionism?
For my money, in such a context, the identity theory seems by far the
most plausible, elegant, and economical guess. To be sure, it must
face serious and, as yet, completely unsolved problems, such as the
"grain objection" (see, for example, Maxwell 1978), and emergence
versus panpsychism (see, for example, Popper & Eccles 1977), but I
believe that epiphenomenalism and interactionism face even more
severe difficulties.
Before proceeding, I should emphasize that contemporary scientific
knowledge not only leads us to an event ontology but also that it
indicates the falsity of naive realism and "gently persuades" us to
accept what I have (somewhat misleadingly, I fear) called "structural
realism." According to this, virtually all of our knowledge of the physical
world is knowledge of the structure (including space-time structure) of
the causal networks that constitute it. (See, for example, Russell 1948
and Maxwell 1976). This holds with full force for knowledge about the
brain (except for a very special kind of knowledge, to be discussed
soon). We are, therefore, left ignorant as to what the intrinsic
(nonstructural) properties of "matter" (or what contemporary physics
leaves of it) are. In particular, if only we knew a lot more neurophysiolo-
gy, we would know the structure of the (immense) causal network that
constitutes the brain, but we would not know its content; that is, we still
wouldn't know what any of its constituent events are. Identity theory
goes a step further and speculates that some of these events just are
(instances of) our intentional states, our sensations, our emotions, and
so on, in all of their genuinely mentalistic richness, as they are known
directly "by acquaintance." This is the "very special knowledge"
mentioned above, and if identity theory is true, it is knowledge of what
some (probably a very small subset) of the events that constitute the
brain are. In this small subset of events we know intrinsic as well as
structural properties.
Let us return to one of the questions posed by Searle: "could an
artifact, a man-made machine, think?" The answer he gives is, I think,
the best possible one, given our present state of unbounded ignorance
in the neurosciences, but I'd like to elaborate a little. Since, I have
claimed above, thoughts and other (genuinely) mental events are part
of the hardware of "thinking machines," such hardware must some-
how be got into any such machine we build. At present we have no
inkling as to how this could be done. The best bet would seem to be,
as Searle indicates, to "build" a machine (out of protoplasm) with
neurons, dentrites, and axons like ours, and then to hope that, from
this initial hardware, mental hardware would be mysteriously generated
(would "emerge"). But this "best bet" seems to me extremely
implausible. However, I do not conclude that construction of a thinking
machine is (even contingently, much less logically) impossible. I
conclude, rather, that we must learn a lot more about physics,
neurophysiology, neuropsychology, psychophysiology, and so on, not
just more details - but much more about the very foundations of our
theroretical knowledge in these areas, before we can even speculate
with much sense about building thinking machines. (I have argued in
Maxwell 1978 that the foundations of contemporary physics are in
such bad shape that we should hope for truly "revolutionary" changes
in physical theory, that such changes may very well aid immensely in
"solving the mind-brain problems," and that speculations in
neurophysiology and perhaps even psychology may very well provide
helpful hints for the physicist in his renovation of, say, the foundations
of space-time theory.) Be all this as it may, Searle has shown the total
futility of the strong Al route to genuine artificial intelligence.
by E.W. Menzel, Jr.
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony
Brook, N.Y. 11794
Is the pen mightier than the computer?
The area of artificial intelligence (Al) differs from that of natural
intelligence in at least three respects. First, in Al one is perforce limited
to the use of formalized behavioral data or "output" as a basis for
making inferences about one's subjects. (The situation is no different,
however, in the fields of history and archaeology.) Second, by conven-
tion, if nothing else, in Al one must ordinarily assume, until proved
otherwise, that one's subject has no more mentality than a rock;
whereas in the area of natural intelligence one can often get away with
the opposite assumption, namely, that until proved otherwise, one's
subject can be considered to be sentient. Third, in Al analysis is
ordinarily limited to questions regarding the "structure" of intelligence,
whereas a complete analysis of natural intelligence must also consider
questions of function, development, and evolution.
In other respects, however, it seems to me that the problems of
inferring mental capacities are very much the same in the two areas.
And the whole purpose of the Turing test (or the many counterparts to
that test which are the mainstay of comparative psychology) is to
devise a clear set of rules for determining the status of subjects of any
species, about whose possession of a given capacity we are uncer-
tain. This is admittedly a game, and it cannot be freed of all possible
arbitrary aspects any more than can, say, the field of law. Furthermore,
unless everyone agrees to the rules of the game, there is no way to
prove one's case for (or against) a given capacity with absolute and
dead certainty.
As I see it. Searle quite simply refuses to play such games, at least
according to the rules proposed by Al. He assigns himself the role of a
judge who knows beforehand in most cases what the correct decision
should be. And he does not, in my opinion, provide us with any decision
rules for the remaining (and most interesting) undecided cases, other
than rules of latter-day common sense (whose pitfalls and ambiguities
are perhaps the major reason for devising objective tests that are
based on performance rather than physical characteristics such as
species, race, sex, and age).
Let me be more specific. First of all, the discussion of "the brain"
and "certain brain processes" is not only vague but seems to me to
displace and complicate the problems it purports to solve. In saying
this I do not imply that physiological data are irrelevant; I only say that
their relevance is not made clear, and the problem of deciding where
the brain leaves off and nonbrain begins is not as easy as it sounds.
Indeed. I doubt that many neuroanatomists would even try to draw any
sharp and unalterable line that demarcates exactly where in the animal
kingdom "the brain" emerges from "the central nervous system"; and
I suspect that some of them would ask, Why single out thu brain as
crucial to mind or intentionality? Why not thu central nervous system or
DNA or (to become more restrictive rather than liberal) the human brain
or the Caucasian brain? Precisely analogous problems would arise in
trying to specify for a single species such as man precisely how much
intact brain, or what parts of it, or which of the "certain brain
processes," must be taken into account and when one brain process
leaves off and another one begins. Quite coincidentally, I would be
curious as to what odds Searle would put on the likelihood that a
neurophysiologist could distinguish between the brain processes of
Searle during the course of his hypothetical experiment and the brain
processes of a professor of Chinese. Also, I am curious as to what
mental status he would assign to, say, an earthworm.
Second, it seems to me that, especially in the domain of psychology,
there are always innumerable ways to skin a cat, and that these ways
are not necessarily commensurate, especially when one is discussing
two different species or cultures or eras. Thus, for example, I would be
quite willing to concede that to "acquire the calculus" I would not
require the intellectual power of Newton or of Leibnitz, who invented
the calculus. But how would Searle propose to quantity the relative
"causal powers" that are involved here, or how would he establish the
relative similarity of the "effects"? The problem is especially difficult
when Searle talks about subjects who have "zero understanding," for
we possess no absolute scales or ratio scales in this domain, but only
relativistic ones. In other words, we can assume by definition that a
given subject may be taken as a criterion of "zero understanding," and
assess the competence of other subjects by comparing them against
this norm; but someone else is always free to invoke some other norm.
Thus, for example, Searle uses himself as a standard of comparison
and assumes he possesses zero understanding of Chinese. But what it
I proposed that a better norm would be, say, a dog? Unless Searle's
performance were no better than that of the dog, it seems to me that
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the student of Al could argue that Searle's understanding must be
greater than zero, and that his hypothetical experiment is therefore
inconclusive; that is, the computer, which performs as he did, cannot
necessarily be said to have zero understanding either.
In addition to these problems, Searle's hypothetical experiment is
based on the assumption that Al would be proved "false" if it could be
shown that even a single subject on a single occasion could conceiv-
ably pass a Turing test despite the fact that he possesses what may be
assumed to be zero understanding. This, in my opinion, is a mistaken
assumption. No student of Al would, to my knowledge, claim infallibility.
His predictions would be at best probabilistic or statistical; and, even
apart from problems such as cheating, some errors of classification
are to be expected on the basis of "chance" alone. Turing, for
example, predicted only that by the year 2000 computers will be able
to fool an average interrogator on a Turing test, and be taken for a
person, at least 30 times out of 100. In brief, I would agree with Searle if
he had said that the position of strong Al is unprovable with dead
certainty; but by his criteria no theory in empirical science is provable,
and I therefore reject his claim that he has shown Al to be false.
Perhaps the central question raised by Searle's paper is, however,
Where does mentality lie? Searle tells us that the intelligence of
computers lies in our eyes alone. Einstein, however, used to say, "My
pencil is more intelligent than I"; and this maxim seems to me to come
at least as close to the truth as Searle's position. It is quite true that
without a brain to guide it and interpret its output, the accomplishments
of a pencil or a computer or of any of our other "tools of thought"
would not be very impressive. But, speaking for myself, I confess I'd
have to take the same dim view of my own accomplishments. In other
words, I am quite sure that I could not even have "had" the thoughts
expressed in the present commentary without the assistance of
various means of externalizing and objectifying "them" and rendering
them accessible not only for further examination but for their very
formulation. I presume that there were some causal connections and
correspondences between what is now on paper (or is it in the
reader's eyes alone?) and what went on in my brain or mind; but it is an
open question as to what these causal connections and correspon-
dences were. Furthermore, it is only if one confuses present and past,
and internal and external happenings with each other, and considers
them a single "thing," that "thinking" or even the causal power behind
thought can be allocated to a single "place" or entity. I grant that it is
metaphorical if not ludicrous to give my pencil the credit or blame for
the accomplishment of "the thoughts in this commentary." But it would
be no less metaphorical and ludicrous - at least in science, as
opposed to everyday life - to give the credit or blame to my brain as
such. Whatever brain processes or mental processes were involved in
the writing of this commentary, they have long since been terminated.
In the not-too-distant future not even " I " as a body will exist any longer.
Does this mean that the reader of the future will have no valid basis for
estimating whether or not I was (or, as a literary figure, "am") any more
intelligent than a rock? I am curious as to how Searle would answer this
question. In particular, I would like to know whether he would ever infer
from an artifact or document alone that its author had a brain or certain
brain processes - and, if so, how this is different from making
inferences about mentality from a subject's outputs alone.
by Marvin Minsky
Artlliciel Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute ol Technology.
Cambridge. Mass. 02139
Decentralized minds
In this essay, Searle asserts without argument: "The study of the mind
starts with such facts as that humans have beliefs, while thermostats,
telephones, and adding machines don't. If you get a theory that denies
this. . .the theory is false."
No. The study of mind is not the study of belief; it is the attempt to
discover powerful concepts - be they old or new - that help explain
why some machines or animals can do so many things others cannot. I
will argue that traditional, everyday, precomputational concepts like
believing and understanding are neither powerful nor robust enough for
developing or discussing the subject.
In centuries past, biologists argued about machines and life much as
Searle argues about programs and mind; one might have heard: "The
study of biology begins with such facts as that humans have life, while
locomotives and telegraphs don't. If you get a theory that denies this -
the theory is false." Yet today a successful biological science is based
on energetics and information processing; no notion of "alive"
appears in the theory, nor do we miss it. The theory's power comes
from replacing, for example, a notion of "self-reproduction" by more
sophisticated notions about encoding, translation, and recombina-
tion - to explain the reproduction of sexual animals that do not,
exactly, "reproduce."
Similarly in mind science, though prescientific idea germs like
"believe," know," and "mean" are useful in daily life, they seem
technically too coarse to support powerful theories; we need to
supplant, rather than to support and explicate them. Real as "self" or
"understand" may seem to us today, they are not (like milk and sugar)
objective things our theories must accept and explain; they are only
first steps toward better concepts. It would be inappropriate here to
put forth my own ideas about how to proceed; instead consider a
fantasy in which our successors recount our present plight: "The
ancient concept of 'belief proved inadequate until replaced by a
continuum in which, it turned out, stones placed near zero, and
termostats scored 0.52. The highest human score measured so far is
67.9. Because it is theoretically possible for something to be believed
as intensely as 3600, we were chagrined to learn that men in fact
believe so poorly. Nor, for that matter, are they very proficient (on an
absolute scale) at intending. Still, they are comfortably separated from
the thermostats." |0livaw, R.D. (2063) Robotic reflections, Phenome-
nological Science 67:60.] A joke, of course; I doubt any such one-
dimensional idea would help much. Understanding how parts of a
program or mind can relate to things outside of it - or to other parts
within - is complicated, not only because of the intricacies of hypotheti-
cal intentions and meanings, but because different parts of the mind do
different things - both with regard to externals and to one another. This
raises another issue: "In employing formulas like 'A believes that B
means C,' our philosophical precursors became unwittingly entrapped
in the 'single-agent fallacy' - the belief that inside each mind is a single
believer (or meaner) who does the believing. It is strange how long this
idea survived, even after Freud published his first clumsy portraits of
our inconsistent and adversary mental constitutions. To be sure, that
myth of 'self is indispensable both for social purposes, and in each
infant's struggle to make simplified models of his own mind's structure.
But it has not otherwise been of much use in modern applied cognitive
theory, such as our work to preserve, rearrange, and recombine those
aspects of a brain's mind's parts that seem of value." IByerly, S.
(2080) New hope for the Dead, Reader's Digest, March 13]
Searle talks of letting "the individual internalize all of these elements
of the system" and then complains that "there isn't anything in the
system that isn't in him." Just as our predecessors sought "life" in the
study of biology, Searle still seeks "him" in the study of mind, and
holds strong Al to be impotent to deal with the phenomenology of
understanding. Because this is so subjective a topic, I feel it not
inappropriate to introduce some phenomenology of my own. While
reading about Searle's hypothetical person who incorporates into his
mind - "without understanding" - the hypothetical "squiggle squog-
gle" process that appears to understand Chinese, I found my own
experience to have some of the quality of a double exposure: "The
text makes sense to some parts of my mind but, to other parts of my
mind, it reads much as though it were itself written in Chinese. I
understand its syntax, I can parse the sentences, and I can follow the
technical deductions. But the terms and assumptions themselves -
what the words like 'intend' and 'mean' intend and mean - escape me.
They seem suspiciously like Searle's 'formally specified symbols' -
because their principal meanings engage only certain older parts of my
mind that are not in harmonious, agreeable contact with just those
newer parts that seem better able to deal with such issues (precisely
because they know how to exploit the new concepts of strong Al)."
Searle considers such internalizations - ones not fully integrated in
the whole mind - to be counterexamples, or reductiones ad absurdum
of some sort, setting programs somehow apart from minds. I see them
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as illustrating the usual condition of normal minds, in which different
fragments of structure interpret - and misinterpret - the fragments of
activity they "see" in the others. There is absolutely no reason why
programs, too, cannot contain such conflicting elements. To be sure,
the excessive clarity of Searle's example saps its strength; the man's
Chinese has no contact at all with his other knowledge - while even the
parts of today's computer programs are scarcely ever jammed
together in so simple a manner.
In the case of a mind so split into two parts that one merely executes
some causal housekeeping for the other, I should suppose that each
part - the Chinese rule computer and its host - would then have its
own separate phenomenologies - perhaps along different time scales.
No wonder, then, that the host can't "understand" Chinese very
fluently - here I agree with Searle. But (for language, if not for walking
or breathing) surely the most essential nuances of the experience of
intending and understanding emerge, not from naked data bases of
assertions and truth values, but from the interactions - the conso-
nances and conflicts among different reactions within various partial
selves and self-images.
What has this to do with Searle's argument? Well, I can see that if
one regards intentionality as an all-or-none attribute, which each
machine has or doesn't have, then Searle's idea - that intentionality
emerges from some physical semantic principle - might seem plausi-
ble. But in may view this idea (of intentionality as a simple attribute)
results from an oversimplification - a crude symbolization - of complex
and subtle introspective activities. In short, when we construct our
simplified models of our minds, we need terms to represent whole
classes of such consonances and conflicts - and, I conjecture, this is
why we create omnibus terms like "mean" and "intend." Then, those
terms become reified.
It is possible that only a machine as decentralized yet intercon-
nected as a human mind would have anything very like a human
phenomenology. Yet even this supports no Searle-like thesis that
mind's character depends on more than abstract information process-
ing - on, for example, the "particular causal properties" of the
substances of the brain in which those processes are embodied. And
here I find Searle's arguments harder to follow. He criticizes dualism,
yet complains about fictitious antagonists who suppose mind to be as
substantial as sugar. He derides "residual operationalism" - yet he
goes on to insist that, somehow, the chemistry of a brain can
contribute to the quality or flavor of its mind with no observable effect
on its behavior.
Strong Al enthusiasts do not maintain, as Searle suggests, that
"what is specifically mental about the mind has no intrinsic connection
with the actual properties of the brain." Instead, they make a much
more discriminating scientific hypothesis: about which such causal
properties are important in mindlike processes - namely computation-
supporting properties. So, what Searle mistakenly sees as a difference
in kind is really one of specific detail. The difference is important
because what might appear to Searle as careless inattention to vital
features is actually a deliberate - and probably beneficial - scientific
strategy! For, as Putnam points out:
What is our intellectual form? is the question, not what the matter is.
Small effects may have to be explained in terms of the actual physics
of the brain. But when are not even at the level of an idealized
description of the functional organization of the brain, to talk about
the importance of small perturbations seems decidedly premature.
Now, many strong Al enthusiasts go on the postulate that functional
organization is the only such dependency, and it is this bold assump-
tion that leads directly to the conclusion Searle seems to dislike so;
that nonorganic machines may have the same kinds of experience as
people do. That seems fine with me. I just can't see why Searle is so
opposed to the idea that a really big pile of junk might have feelings like
ours. He proposes no evidence whatever against it, he merely tries to
portray it as absurd to imagine machines, with minds like ours -
intentions and all - made from stones and paper instead of electrons
and atoms. But I remain left to wonder how Searle, divested of
despised dualism and operationalism, proposes to distinguish the
authentic intentions of carbon compounds from their behaviorally
identical but mentally counterfeit imitations.
I feel that I have dealt with the arguments about Chinese, and those
about substantiality. Yet a feeling remains that there is something
deeply wrong with all such discussions (as this one) of other minds;
nothing ever seems to get settled in them. From the finest minds, on all
sides, emerge thoughts and methods of low quality and little power.
Surely this stems from a burden of traditional ideas inadequate to this
tremendously difficult enterprise. Even our logic may be suspect. Thus,
I could even agree with Searle that modern computational ideas are of
little worth here - if, with him, I could agree to judge those ideas by their
coherence and consistency with earlier constructions in philosophy.
However, once one suspects that there are other bad apples in the
logistic barrel, rigorous consistency becomes much too fragile a
standard - and we must humbly turn to what evidence we can gather.
So, beacuse this is still a formative period for our ideas about mind, I
suggest that we must remain especially sensitive to the empirical
power that each new idea may give us to pursue the subject further.
And, as Searle nowhere denies, computationalism is the principal
source of the new machines and programs that have produced for us
the first imitations, however limited and shabby, of mindlike activity.
by Thomas Natsoulas
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Calif. 95616
The primary source of intentionality
I have shared Searle's belief: the level of description that computer
programs exemplify is not one adequate to the explanation of mind. My
remarks about this have appeared in discussions of perceptual theory
that make little if any reference to computer programs per se (Natsou-
las 1974; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; 1980). Just as Searle argues for the
material basis of mind - "that actual human mental phenomena
Idepend] on actual physical-chemical properties of actual human
brains" - I have argued that the particular concrete nature of percep-
tual awarenesses, as occurrences in a certain perceptual system, is
essential to the references they make to objects, events, or situations
in the stimulational environment.
In opposition to Gibson (for example, 1966; 1967; 1972), whose
perceptual theory amounts to hypotheses concerning the pickup by
perceptual systems of abstract entities called "informational invari-
ants" from the stimulus flux, I have stated:
Perceptual systems work in their own modes to ascribe the detected
properties which are specified informationally to the actual physical
environment around us. The informational invariants to which a
perceptual system resonates are defined abstractly [by Gibson] such
that the resonating process itself can exemplify them. But the
resonance process is not itself abstract. And characterization of it at
the level of informational invariants cannot suffice for the theory of
perception. It is crucial to the theory of perception that informational
invariants are resonated to in concrete modes that are characteristic
of the organism as the kind of perceiving physical system that it is.
(Natsoulas 1978b, p. 281)
The latter is crucial to perceptual theory, I have argued, if that theory is
to explain the intentionality, or aboutness, of perceptual awarenesses
[see also Ullman: "Against Direct perception" BBS 3(3) 1980, this
issue].
And just as Searle summarily rejects the attempt to eliminate
intentionality, saying that it does no good to "feign anesthesia," I
argued as follows against Dennett's (1969; 1971; 1972) effort to treat
intentionality as merely a heuristic overlay on the extensional theory of
the nervous system and bodily motions.
In knowing that we are knowing subjects, here is one thing that we
know: that we are aware of objects in a way other than the
"colorless" way in which we sometimes think of them. The experi-
enced presence of objects makes it difficult if not impossible to claim
that perceptions involve only the acquisition of information.. . It is
this. . . kind of presence that makes perceptual aboutness some-
thing more than an "interpretation" or "heuristic overlay" to be
dispensed with once a complete enough extensional account is at
hand. The qualitative being thereness of objects and scenes. . . is
about as easy to doubt as our own existence. (Natsoulas 1977, pp.
94-95; cf. Searle, 1979b, p. 261, on "presentational immediacy.")
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However, I do not know in what perceptual aboutness consists. I
have been making some suggestions and I believe, with Sperry (1969;
1970; 1976), that an objective description of subjective experience is
possible in terms of brain function. Such a description should include
that feature or those features of perceptual awareness that make it be
of (or as if it is of, in the hallucinatory instance) an object, occurrence,
or situation in the physical environment or in the perceiver's body
outside the nervous system. If the description did not include this
feature it would be incomplete, in my view, and in need of further
development.
In another recent article on intentionality, Searle (1979a) has written
of the unavoidability of "the intentional circle," arguing that any
explanation of intentionality that we may come up with will presuppose
an understanding of intentionality: "There is no analysis of intentionality
into logically necessary and sufficient conditions of the form 'X is an
intentional state S if and only if 'p, q, and r,' where 'p, q, and r' make no
use of intentional notions" (p. 195). I take this to say that the
intentionality of mental states is not reducible; but I don't think it is
meant, by itself, to rule out the possibility that intentionality might be a
property of certain brain processes. Searle could still take the view that
it is one of their as yet unknown "ground floor" properties.
But Searle's careful characterization, in the target article, of the
relation between brain and mental processes as causal, with mental
processes consistently said to be produced by brain processes, gives
a different impression. Of course brain processes produce other brain
processes, but if he had meant to include mental processes among the
latter, would he have written about only the causal properties of the
brain in a discussion of the material basis of intentionality?
One is tempted to assume that Searle would advocate some form of
interactionism with regard to the relation of mind to brain. I think that his
analogy of mental processes to products of biological processes, such
as sugar and milk, was intended to illuminate the causal basis of
mental processes and not their nature. His statement that intentionality
is "a biological phenomenon" was prefaced by "whatever else inten-
tionality is" and was followed by a repetition of his earlier point
concerning the material basis of mind (mental processes as produced
by brain processes). And I feel quite certain that Searle would not
equate mental processes with another of the brain's effects, namely
behaviors (see Searle 1979b).
Though it may be tempting to construe Searle's position as a form of
dualism, there remains the more probable alternative that he has
simple chosen not to take, in these recent writings, a position on the
ontological question. He has chosen to deal only with those elements
that seem already clear to him as regards the problem of intentionality.
However, his emphasis in the target article on intentionality's material
basis would seem to be an indication that he is now inching toward a
position on the ontological question and the view that this position
matters to an understanding of intentionality.
I emphasize the latter because of what Searle has written on "the
form of realization" of mental states in still another recent article on
intentionality. In this article (Searle 1979c), he made the claim that the
"traditional ontological problems about mental states are for the most
part simply irrelevant to their Intentional features" (p. 81). It does not
matter how a mental state is realized, Searle suggested, so long as in
being realized it is realized so as to have those features. To know what
an intentional state is requires only that we know its "representative
content" and its "psychological mode."
But this would not tell us actually what the state is, only which one it
is, or what kind it is. For example, I may know that the mental state that
just occurred to me was a passing thought to the effect that it is raining
in London at this moment. It is an it-is-raining-in-London-right-now kind
of thought that just occurred to me. Knowing of this thought's occur-
rence and of that of many others, which is to know their representative
contents and psychological modes, would not be to know what the
thought is, what the mental occurrence is that is the passing thought.
Moreover, for a mental state or occurrence to have its intentional
features, it must have a form of realization that gives it to them. Searle
has stated: "It doesn't matter how an Intentional state is realized, as
long as the realization is a realization of its Intentionality" (1979c, p.
81). The second part of this sentence is an admission that it does
matter how it is realized. The explanation of intentionality remains
incomplete in the absence of an account of its source and of its
relation to that source. This point becomes vivid when considered in
the context of another discussion contained in the same article.
In this part of the article, Searle gave some attention to what he
called "the primary form of Intentionality," namely perception (cf.
Searle 1979b, pp. 260-61). One's visual experience of a table was
said to be a "presentation" of the table, as opposed to a representa-
tion of it. Still, such presentations are intrinsically intentional, for
whenever they occur, the person thereby perceives or hallucinates a
table. The visual experience if of a table, even though it is not a
representation of a table, because it is satisfied by the physical
presence of a table there where the table visually seems to be
located.
Concluding this discussion, Searle added,
To say that I have a visual experience whenever I perceive the
table visually is to make an ontological claim, a claim about the form
of realization of an Intentional state, in a way that to say all my beliefs
have a representational content is not to make an ontological claim.
(1979c, p. 91)
Since Searle would say that he, and the people reading his article, and
animals, and so on, have visual experiences, the question he needs to
answer, as the theorist of intentionality he is, is: what is the ontological
claim he is making in doing so? Or, what is the "form of realization" of
our visual experiences that Searle is claiming when he attributes them
to us?
by Roland Puccetti
Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H
3JS
The chess room: further demythologizing of strong Al
On the grounds he has staked out, which are considerable, Searle
seems to me completely victorious. What I shall do here is to lift the
sights of his argument and train them on a still larger, very tempting
target.
Suppose we have an intelligent human from a chess-free culture, say
Chad in Central Africa, and we introduce him to the chess room. There
he confronts a computer console on which are displayed numbers 1-8
and letters R,N,B,K,Q, and P, plus the words WHITE and BLACK. He is
told WHITE goes first, then BLACK, alternately, until the console lights
go out. There is, of course, a binary machine representation of the
chessboard that prevents illegal moves, but he need know nothing of
that. He is instructed to identify himself with WHITE, hence to move
first, and that the letter-number combination P-K4 is a good beginning.
So he presses P-K4 and waits.
BLACK appears on the console, followed by three alternative
letter-number combinations, P-K4, P-QB4, and P-K3. If this were a
"depth-first" program, each of these replies would be searched two
plies further and a static evaluation provided. Thus to BLACK'S P-K4,
WHITE could try either N-KB3 or B-B4. If N-KB3, BLACK'S rejoinder
N-QB3 or P-Q3 both yield an evaluation for WHITE of + 1; whereas if
B-B4, BLACK'S reply of either B-B4 or N-KB3 produces an evaluation
of, respectively, +0 and +3. Since our Chadian has been instructed to
reject any letter-number combinations yielding an evaluation of less
than + 1 , he will not pursue B-B4, but is prepared to follow N-KB3
unless a higher evaluation turns up. And in fact it does. The BLACK
response P-QB4 allows N-KB3, and to that, BLACK'S best counter-
moves P-Q3, P-K3, and N-QB3 produce evaluations of +7, +4,
and +8. On the other hand, if this were a "breadth-first" program, in
which all nodes (the point at which one branching move or half-move
subdivides into many smaller branches in the game tree) at one level
are examined prior to nodes at a deeper level, WHITE'S continuations
would proceed more statically; but again this does not matter to the
Chadian in the chess room, who, in instantiating either kind of program,
hasn't the foggiest notion what he is doing.
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We must get perfectly clear what this implies. Both programs
described here play chess (Frey 1977), and the latter with striking
success in recent competition when run on a more powerful computer
than before, a large scale Control Data Cyber 170 system (Frey 1977,
Appendix). Yet there is not the slightest reason to believe either
program understands chess play. Each performs "computational
operations on purely formally specified elements," but so would the
uncomprehending Chadian in our chess room, although of course
much more slowly (we could probably use him only for postal chess,
for this reason). Such operations, by themselves cannot, then, consti-
tute understanding the game, no matter how intelligently played.
It is surprising that this has not been noticed before. For example,
the authors of the most successful program to date (Slate & Atkin
1977) write that the evaluative function of CHESS 4.5 understands that
it is bad to make a move that leaves one of one's own pieces attacked
and undefended, it is good to make a move that forks two enemy
pieces, and good to make a move that prevents a forking maneuver by
the opponent (p. 114). Yet in a situation in which the same program is
playing WHITE to move with just the WHITE king on KB5, the BLACK
king on KR6, and BLACK's sole pawn advancing from KR4 to a
possible queening, the initial evaluation of WHITE'S six legal moves is
as follows:
Move
K-K4
K-B4
K-N4
K-K5
K-K6
K-B6
PREL score
-116
-114
-106
- 1 2 1
-129
-127
In other words, with a one-ply search the program gives a slightly
greater preference to WHITE moving K-N4 because one of its evalua-
tors encourages the king to be near the surviving enemy pawn, and N4 '
is as close as the WHITE king can legally get. This preliminary score
does not differ much from that of the other moves since, as the authors
admit, "the evaluation function does not understand that the pawn will
be captured two half-moves later (p. 111)." It is only after a two-ply
and then a three-ply iteration of K-N4 that the program finds that all
possible replies are met. The authors candidly conclude:
The whole 3-ply search here was completed in about 100 millisec-
onds. In a tournament the search would have gone out to perhaps
12 phy to get the same result, since the program lacks the sense to
see that since White can force a position in which all material is
gone, the game is necessarily drawn, (p. 113).
But then if CHESS 4.5 does not understand even this about chess,
why say it "understands" forking maneuvers, and the like? All this can
mean is that the program has built-in evaluators that discourage it from
getting into forked positions and encourage it to look for ways to fork
its opponent. That is not understanding, since as we saw, our Chadian
in the chess room could laboriously achieve the same result on the
console in blissful ignorance of chess boards, chess positions, or
indeed how the game is played. Intelligent chess play is of course
simulated this way, but chess understanding is not thereby duplicated.
Up until the middle of this century, chess-playing machines were
automata with cleverly concealed human players inside them (Carroll
1975). We now have much more complex automata, and while the
programs they run on are inside them, they do not have the intentional-
ity towards the chess moves they make that midget humans had in the
hoaxes of yesteryear. They simply know not what they do.
Searle quite unnecessarily mars his argument near the end of the
target article by offering the observation, perhaps to disarm hard-
nosed defenders of strong Al, that we humans are "thinking
machines." But surely if he was right to invoke literal meaning against
claims that, for example, thermostats have beliefs, he is wrong to say
humans are machines of any kind. There were literally no machines on
this planet 10,000 years ago, whereas the species Homo sapiens has
existed here for at least 100,000 years, so it cannot be that men are
machines.
byZenon W. Pylyshyn'
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calit. S430S.
The "causal power" of machines
What kind of stuff can refer? Searle would have us believe that
computers, qua formal symbol manipulators, necessarily lack the
quality of intentionality, or the capacity to understand and to refer,
because they have different "causal powers" from us. Although just
what having different causal powers amounts to (other than not being
capable of intentionality) is not spelled out, it appears at least that
systems that are functionally identical need not have the same "causal
powers." Thus the relation of equivalence with respect to causal
powers is a refinement of the relation of equivalence with respect to
function. What Searle wants to claim is that only systems that are
equivalent to humans in this stronger sense can have intentionality. His
thesis thus hangs on the assumption that intentionality is tied very
closely to specific material properties - indeed, that it is literally caused
by them. From that point of view it would be extremely unlikely that any
system not made of protoplasm - or something essentially identical to
protoplasm - can have intentionality. Thus if more and more of the
cells in your brain were to be replaced by integrated circuit chips,
programmed in such a way as to keep the input-output function of
each unit identical to that of the unit being replaced, you would in all
likelihood just keep right on speaking exactly as you are doing now
except that you would eventually stop meaning anything by it. What we
outside observers might take to be words would become for you just
certain noises that circuits caused you to make.
Searle presents a variety of seductive metaphors and appeals to
intuition in support of this rather astonishing view. For example, he
asks: why should we find the view that intentionality is tied to detailed
properties of the material composition of the system so surprising,
when we so readily accept the parallel claim in the case of lactation?
Surely it's obvious that only a system with certain causal powers can
produce milk; but then why should the same not be true of the ability to
refer? Why this example should strike Searle as even remotely relevant
is not clear, however. The product of lactation is a substance, milk,
whose essential defining properties are, naturally, physical and chemi-
cal ones (although nothing prevents the production of synthetic milk
using a process that is materially very different from mammalian
lactation). Is Searle then proposing that intentionality is a substance
secreted by the brain, and that a possible test for intentionality might
involve, say, titrating the brain tissue that realized some putative mental
episodes?
Similarly, Searle says that it's obvious that merely having a program
can't possibly be a sufficient condition for intentionality since you can
implement that program on a Turing machine made out of "a roll of
toilet paper and a pile of small stones." Such a machine would not
have intentionality because such objects "are the wrong kind of stuff to
have intentionality in the first place." But what is the right kind of stuff?
Is it cell assemblies, individual neurons, protoplasm, protein molecules,
atoms of carbon and hydrogen, elementary particles? Let Searle name
the level, and it can be simulated perfectly well using "the wrong kind
of stuff." Clearly it isn't the s/i/ZHhat has the intentionality. Your brain
cells don't refer any more than do the water pipes, bits of paper,
computer operations, or the homunculus in the Chinese room exam-
ples. Searle presents no argument for the assumption that what makes
the difference between being able to refer and not being able to refer -
or to display any other capacity - is a "finer grained" property of the
system than can be captured in a functional description. Furthermore,
it's obvious from Searle's own argument that the nature of the stuff
cannot be what is relevant, since the monolingual English speaker who
has memeorized the formal rules is supposed to be an example of a
system made of the right stuff and yet it allegedly still lacks the relevant
intentionality.
Having said all this, however, one might still want to maintain that in
some cases - perhaps in the case of Searle's example - it might be
appropriate to say that nothing refers, or that the symbols are not
being used in a way that refers to something. But if we wanted to deny
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that these symbols referred, it would be appropriate to ask what
licences us ever to say that a symbol refers. There are at least three
different approaches to answering that question: Searle's view that it is
the nature of the embodiment of the symbol (of the brain substance
itself), the traditional functionalist view that it is the functional role that
the symbol plays in the overall behavior of the system, and the view
associated with philosophers like Kripke and Putnam, that it is in the
nature of the causal connection that the symbol has with certain past
events. The latter two are in fact compatible insofar as specifying the
functional role of a symbol in the behavior of a system does not
preclude specifying its causal interactions with an environment. It is
noteworthy that Searle does not even consider the possibility that a
purely formal computational model might constitute an essential part of
an adequate theory, where the latter also contained an account of the
system's transducers and an account of how the symbols came to
acquire the role that they have in the functioning of the system.
Functlonalism and reference. The functionalist view is currently
the dominant one in both Al and information-processing psychology. In
the past, mentalism often assumed that reference was established by
relations of similarity; an image referred to a horse if it looked
sufficiently like a horse. Mediational behaviorism took it to be a simple
causal remnant of perception: a brain event referred to a certain object
if it shared some of the properties of brain events that occur when that
object is perceived. But information-processing psychology has opted
for a level of description that deals with the informational, or encoded,
aspects of the environment's effects on the organism. On this view it
has typically been assumed that what a symbol represents can be
seen by examining how the symbol enters into relations with other
symbols and with transducers. It is this position that Searle is quite
specifically challenging, fvly own view is that although Searle is right in
pointing out that some versions of the functionalist answer are in a
certain sense incomplete, he is off the mark both in his diagnosis of
where the problem lies and in his prognosis as to just how impover-
ished a view of mental functioning the cognitivist position will have to
settle for (that is, his "weak Al").
The sense in which a functionalist answer might be incomplete is if it
failed to take the further step of specifying what it was about the
system that warranted the ascription of one particular semantic
content to the functional states (or to the symbolic expressions that
express that state) rather than some other logically possible content. A
cognitive theory claims that the system behaves in a certain way
because certain expressions represent certain things (that is, have a
certain semantic interpretation). It is, furthermore, essential that it do
so: otherwise we would not be able to subsume certain classes of
regular behaviors in a single generalization of the sort "the system
does X because the state S represents such and such" (for example,
the person ran out of the building because he believed that it was on
fire). (For a discussion of this issue, see Pylyshyn 1980b.) But the
particular interpretation appears to be extrinsic to the theory inasmuch
as the system would behave in exactly the same way without the
interpretation. Thus Searle concludes that it is only we, the theorists,
who take the expression to represent, say, that the building is on fire.
The system doesn't take it to represent anything because it literally
doesn't know what the expression refers to: only we theorists do. That
being the case, the system can't be said to behave in a certain way
because of what it represents. This is in contrast with the way in which
our behavior is determined: we do behave in certain ways because of
what our thoughts are about. And that, according to Searle, adds up to
weak Al; that is, a functionalist account in which formal analogues
"stands in" for, but themselves neither have, nor explain, mental
contents.
The last few steps, however, are non sequiturs. The fact that it was
we, the theorists, who provided the interpretation of the expressions
doesn't by itself mean that such an interpretation is simply a matter of
convenience, or that there is a sense in which the interpretation is ours
rather than the system's. Of course it's logically possible that the
interpretation is only in the mind of the theorist and that the system
behaves the way it does for entirely different reasons. But even if that
happened to be true, it wouldn't follow simply from the fact that the Al
theorist was the one who came up with the interpretation. Much
depends on his reasons for coming up with that interpretation. In any
case, the question of whether the semantic interpretation resides in the
head of the programmer or in the machine is the wrong question to
ask. A more relevant question would be: what fixes the semantic
interpretation of functional states, or what latitude does the theorist
have in assigning a semantic interpretation to the states of the
system?
When a computer is viewed as a self-contained device for process-
ing formal symbols, we have a great deal of latitude in assigning
semantic interpretations to states. Indeed, we routinely change our
interpretation of the computer's functional states, sometimes viewing
them as numbers, sometimes as alphabetic characters, sometimes as
words or descriptions of a scene, and so on. Even where it is difficult to
think of a coherent interpretation that is different from the one the
programmer had in mind, such alternatives are always possible in
principle. However, if we equip the machine with transducers and allow
it to interact freely with both natural and linguistic environments, and if
we endow it with the power to make (syntactically specified) infer-
ences, it is anything but obvious what latitude, if any, the theorist (who
knows how the transducers operate, and therefore knows what they
respond to) would still have in assigning a coherent interpretation to
the functional states in such a way as to capture psychologically
relevant regularities in behavior.
The role of intuitions. Suppose such connections between the
system and the world as mentioned above (and possibly other
considerations that no one has yet considered) uniquely constrained
the possible interpretations that could be placed on representational
states. Would this solve the problem of justifying the ascription of
particular semantic contents to these states? Here I suspect that one
would run into differences of opinion that may well be unresolvable,
simply because they are grounded on different intuitions. For example
there immediately arises the question of whether we possess a
privileged interpretation of our own thoughts that must take prece-
dence over such functional analyses. And if so, then there is the further
question of whether being conscious is what provides the privileged
access; and hence the question of what one is to do about the
apparent necessity of positing unconscious mental processes. So far
as I can see the only thing that recommends that particular view is the
intuition that, whatever may be true of other creatures, I at least know
what my thoughts refer to because I have direct experiential access to
the referents of my thoughts. Even if we did have strong intuitions
about such cases, there is good reason to believe that such intuitions
should be considered as no more than secondary sources of
constraint, whose validity should be judged by how well theoretical
systems based on them perform. We cannot take as sacred anyone's
intuitions about such things as whether another creature has intention-
ality - especially when such intuitions rest (as Searle's do, by his own
admission) on knowing what the creature (or machine) is made of (for
instance, Searle is prepared to admit that other creatures might have
intentionality if "we can see that the beasts are made of similar stuff to
ourselves"). Clearly, intuitions based on nothing but such anthropo-
centric chauvinism cannot form the foundation of a science of cogni-
tion |See "Cognition and Consciousness in Nonhuman Species" BBS
1(4) 1978|.
A major problem in science - especially in a developing science like
cognitive psychology - is to decide what sorts of phenomena "go
together," in the sense that they will admit of a uniform set of
explanatory principles. Information-processing theories have achieved
some success in accounting for aspects of problem solving, language
processing, perception, and so on, by deliberately glossing over the
conscious-unconscious distinction; by gouping under common princi-
ples a wide range of rule-governed processes necessary to account
for functioning, independent of whether or not people are aware of
them. These theories have also placed to one side questions as to
what constitute consciously experienced qualia or "raw feels" -
dealing only with some of their reliable functional correlates (such as
the belief that one is in pain, as opposed to the experience of the pain
itself) - and they have to a large extent deliberately avoided the
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3 443
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
question of what gives symbols their semantics. Because Al has
chosen to carve up phenomena in this way, people like Searle are led
to conclude that what is being done is weak Al - or the modelling of the
abstract functional structure of the brain without regard for what its
states represent. Yet there is no reason to think that this program does
not in fact lead to strong Al in the end. There is no reason to doubt that
at asymptote (for example, when and if a robot is built) the ascription
of intentionality to programmed machines will be just as warranted as
its ascription to people, and for reasons that have absolutely nothing to
do with the issue of consciousness.
What is frequently neglected in discussions of intentionality is that
we cannot state with any degree of precision what it is that entitles us
to claim that people refer (though there are one or two general ideas,
such as those discussed above), and therefore that arguments against
the intentionality of computers typically reduce to "argument from
ignorance." If we knew what it was that warranted our saying that
people refer, we might also be in a position to claim that the ascription
of semantic content to formal computational expressions - though it
is in fact accomplished in practice by "inference to the best explana-
tion" - was in the end warranted in exactly the same way. Humility, if
nothing else, should prompt us to admit that there's a lot we don't
know about how we ought to describe the capacities of future robots
and other computing machines, even when we do know how their
electronic circuits operate.
Note
1. Current address: Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario,
London, Canada. N6A 5C2.
by Howard Rachlin
Department of Psychology. Slate University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony
Brook, NY. 11794
The behaviorist reply (Stony Brook)
It is easy to agree with the negative point Searle makes about mind and
Al in this stimulating paper. What is difficult to accept is Searle's own
conception of mind.
His negative point is that the mind can never be a computer
program. Of course, that is what behaviorists have said all along
("residual behaviorism" in the minds of Al researchers notwithstand-
ing). His positive point is that the mind is the same thing as the brain.
But this is just as clearly false as the strong Al position that he
criticizes.
Perhaps the behaviorist viewpoint can best be understood through
two examples, one considered by Searle and one (although fairly
obvious) not considered. The combination robot example is essentially
a behavioral one. A robot behaves exactly like a man. Does it think?
Searle says "If the robot looks and behaves sufficiently like us, then we
would suppose, until proven otherwise, that it must have mental states
like ours"(italics mine). Of couse we would. And let us be clear about
what this robot would be required to do. It might answer questions
about a story that it hears, but it should also laugh and cry in the right
places; it should be able to tell when the story is over. If the story is a
moral one the robot might change its subsequent behavior in situations
similar to the ones the story describes. The robot might ask questions
about the story itself, and the answers it receives might change its
behavior later. The list of typically human behaviors in "response" to
stories is endless. With a finite number of tests we can never be
absolutely positive that the robot understood the story. But proof
otherwise can only come from one place - the robot's subsequent
behavior. That is, the robot may prove that it did not understand a story
told to it at time-X by doing or saying something at a later time that a
normal human would not do who heard a similar story under similar
conditions. If it passes all our behavior tests we would say that,
pending future behavioral evidence, the robot understood the story.
And we would say this even if we were to open up the robot and find a
man translating Chinese, a computer, a dog, a monkey, or a piece of
stale cheese.
The appropriate test is to see whether the robot, upon hearing the
story, behaves like a normal human being. How does a normal human
being behave when told a story? That is a valid question - one in which
behaviorists have been interested and one to which Searle and his
fellow mentalists might also profitably devote their attention when they
finish fantasizing about what goes on inside the head. The neural
mythology that Searle suggests is no better than the computer-
program mythology of the Al researchers.
Searle is willing to abandon the assumption of intentionality (in a
robot) as soon as he discovers that a computer was running it after all.
Here is a perfect example of how cognitive concepts can serve as a
mask for ignorance. The robot is said to think until we find out how it
works. Then it is said not to think. But suppose, contrary to anyone's
expectations, all of the functional properties of the human brain were
discovered. Then the "human robot" would be unmasked, and we
might as well abandon the assumption of intentionality for humans too.
It is only the behaviorist, it seems, who is willing to preserve terms such
as thought, intentionality, and the like (as patterns of behavior). But
there are no "mental states underlying. . . behavior" in the way that a
skeleton underlies our bodily structure. The pattern of the behavior is
the mental state. These patterns are results of internal and external
factors in the present and in the past - not of a controlling mental
state - even one identified with the brain.
That the identification of mind with brain will not hold up is obvious
from the consideration of another example which I daresay will be
brought up by other commentators - even Al researchers - so obvious
is it. Let's call it "The Donovan's brain reply (Hollywood)." A brain is
removed from a normal adult human. That brain is placed inside a
computer console with the familiar input-output machinery - tape
recorders, teletypewriters, and so on. The brain is connected to the
machinery by a series of interface mechanisms that can stimulate all
nerves that the body can normally stimulate and measure the state of
all nerves that normally affect muscular movement. The brain,
designed to interact with a body, will surely do no better (and probably
a lot worse) at operating the interface equipment than a standard
computer mechanism designed for such equipment. This "robot"
meets Searle's criterion for a thinking machine - indeed it is an ideal
thinking machine from his point of view. But it would be ridiculous to say
that it could think. A machine that cannot behave like a human being
cannot, by definition, think.
by Martin Ringle
Computer Science Department. Vassar College. Poughkeepsle. N. Y. 12601
Mysticism as a philosophy of artificial intelligence
Searle identifies a weakness in Al methodology that is certainly worth
investigating. He points out that by focusing attention at such a high
level of cognitive analysis, Al ignores the foundational role that physical
properties play in the determination of intentionality. The case may be
stated thus: in human beings, the processing of cognized features of
the world involves direct physical activity of neural structures and
substructures as well as causal interactions between the nervous
system and external physical phenomena. When we stipulate a "pro-
gram" as an explanation (or, minimally, a description) of a cognitive
process we abstract information-processing-type elements at some
arbitrary level of resolution and we presuppose the constraints and
contributions made at lower levels (for example, physical instantiation).
Al goes wrong, according to Searle, by forgetting the force of this
presupposition and thereby assuming that the computer implementa-
tion of the stipulated program will, by itself, display the intentional
properties of the original human phenomenon.
Al doctrine, of course, holds that the lower-level properties are
irrelevant to the character of the higher level cognitive processes -
thus following the grand old tradition inaugurated by Turing (1964) and
Putnam (1960).
If this is in fact the crux of the dispute between Searle and Al, then it
is of relatively small philosophical interest. For it amounts to saying
nothing more than that there may be important information processes
occurring at the intraneuronal and subneuronal levels - a question that
can only be decided empirically. If it turns out that such processes do
not exist, then current approaches in Al are vindicated; if, on the other
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hand, Searle's contention is correct, then Al must accommodate lower
level processes in its cognitive models. Pragmatically, the simulation of
subneuronal processes on a scale large enough to be experimentally
significant might prove to be impossible (at least with currently
envisioned technology). This is all too likely and would, if proven to be
the case, spell methodological doom for Al as we now know it.
Nevertheless, this would have little philosophical import since the
inability to model the interface between complex subneural and inter-
neuronal processes adequately would constitute a technical, not a
theoretical, failure.
But Searle wants much more than this. He bases his denial of the
adequacy of Al models on the belief that the physical properties of
neuronal systems are such that they cannot in principle be simulated by
a nonprotoplasmic computer system. This is where Searle takes refuge
in what can only be termed mysticism.
Searle refers to the privileged properties of protoplasmic neuronal
systems as "causal powers." I can discover at least two plausible
interpretations of this term, but neither will satisfy Searle's argument.
The first reading of "causal power" pertains to the direct linkage of the
nervous system to physical phenomena of the external world. For
example, when a human being processes visual images, the richness
of the internal information results from direct physical interaction with
the world. When a computer processes a scene, there need be no
actual link between light phenomena in the world and an internal
"representation" in the machine. Because the internal "representa-
tion" is the result of some stipulated program, one could (and often
does in Al) input the "representation" by hand, that is, without any
physical, visual apparatus. In such a case, the causal link between
states of the world and internal states of the machine is merely
stipulated. Going one step further, we can argue that without such a
causal link, the internal states cannot be viewed as cognitive states
since they lack any programmer-independent semantic content. Al
workers might try to remedy the situation by introducing appropriate
sensory transducers and effector mechanisms (such as "hands") into
their systems, but I suspect that Searle could still press his point by
arguing that the causal powers of such a system would still fail to mirror
the precise causal powers of the human nervous system. The
suppressed premise that Searle is trading on, however, is that nothing
but a system that shared the physical properties of our systems would
display precisely the same sort of causal links.
Yet if the causality with which Searle is concerned involves nothing
more than direct connectivity between internal processes and sensori-
motor states, it would seem that he is really talking about functional
properties, not physical ones. He cannot make his case that a
photo-electric cell is incapable of capturing the same sort of informa-
tion as an organic rod or cone in a human retina unless he can
specifically identify a (principled) deficiency of the former with respect
to the latter. And this he does not do. We may sum up by saying that
"causal powers," in this interpretation, does presuppose embodiment
but that no particular physical makeup for a body is demanded.
Connecting actual sensorimotor mechanisms to a perceptronlike inter-
nal processor should, therefore, satisfy causality requirements of this
sort (by removing the stipulational character of the internal states).
Under the second interpretation, the term "causal powers" refers to
the capacities of protoplasmic neurons to produce phenomenal states,
such as felt sensations, pains, and the like. Here, Searle argues that
things like automobiles and typewriters, because of their inorganic
physical composition, are categorically incapable of causing felt
sensations, and that this aspect of consciousness is crucial to inten-
tionality.
There are two responses to this claim. First, arguing with Dennett,
Schank, and others, we might say that Searle is mistaken in his view
that intentionality necessarily requires felt sensations, that in fact the
functional components of sensations are all that is required for a
cognitive model. But, even if we accept Searle's account of intentional-
ity, the claim stills seems to be untenable. The mere fact that mental
phenomena such as felt sensations have been, historically speaking,
confined to protoplasmic organisms in no way demonstrates that such
phenomena could not arise in a nonprotoplasmic system. Such an
assertion is on a par with a claim (made in antiquity) that only organic
creatures such as birds or insects could fly. Searle explicitly and
repeatedly announces that intentionality "is a biological phenomenon,"
but he never explains what sort of biological phenomenon it is, nor
does he ever give us a reason to believe that there is a property or set
of properties inherent in protoplasmic neural matter that could not, in
principle, be replicated in an alternative physical substrate.
One can only conclude that the knowledge of the necessary
connection between intentionality and protoplasmic embodiment is
obtained through some sort of mystical revelation. This, of course,
shouldn't be too troublesome to Al researchers who, after all, trade on
mysticism as much as anyone in cognitive science does these days.
And so it goes.
by Richard Rorty
Department of Philosophy. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 06544
Searle and the special powers of the brain
Searle sets up the issues as would a fundamentalist Catholic defending
transubstantiation. Suppose a demythologizing Tillichian theologian
urges that we think of the Eucharist not in terms of substantial change,
but rather in terms of significance in the lives of the faithful. The
defender of orthodoxy will reply that the "natural supernatural distinc-
tion cannot be just in the eye of the beholder but must be intrinsic;
otherwise it would be up to any beholder to treat anything as
supernatural." (Compare Searle on the mental-nonmental distinction,
p. 420) Theology, the orthodox say, starts with such facts as that the
Catholic Eucharist is a supernatural event whereas a Unitarian minister
handing around glasses of water isn't. Searle says that "the study of
the mind starts with such facts as that humans have beliefs, while
thermostats . . . and adding machines don't." In theology, the orthodox
continue, one presupposes the reality and knowability of the supernat-
ural. Searle says, "In 'cognitive sciences' one presupposes the reality
and knowability of the mental." The orthodox think that the demythol-
ogizers are just changing the subject, since we know in advance that
the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is a distinction
between two sorts of entities having different special causal powers.
We know that we can't interpret the Eucharist "functionally" in terms of
its utility as an expression of our ultimate concern, for there could be
such an expression without the elements actually changing their
substantial form. Similarly, Searle knows in advance that a cognitive
state "couldn't be just computational processes and their output
because the computational processes and their output can exist
without the cognitive state." Both the orthodox theologian and Searle
criticize their opponents as "unashamedly behavioristic and operation-
alist."
Searle uses the example of being trained to answer enough ques-
tions in Chinese to pass a Turing test. The defender of transubstantia-
tion would use the example of a layman disguised as a priest reciting
the mass and fooling the parishioners. The initial reply to Searle's
example is that if the training kept on for years and years so that Searle
became able to answer all possible Chinese questions in Chinese, then
he jolly well would understand Chinese. If you can fool all the people all
of the time, behaviorists and operationalists say, it doesn't count as
fooling any more. The initial reply to the orthodox theologian's example
is that when Anglican priests perform Eucharist services what happens
is functionally identical with what happens in Roman churches, despite
the "defect of intention" in Anglican orders. When you get a body of
worshippers as large as the Anglican communion to take the Eucharist
without the necessary "special causal powers" having been present,
that shows you that those powers weren't essential to the sacrament.
Sufficiently widely accepted simulation is the real thing. The orthodox,
however, will reply that a "consecrated" Anglican Host is no more the
Body of Christ than a teddy bear is a bear, since the "special causal
powers" are the essence of the matter. Similarly, Searle knows in
advance that "only something that has the same causal powers as
brains can have intentionality."
How does Searle know that? In the same way, presumably, as the
orthodox theologian knows things. Searle knows what "mental" and
"cognitive" and such terms mean, and so he knows that they can't be
properly applied in the absence of brains - or, perhaps, in the absence
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1980), 3 445
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005811
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Searle: Minds, brains, and programs
ol something that is much like a brain in respect to "causal powers."
How would we tell whether something was sufficiently like?, behavior-
ists and operationalists ask. Presumably they will get no answer until
we discover enough about how the brain works to distinguish intention-
ality from mere simulations of intentionality. How might a neutral party
judge the dispute between Anglicans and Roman Catholics about the
validity of Anglican orders? Presumably he will have to wait until we
discover more about God.
But perhaps the analogy is faulty: we moderns believe in brains but
not in God. Still, even if we dismiss the theological analogue, we may
have trouble knowing jusf what brain research is supposed to look for.
We must discover content rather than merely form, Searle tells us, for
mental states are "literally a product of the operation of the brain" and
hence no conceivable program description (which merely gives a form,
instantiable by many different sorts of hardware) will do. Behaviorists
and operationalists, however, think the form-content and program-
hardware distinctions merely heuristic, relative, and pragmatic. This is
why they are, if not shocked, at least wary, when Searle claims "that
actual human mental phenomena might be dependent on actual
physical-chemical properties of actual human brains." If this claim is to
be taken in a controversial sense, then it seems just a device for
ensuring that the secret powers of the brain will move further and
further back out of sight every time a new model of brain functioning is
proposed. For Searle can tell us that every such model is merely a
discovery of formal patterns, and that "mental content" has still
escaped us. (He could buttress such a suggestion by citing Henri
Bergson and Thomas Nagel on the ineffable inwardness of even the
brute creation.) There is, after all, no great difference - as far as the
form-content distinction goes - between building models for the
behavior of humans and for that of their brains. Without further
guidance about how to tell content when we finally encounter it, we
may well feel that all research in the area
is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravell'd world whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move. (Tennyson: Ulysses)
My criticisms of Searle should not, however, be taken as indicating
sympathy with Al. In 1960 Putnam remarked that the mind-program
analogy did not show that we can use computers to help philosophers
solve the mind-body problem, but that there wasn't any mind-body
problem for philosophers to solve. The last twenty years' worth of work
in Al have reinforced Putnam's claim. Nor, alas, have they done
anything to help the neurophysiologists - something they actually
might, for all we could have known, have done. Perhaps it was worth it
to see whether programming computers could produce some useful
models of the brain, if not of "thought" or "the mind." Perhaps,
however, the money spent playing Turing games with expensive
computers should have been used to subsidize relatively cheap
philosophers like Searle and me. By now we might have worked out
exactly which kinds of operationalism and behaviorism to be ashamed
of and which not. Granted that some early dogmatic forms of these
doctrines were a bit gross, Peirce was right in saying something like
them has got to be true if we are to shrug off arguments about
transubstantiation. If Searle's present pre-Wittgensteinian attitude
gains currency, the good work of Ryle and Putnam will be undone and
"the mental" will regain its numinous Cartesian glow. This will boomer-
ang in favor of Al. "Cognitive scientists" will insist that only lots more
simulation and money will shed empirical light upon these deep
"philosophical" mysteries. Surely Searle doesn't want that.
by Roger C. Schank
Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, Conn, 06520
Understanding Searle
What is understanding? What is consciousness? What is meaning? What
does it mean to think? These, of course, are philosopher's questions. They
are the bread and butter of philosophy. But what of the role of such
questions in Al? Shouldn't Al researchers be equally concerned with such
questions? I believe the answer to be yes and no.
According to the distinction between weak and strong Al, I would
have to place myself in the weak Al camp with a will to move to the
strong side. In a footnote, Searle mentions that he is not saying that I
am necessarily committed to the two "Al claims" he cites. He states
that claims that computers can understand stories or that programs
can explain understanding in humans are unsupported by my work.
He is certainly right in that statement. No program we have written
can be said to truly understand yet. Because of that, no program we
have written "explains the human ability to understand."
I agree with Searle on this for two reasons. First, we are by no
means finished with building understanding machines. Our programs
are at this stage partial and imcomplete. They cannot be said to be
truly understanding. Because of this they cannot be anything more than
partial explanations of human abilities.
Of course, I realize that Searle is making a larger claim than this. He
means that our programs never will be able to understand or explain
human abilities. On the latter claim he is clearly quite wrong. Our
programs have provided successful embodiments of theories that
were later tested on human subjects. All experimental work in psychol-
ogy to date has shown, for example, that our notion of a script (Schank
& Abelson 1977) is very much an explanation of human abilities (see
Nelson & Gruendel 1978; Gruendel 1980; Smith, Adams, & Schorr
1978; Bower, Black, & Turner 1979; Graesser et al. 1979; Anderson
1980).
All of the above papers are reports of experiments on human
subjects that support the notion of a script. Of course, Searle can
hedge here and say that it was our theories rather than our programs
that explained human abilities in that instance. In that case, I can only
attempt to explain carefully my view of what Al is all about. We cannot
have theories apart from our computer implementations of those
theories. The range of the phenomena to be explained is too broad
and detailed to be covered by a theory written in English. We can only
know if our theories of understanding are plausible if they can work by
being tested on a machine.
Searle is left with objecting to psychological experiments themselves
as adequate tests of theories of human abilities. Does he regard
psychology as irrelevant? The evidence suggests that he does,
although he is not so explicit on this point. This brings me back to his
first argument. "Can a machine understand?" Or, to it put another way,
can a process model of understanding tell us something about
understanding? This question applies whether the target of attack is Al
or psychology.
To answer this question I will attempt to draw an analogy. Try to
explain what "life" is. We can give various biological explanations of
life. But, in the end, I ask, what is the essence of life? What is it that
distinguishes a dead body that is physically intact from a live body?
Yes, of course, the processes are ongoing in the live one and not
going (or "dead") in the dead one. But how to start them up again?
The jolt of electricity from Dr. Frankenstein? What is the "starter"?
What makes life?
Biologists can give various process explanations of life, but in the
end that elusive "starter of life" remains unclear. And so it is with
understanding and consciousness.
We attribute understanding, consciousness, and life to others on the
grounds that we ourselves have these commodities. We really don't
know if anyone else "understands," "thinks," or even is "alive." We
assume it on the rather unscientific basis that since we are all these
things, others must be also.
We cannot give scientific explanations for any of these phenomena.
Surely the answers, formulated in chemical terms, should not satisfy
Searle. I find it hard to believe that what philosophers have been after
for centuries were chemical explanations for the phenomena that
pervade our lives.
Yet, that is the position that Searle forces himself into. Because,
apart from chemical explanation, what is left? We need explanations in
human terms, in terms of the entities that we meet and deal with in our
daily lives, that will satisfy our need to know about these things.
Now I will return to my analogy. Can we get at the process
explanation of "life"? Yes, of course, we could build a model that
functioned "as if it were alive," a robot. Would it be alive?
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The same argument can be made with respect to consciousness
and understanding. We could build programs that functioned as if they
understood or had free conscious thought. Would they be conscious?
Would they really understand?
I view these questions somewhat differently from most of my Al
colleagues. I do not attribute beliefs to thermostats, car engines, or
computers. My answers to the above questions are tentative no's. A
robot is not alive. Our story-understanding systems do not understand
in the sense of the term that means true empathy of feeling and
expression.
Can we ever hope to get our programs to "understand" at that
level? Can we ever create "life"? Those are, after all, empirical
questions.
In the end, my objection to Searle's remarks can be formulated this
way. Does the brain understand? Certainly we humans understand, but
does that lump of matter we call our brain understand? All that is going
on there is so many chemical reactions and electrical impulses, just so
many Chinese symbols.
Understanding means finding the system behind the Chinese
symbols, whether written for brains or for computers. The person who
wrote the rules for Searle to use to put out the correct Chinese symbols
at the appropriate time - now that was a linguist worth hiring. What
rules did he write? The linguist who wrote the rules "understood" in the
deep sense how the Chinese language works. And, the rules he wrote
embodied that understanding.
Searle wants to call into question the enterprise of Al, but in the end,
even he must appreciate that the rules for manipulating Chinese
symbols would be a great achievement. To write them would require a
great understanding of the nature of language. Such rules would satisfy
many of the questions of philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and Al.
Does Searle, who is using those rules, understand? No. Does the
hardware configuration of the computer understand? No. Does the
hardware configuration of the brain understand? No.
Who understands then? Why, the person who wrote the rules of
course. And who is he? He is what is called an Al researcher.
by Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher
School of Social Sciences. University ol Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QN. England
How to turn an information processor into an
understander
Searle's delightfully clear and provocative essay contains a subtle
mistake, which is also often made by Al researchers who use familiar
mentalistic language to describe their programs. The mistake is a
failure to distinguish form from function.
That some mechanism or process has properties that would, in a
suitable context, enable it to perform some function, does not imply
that it already performs that function. For a process to be understand-
ing, or thinking, or whatever, it is not enough that it replicate some of
the structure of the processes of understanding, thinking, and so on. It
must also fulfil the functions of those processes. This requires it to be
causally linked to a larger system in which other states and processes
exist. Searle is therefore right to stress causal powers. However, it is
not the causal powers of brain cells that we need to consider, but the
causal powers of computational processes. The reason the processes
he describes do not amount to understanding is not that they are not
produced by things with the right causal powers, but that they do not
have the right causal powers, since they are not integrated with the
right sort of total system.
That certain operations on symbols occurring in a computer, or even
in another person's mind, happen to be isomorphic with certain formal
operations in your mind does not entail that they serve the same
function in the political economy of your mind. When you read a
sentence, a complex, mostly unconscious, process of syntactic and
semantic analysis occurs, along with various inferences, alterations to
your long-term memory, perhaps changes in your current plans, or
even in your likes, dislikes, or emotional state. Someone else reading
the sentence will at most share a subset of these processes. Even if
there is a subset of formal symbolic manipulations common to all those
who hear the sentence, the existence of those formal processes will
not, in isolation, constitute understanding the sentence. Understanding
can occur only in a context in which the process has the opportunity to
interact with such things as beliefs, motives, perceptions, inferences,
and decisions - because it is embedded in an appropriate way in an
appropriate overall system.
This may look like what Searle calls "The robot reply" attributed to
Yale. However, it is not enough to say that the processes must occur in
some physical system which it causes to move about, make noises,
and so on. We claim that it doesn't even have to be a physical system:
the properties of the larger system required for intentionality are
computational not physical. (This, unlike Searle's position, explains
why it makes sense to ordinary folk to attribute mental states to
disembodied souls, angels, and the like, though not to thermostats.)
What sort of larger system is required? This is not easy to answer.
There is the beginning of an exploration of the issues in chapters 6 and
10 of Sloman (1978) and in Sloman (1979). (See also Dennett 1978.)
One of the central problems is to specify the conditions under which it
could be correct to describe a computational system, whether embod-
ied in a human brain or not, as possessing its own desires, prefer-
ences, tastes, and other motives. The conjecture we are currently
exploring is that such motives are typically instantiated in symbolic
representations of states of affairs, events, processes, or selection
criteria, which play a role in controlling the operations of the system,
including operations that change the contents of the store of motives,
as happens when we manage (often with difficulty) to change our own
likes and dislikes, or when an intention is abandoned because it is
found to conflict with a principle. More generally, motives will control
the allocation of resources, including the direction of attention in
perceptual processes, the creation of goals and subgoals, the kind of
information that is processed and stored for future use, and the
inferences that are made, as well as controlling external actions if the
system is connected to a set of 'motors' (such as muscles) sensitive to
signals transmitted during the execution of plans and strategies. Some
motives will be capable of interacting with beliefs to produce the
complex disturbances characteristic of emotional states, such as fear,
anger, embarrassment, shame, and disgust. A precondition for the
system to have its own desires and purposes is that its motives should
evolve as a result of a feedback process during a lengthy sequence of
experiences, in which beliefs, skills (programs), sets of concepts, and
the like also develop. This, in turn requires the system of motives to
have a multilevel structure, which we shall not attempt to analyse
further here.
This account looks circular because it uses mentalistic terminology,
but our claim, and this is a claim not considered by Searle, is that
further elaboration of these ideas can lead to a purely formal specifica-
tion of the computational architecture of the required system. Frag-
ments can already be found in existing operating systems (driven in
part by priorities and interrupts), and in Al programs that interpret
images, build and debug programs, and make and execute plans. But
not existing system comes anywhere near combining all the intricacies
required before the familiar mental processes can occur. Some of the
forms are already there, but not yet the functions.
Searle's thought experiment, in which he performs uncomprehend-
ing operations involving Chinese symbols does not involve operations
linked into an appropriate system in the appropriate way. The news, in
Chinese, that his house is on fire will not send him scurring home, even
though in some way he operates correctly with the symbols. But,
equally, none of the so-called understanding programs produced so
far is linked to an appropriate larger system of beliefs and decision.
Thus, as far as the ordinary meanings of the words are concerned, it is
incorrect to say that any existing Al programs understand, believe,
learn, perceive, or solve problems. Of course, it might be argued
(though not by us) that they already have the potential to be so linked -
they have a form that is adequate for the function in question. If this
were so, they might perhaps be used as extensions of people - for
example, as aids for the deaf or blind or the mentally handicapped, and
they could then be part of an understanding system.
It could be argued that mentalistic language should be extended to
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encompass all systems with the potential for being suitably linked into a
complete mind. That is, it could be argued that the meanings of words
like "understand," "perceive," "intend," "believe" should have their
functional preconditions altered, as if we were to start calling things
screwdrivers or speed controllers if they happened to have the
appropriate structure to perform the functions, whether or not they
were ever used or even intended to be used with the characteristic
functions of screwdrivers and speed controllers. The justification for
extending the usage of intentional and other mental language in this
way would be the discovery that some aspects of the larger architec-
ture (such as the presence of subgoal mechanisms or inference
mechanisms) seem to be required within such isolated subsystems to
enable them to satisfy even the formal preconditions. However, our
case against Searle does not depend on altering meanings of familiar
words.
Is it necessary that a mental system be capable of controlling the
operations of a physcial body or that it be linked to physical sensors
capable of receiving information about the physical environment? This
is close to the question whether a totally paralysed, deaf, blind, person
without any functioning sense organs might nevertheless be conscious,
with thoughts, hopes, and fears. (Notice that this is not too different
from the state normal people enter temporarily each night.) We would
argue that there is no reason (apart from unsupportable behaviourist
considerations) to deny that this is a logical possibility. However, if the
individual had never interacted with the external world in the normal
way, then he could not think of President Carter, Paris, the battle of
Hastings, or even his own body: at best his thoughts and experiences
would refer to similar nonexistent entities in an imaginary world. This is
because successful reference presupposes causal relationships which
would not hold in the case of our disconnected mind.
It might be thought that we have missed the point of Searle's
argument since whatever the computational architecture we finally
posit for a mind, connected or disconnected, he will always be able to
repeat his thought experiment to show that a purely formal symbol-
manipulating system with that structure would not necessarily have
motives, beliefs, or percepts. For he could execute all the programs
himself (at least in principle) without having any of the alleged desires,
beliefs, perceptions, emotions, or whatever.
At this point the "other minds" argument takes on a curious twist.
Searle is assuming that he is a final authority on such questions as
whether what is going on in his mental activities includes seeing (or
appearing to see) pink elephants, thinking about Pythagoras's theo-
rem, being afraid of being burnt at the stake, or understanding Chinese
sentences. In other words, he assumes, without argument, that it is
impossible for another mind to be based on his mental processes
without his knowing. However, we claim (compare the discussion of
consciousness in Sloman 1978, chapter 10) that if he really does
faithfully execute all the programs, providing suitable time sharing
between parallel subsystems where necessary, then a collection of
mental processes will occur of whose nature he will be ignorant, if all he
thinks he is doing is manipulating meaningless symbols. He will have no
more basis for denying the existence of such mental processes than
he would have if presented with a detailed account of the low-level
internal workings of another person's mind, which he can only under-
stand in terms of electrical and chemical processes, or perhaps
sequences of abstract patterns embedded in such processes.
If the instructions Searle is executing require him to use information
about things he perceives in the environment as a basis for selecting
some of the formal operatons, then it would even be possible for the
"passenger" to acquire information about Searle (by making infer-
ences from Searle's behaviour and from what other people say about
him) without Searle ever realising what is going on. Perhaps this is not
too unlike what happens in some cases of multiple personalities?
by William E. Smythe
Department of Psychology. University ol Toronto. Toronto, Ontario.
Canada MSS IAI
Simulation games
Extensive use of intentional idioms is now common in discussions of
the capabilities and functioning of Al systems. Often these descriptions
are to be taken no more substantively than in much of ordinary
programming where one might say, for example, that a statistical
regression program "wants" to minimize the sum of squared devia-
tions or "believes" it has found a best-fitting function when it has done
so. In other cases, the intentional account is meant to be taken more
literally. This practice requires at least some commitment to the claim
that intentional states can be achieved in a machine just in virtue of its
performing certain computations. Searle's article serves as a cogent
and timely indicator of some of the pitfalls that attend such a claim.
If certain Al systems are to possess intentionality, while other
computational systems do not, then it ought to be in virtue of some set
of purely computational principles. However, as Searle points out, no
such principles have yet been forthcoming from Al. Moreover, there is
reason to believe that they never will be. A sketch of one sort of
argument is as follows: intentional states are, by definition, "directed
at" objects and states of affairs in the world. Hence the first require-
ment for any theory about them would be to specify the relation
between the states and the world they are "about." However it is
precisely this relation that is not part of the computational account of
mental states (cf. Foder 1980). A computational system can be
interfaced with an external environment in any way a human user may
choose. There is no dependence of this relation on any ontogenetic or
phylogenetic history of interaction with the environment. In fact, the
relation between system and environment can be anything at all without
affecting the computations performed on symbols that purportedly
refer to it. This fact casts considerable doubt on whether any purely
computational theory of intentionality is possible.
Searle attempts to establish an even stronger conclusion: his
argument is that the computational realization of intentional states is, in
fact, impossible on a priori grounds. The argument is based on a
"simulation game" - a kind of dual of Turing's imitation game - in
which man mimics computer. In the simulation game, a human agent
instantiates a computer program by performing purely syntactic opera-
tions on meaningless symbols. The point of the demonstration is that
merely following rules for the performance of such operations is not
sufficient for manifesting the right sort of intentionality. In particular, a
given set of rules could create an effective mimicking of some
intelligent activity without bringing the rule-following agent any closer to
having intentional states pertaining to the domain in question.
One difficulty with this argument is that it does not distinguish
between two fundamentally different ways of instantiating a computer
program or other explicit prodecure in a physical system. One way is to
imbed the program in a system that is already capable of interpreting
and following rules. This requires that the procedure be expressed in a
"language" that the imbedding system can already "understand." A
second way is to instantiate the program directly by realizing its "rules"
as primitive hardware operations. In this case a rule is followed, not by
"interpreting" it, but by just running off whatever procedure the rule
denotes. Searle' simulation game is germane to the first kind of
instantiation but not the second. Following rules in natural language (as
the simulation game requires) involves the mediation of other inten-
tional states and so is necessarily an instance of indirect instantiation.
To mimic a direct instantiation of a program faithfully, on the other
hand, the relevant primitives would have to be realized nonmediately in
one' own activity. If such mimicry were possible, it would be done only
at the cost of being unable to report on the system's lack of intentional
states, if in fact it had none.
The distinction between directly and indirectly instantiating computa-
tional procedures is important because both kinds of processes are
required to specify a computational system completely. The first
comprises its architecture or set of primitives, and the second
comprises the algorithms the system can apply (Newell 1973; 1980).
Hence Searle's argument is a challenge to strong Al when that view is
put forward in terms of the capabilities of programs, but not when it is
framed (as, for example, by Pylyshyn 1980a) in terms of computational
systems. The claim that the latter cannot have intentional states must
therefore proceed along different lines. The approach considered
earlier, for example, called attention to the arbitrary relation between
computational symbol and referent. Elsewhere the argument has been
put forward in more detail that it is an overly restrictive notion of symbol
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that creates the most serious difficulties for the computational theory
(Kolers & Smythe 1979; Smythe 1979). The notion of an independent
token subject to only formal syntactic manipulation is neither a
sufficient characterization of what a symbol is, nor well motivated in the
domain of human cognition. Sound though this argument is, it is not the
sort of secure conclusion that Searle's simulation game tries to
demonstrate.
However, the simulation game does shed some light on another
issue. Why is it that the belief is so pervasive that Al systems are truly
constitutive of mental events? One answer is that many people seem to
be playing a different version of the simulation game from the one that
Searle recommends. The symbols of most Al and cognitive simulation
systems are rarely the kind of meaningless tokens that Searle's
simulation game requires. Rather, they are often externalized in forms
that carry a good deal of surplus meaning to the user, over and above
their procedural identity in the system itself, as pictorial and linguistic
inscriptions, for example. This sort of realization of the symbols can
lead to serious theoretical problems. For example, systems like that of
Kosslyn and Shwartz (1977) give the appearance of operating on
mental images largely because their internal representations "look"
like images when displayed on a cathode ray tube. It is unclear that the
system could be said to manipulate images in any other sense. There
is a similar problem with language understanding systems. The seman-
tics of such systems is often assessed by means of an informal
procedure that Hayes (1977, p. 559) calls "pretent-it's-English." That
is, misleading conclusions about the capabilities of these systems can
result from the superficial resemblance of their internal representations
to statements in natural language. An important virute of Searle's
argument is that it specifies how to play the simulation game correctly.
The procedural realization of the symbols is all that should matter in a
computational theory; their external appearance ought to be irrele-
vant.
The game, played this way, may not firmly establish that computa-
tional systems lack intentionality. However, it at least undermines one
powerful tacit motivation for supposing they have it.
by Donald O. Walter
Brain Research Institute and Department of Psychiatry, University ot California,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90024
The thermostat and the philosophy professor
Searle: The man certainly doesn't understand Chinese, and neither
do the water pipes, and if we are tempted to adopt what I think is the
absurd view that somehow the conjunction of man and water pipes
understands. . .
Walter: The bimetallic strip by itself certainly doesn't keep the
temperature within limits, and neither does the furnace by itself, and if
we are tempted to adopt the view that somehow a system of bimetallic
strip and furnace will keep the temperature within limits - or (para-
phrasing Hanson 1969; or others), Searle's left retina does not see,
nor does his right, nor either (or both) optic nerve(s); we can even
imagine a "disconnection syndrome" in which Searle's optic cortex no
longer connects with the rest of his brain, and so conclude that his
optic cortex doesn't see, either. If we then conclude that because no
part sees, therefore he cannot see, are we showing consistency, or
are we failing to see something about our own concepts?
Searle: No one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm
fire will burn the neighborhood down . . . Why on earth would anyone
suppose that a computer simulation of understanding actually under-
stood anything?
Walter: No one supposes that a novelist's description of a five-
alarm fire will burn the neighborhood down; why would anyone
suppose that a novelist writing about understanding actually under-
stood it?
Searle: If we knew independently how to account for its behavior
without such assumptions we would not attribute intentionality to it,
especially if we knew it had a formal program.
Hofstadter (1979, p. 601): There is a related "Theorem" about
progress in Al: once some mental function is programmed, people
soon cease to consider it as an essential ingredient of "real thinking."
The ineluctable core of intelligence is always that next thing which
hasn't yet been programmed.
Walter: Searle seems to be certain that a program is formal
(though he plays, to his own advantage, on the ambiguity between
"adequately definable through form or shape" and "completely defin-
able through nothing but form or shape"), whereas "intentionality,"
"causal powers" and "actual properties" are radically different things
that are unarguably present in any (normal? waking?) human brain, and
possibly in the quaint brains of "Martians" (if they were "alive," at least
in the sense that we did not understand what went on inside them).
These radically different things are also not definable in terms of their
form but of their content. He asserts this repeatedly, without making
anything explicit of this vital alternative. I think it is up to Searle to
establish communication with the readers of this journal, which he has
not done in his target article. Let us hope that in his Response he will
make the mentioned but undescribed alternative more nearly explicit to
by Robert Wilensky
Department ot Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Califor'
nia, Berkeley, Calif. 94720
Computers, cognition and philosophy
Searle's arguments on the feasibility of computer understanding
contain several simple but fatal logical flaws. I can deal only with the
most important difficulties here. However, it is the general thrust of
Searle's remarks rather than the technical flaws in his arguments that
motivates this commentary. Searle' paper suggests that even the best
simulation of intelligent behavior would explain nothing about cognition,
and he argues in support of this claim. Since I would like to claim that
computer simulation can yield important insights into the nature of
human cognitive processes, it is important to show why Searle's
arguments do not threaten this enterprise.
My main objection to Searle's argument he has termed the "Berke-
ley systems reply." The position states that the man-in-the-room
scenario presents no problem to a strong Al-er who claims that
understanding is a property of an information-processing system. The
man in the room with the ledger, functioning in the manner prescribed
by the cognitive theorist who instructed his behavior, constitutes one
such system. The man functioning in his normal everyday manner is
another system. The "ordinary man" system may not understand
Chinese, but this says nothing about the capabilities of the "man-
in-the-room" system, which must therefore remain at least a candidate
for consideration as an understander in view of its language-process-
ing capabilities.
Searle's response to this argument is to have the man internalize the
"man-in-the-room" system by keeping all the rules and computations
in his head. He now encompasses the whole system. Searle argues
that if the man "doesn't understand, then there is no way the system
could understand because the system is just a part of him."
However, this is just plain wrong. Lots of systems (in fact, most
interesting systems) are embodied in other systems of weaker capabil-
ities. For example, the hardware of a computer may not be able to
multiply polynomials, or sort lists, or process natural language,
although programs written for those computers can; individual neurons
probably don't have much - if any - understanding capability, although
the systems they constitute may understand quite a bit.
The difficulty in comprehending the systems position in the case of
Searle's paradox is in being able to see the person as two separate
systems. The following elaborations may be useful. Suppose we
decided to resolve the issue once and for all simply by asking the
person involved whether he understands Chinese. We hand the person
a piece of paper with Chinese characters that mean (loosely trans-
lated) "Do you understand Chinese?" If the man-in-the-room system
were to respond, by making the appropriate symbol manipulations, it
would return a strip of paper with the message: "Of course I
understand Chinese! What do you think I've been doing? Are you
joking?" A heated dialogue then transpires, after which we apologize
to the man-in-the-room system for our rude innuendos. Immediately
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thereafter, we approach the man himself (that is, we ask him to stop
playing with the pieces of paper and talk to us directly) and ask him if
he happens to know Chinese. He will of course deny such knowledge.
Searle's mistake of identifying the experiences of one system with
those of its implementing system is one philosophers often make when
referring to Al systems. For example, Searle says that the English
subsystem knows that "hamburgers" refer to hamburgers, but that the
Chinese subsystem knows only about formal symbols. But it is really
the homunculus who is conscious of symbol manipulation, and has no
idea what higher level task he is engaged in. The parasitic system is
involved in this higher level task, and has no knowledge at all that he is
implemented via symbol manipulation, anymore than we are aware of
how our own cognitive processes are implemented.
What's unusual about this situation is not that one system is
embedded in a weak one, but that the implementing system is so much
more powerful than it need be. That is, the homunculus is a full-fledged
understander, operating at a small percentage of its capacity to push
around some symbols. If we replace the man by a device that is
capable of performing only these opertaions, the temptation to view
the systems as identical greatly diminishes.
It is important to point out, contrary to Searle's claim, that the
systems position itself does not constitute a strong Al claim. It simply
shows that if'A is possible that a system other than a person functioning
in the standard manner can understand, then the man-in-the-room
argument is not at all problematic. If we deny this possibility to begin
with, then the delicate man-in-the-room argument is unnecessary - a
computer program is something other than a person functioning
normally, and by assumption would not be capable of understanding.
Searle also puts forth an argument about simulation in general. He
states that since a simulation of a storm won't leave us wet, why should
we assume that a simulation of understanding should understand?
Well, the reason is that while simulations don't necessarily preserve all
the properties of what they simulate, they don't necessarliy violate
particular properties either. I could simulate a storm in the lab by
spraying water through a hose. If I'm interested in studying particular
properties, I don't have to abandon simulations; I merely have to be
careful about which properties the simulation I construct is likely to
preserve.
So it all boils down to the question, what sort of thing is understand-
ing? If it is an inherently physical thing, like fire or rain or digestion, then
preserving the logical properties of understanding will in fact not
preserve the essential nature of the phenomenon, and a computer
simulation will not understand. If, on the other hand, understanding is
essentially a logical or symbolic type of activity, then preserving its
logical properties would be sufficient to have understanding, and a
computer simulation will literally understand.
Searle's claim is that the term "understanding" refers to a physical
phenomenon, much in the same way that the term "photosynthesis"
does. His argument here is strictly an appeal to our intuitions about the
meaning of this term. My own intuitions simply do not involve the causal
properties of biological organisms (although they do involve their
logical and behavioral properties). It seems to me that this must be true
for most people, as most people could be fooled into thinking that a
computer simulation really understands, but a simulation of photosyn-
thesis would not fool anyone into thinking it had actually created sugar
from water and carbon dioxide.
A major theme in Searle's paper is that intentionality is really at the
bottom of the problem. Computers fail to meet the critieria of true
understanding because they just don't have intentional states, with all
that entails. This, according to Searle, is in fact what boggles one's
intuitions in the man-in-the-room example.
However, it seems to me that Searle's argument has nothing to do
with intentionality at all. What causes difficultly in attributing intentional
states to machines is the fact that most of these states have a
subjective nature as well. If this is the case, then Searle's man-
in-the-room example could be used to simulate a person having some
nonintentional but subjective state, and still have its desired effect. This
is precisely what happens. For example, suppose we simulated
someone undergoing undirected anxiety. It's hard to believe that
anything - the man doing the simulation or the system he implements -
is actually experiencing undirected anxiety, even though this is not an
intentional state.
Futhermore, the experience of discomfort seems proportional to
subjectivity, but independent of intentionality. It doesn't bother my
intuitions much to hear that a computer can understand or know
something; that it is believing something is a little harder to swallow,
and that it has love, hate, rage, pain, and anxiety are much worse.
Notice that the subjectivity seems to increase in each case, but the
intentionality remains the same. The point is that Searle's argument has
nothing to do with intentionality per se, and sheds no light on the nature
of intentional states or on the kinds of mechanisms capable of having
them.
I'd like to sum up by saying one last word on Searle's man-
in-the-room experiment, as this forms the basis for most of his
subsequent arguments. Woody Allen in Without Feathers describes a
mythical beast called the Great Roe. The Great Roe has the head of a
lion, and the body of a lion - but not the same lion. Searle's
Gedankenexpehment is really a Great Roe - the head of an understan-
der and the body of an understander, but not the same understander.
Herein lies the difficulty.
Author's Response
by John Searle
Department of Philosophy. University of California. Berkeley. Calif. 94720
Intrinsic intentionality
I am pleased at the amount of interest my target article has
aroused and grateful that such a high percentage of the
commentaries are thoughtful and forcefully argued. In this
response I am going to attempt to answer every major
criticism directed at my argument. To do that, however, I
need to make fully explicit some of the points that were
implicit in the target article, as these points involve recurring
themes in the commentaries.
Strong Al. One of the virtues of the commentaries is that
they make clear the extreme character of the strong Al thesis.
The thesis implies that of all known types of specifically
biological processes, from mitosis and meiosis to photosynthe-
sis, digestion, lactation, and the secretion of auxin, one and
only one type is completely independent of the biochemistry
of its origins, and that one is cognition. The reason it is
independent is that cognition consists entirely of computa-
tional processes, and since those processes are purely formal,
any substance whatever that is capable of instantiating the
formalism is capable of cognition. Brains just happen to be
one of the indefinite number of different types of computers
capable of cognition, but computers made of water pipes,
toilet paper and stones, electric wires - anything solid and
enduring enough to carry the right program - will necessarily
have thoughts, feelings, and the rest of the forms of intention-
ality, because that is all that intentionality consists in: instan-
tiating the right programs. The point of strong Al is not that if
we built a computer big enough or complex enought to carry
the actual programs that brains presumably instantiate we
would get intentionality as a byproduct (contra Dennett), but
rather that there isn't anything to intentionality other than
instantiating the right program.
Now I find the thesis of strong Al incredible in every sense
of the word. But it is not enough to find a thesis incredible,
one has to have an argument, and I offer an argument that is
very simple: instantiating a program could not be constitutive
of intentionality, because it would be possible for an agent to
instantiate the program and still not have the right kind of
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intentionality. That is the point of the Chinese room example.
Much of what follows will concern the force of that argu-
ment.
Intuitions. Several commentators (Block, Dennett, Pyly-
shyn, Marshall) claim that the argument is just based on
intuitions of mine, and that such intuitions, things we feel
ourselves inclined to say, could never prove the sort of thing I
am trying to prove (Block), or that equally valid contrary
intuitions can be generated (Dennett), and that the history of
human knowledge is full of the refutation of such intuitions as
that the earth is flat or that the table is solid, so intuitions here
are of no force.
But consider. When I now say that I at this moment do not
understand Chinese, that claim does not merely record an
intuition of mine, something I find myself inclined to say. It is
a plain fact about me that I don't understand Chinese.
Furthermore, in a situation in which I am given a set of rules
for manipulating uninterpreted Chinese symbols, rules that
allow no possibility of attaching any semantic content to these
Chinese symbols, it is still a fact about me that I do not
understand Chinese. Indeed, it is the very same fact as before.
But, Wilensky suggests, suppose that among those rules for
manipulating symbols are some that are Chinese for "Do you
understand Chinese?," and in response to these I hand back
the Chinese symbols for "Of course I understand Chinese."
Does that show, as Wilensky implies, that there is a subsystem
in me that understands Chinese? As long as there is no
semantic content attaching to these symbols, the fact remains
that there is no understanding.
The form of Block's argument about intuition is that since
there are allegedly empirical data to show that thinking is just
formal symbol manipulation, we could not refute the thesis
with untutored intuitions. One might as well try to refute the
view that the earth is round by appealing to our intuition that
it is flat. Now Block concedes that it is not a matter of
intuition but a plain fact that our brains are "the seat" of our
intentionality. I want to add that it is equally a plain fact that
I don't understand Chinese. My paper is an attempt to explore
the logical consequences of these and other such plain facts.
Intuitions in his deprecatory sense have nothing to do with the
argument. One consequence is that the formal symbol manip-
ulations could not be constitutive of thinking. Block never
comes to grips with the arguments for this consequence. He
simply laments the feebleness of our intuitions.
Dennett thinks that he can generate counterintuitions.
Suppose, in the "robot reply, " that the robot is my very own
body. What then? Wouldn't I understand Chinese then?
Well, the trouble is that the case, as he gives it to us, is
underdescribed, because we are never told what is going on in
the mind of the agent. (Remember, in these discussions,
always insist on the first person point of view. The first step in
the operationalist sleight of hand occurs when we try to figure
out how we would know what it would be like for others.) If
we describe Dennett's case sufficiently explicitly it is not hard
to see what the facts would be. Suppose that the program
contains such instructions as the following: when somebody
holds up the squiggle-squiggle sign, pass him the salt. With
such instructions it wouldn't take one long to figure out that
"squiggle squiggle" probably means pass the salt. But now the
agent is starting to learn Chinese from following the program.
But this "intuition" doesn't run counter to the facts I was
pointing out, for what the agent is doing in such a case is
attaching a semantic content to a formal symbol and thus
taking a step toward language comprehension. It would be
equally possible to describe a case in such a way that it was
impossible to attach any semantic content, even though my
own body was in question, and in such a case it would be
impossible for me to learn Chinese from following the
program. Dennett's examples do not generate counterintui-
tions, they are simply so inadequately described that we can't
tell from his description what the facts would be.
At one point Dennett and I really do have contrary
intuitions. He says "I understand English my brain doesn't. " I
think on the contrary that when I understand English; it is my
brain that is doing the work. I find nothing at all odd about
saying that my brain understands English, or indeed about
saying that my brain is conscious. I find his claim as implausi-
ble as insisting, "I digest pizza; my stomach and digestive
tract don't."
Marshall suggests that the claim that thermostats don't
have beliefs is just as refutable by subsequent scientific
discovery as the claim that tables are solid. But notice the
difference. In the case of tables we discovered previously
unknown facts about the microstructure of apparently solid
objects. In the case of thermostats the relevant facts are all
quite well known already. Of course such facts as that
thermostats don't have beliefs and that I don't speak Chinese
are, like all empirical facts, subject to disconfirmation. We
might for example discover that, contrary to my deepest
beliefs, I am a competent speaker of Mandarin. But think how
we would establish such a thing. At a minimum we would
have to establish that, quite unconsciously, I know the mean-
ings of a large number of Chinese expressions; and to establish
that thermostats had beliefs, in exactly the same sense that I
do, we would have to establish, for example, that by some
miracle thermostats had nervous systems capable of support-
ing mental states, and so on. In sum, though in some sense
intuition figures in any argument, you will mistake the nature
of the present dispute entirely if you think it is a matter of my
intuitions against someone else's, or that some set of contrary
intuitions has equal validity. The claim that I don't speak
Chinese and that my thermostat lacks beliefs aren't just things
that I somehow find myself mysteriously inclined to say.
Finally, in response to Dennett (and also Pylyshyn ), I do
not, of course, think that intentionality is a fluid. Nor does
anything I say commit me to that view. I think, on the
contrary, that intentional states, processes, and events are
precisely that: states, processes, and events. The point is that
they are both caused by and realized in the structure of the
brain. Dennett assures me that such a view runs counter to
"the prevailing winds of doctrine." So much the worse for the
prevailing winds.
Intrinsic intentionality and observer-relative ascriptions
of intentionality. Why then do people feel inclined to say
that, in some sense at least, thermostats have beliefs? I think
that in order to understand what is going on when people
make such claims we need to distinguish carefully between
cases of what I will call intrinsic intentionality, which are
cases of actual mental states, and what I will call observer-
relative ascriptions of intentionality, which are ways that
people have of speaking about entities figuring in our activi-
ties but lacking intrinsic intentionality. We can illustrate this
distinction with examples that are quite uncontroversial. If I
say that I am hungry or that Carter believes he can win the
election, the form of intentionality in question is intrinsic. I
am discussing, truly or falsely, certain psychological facts
about me and Carter. But if I say the word "Carter" refers to
the present president, or the sentence "Es regnet" means it's
raining, I am not ascribing any mental states to the word
"Carter" or the sentence "Es regnet." These are ascriptions of
intentionality made to entities that lack any mental states, but
in which the ascription is a manner of speaking about the
intentionality of the observers. It is a way of saying that
people use the name Carter to refer, or that when people say
literally "Es regnet" they mean it's raining.
Observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality are always
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dependent on the intrinsic intentionality of the observers.
There are not two kinds of intentional mental states; there is
only one kind, those that have intrinsic intentionality; but
there are ascriptions of intentionality in which the ascription
does not ascribe intrinsic intentionality to the subject of the
ascription. Now I believe that a great deal of the present
dispute rests on a failure to appreciate this distinction. When
McCarthy stoutly maintains that thermostats have beliefs, he
is confusing observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality
with ascriptions of intrinsic intentionality. To see this point,
ask yourself why we make these attributions to thermostats
and the like at all. It is not because we suppose they have a
mental life very much like our own; on the contrary, we know
that they have no mental life at all. Rather, it is because we
have designed them (our intentionality) to serve certain of our
purposes (more of our intentionality), to perform the sort of
functions that we perform on the basis of our intentionality. I
believe it is equally clear that our ascription of intentionality
to cars, computers, and adding machines is observer relative.
Functionalism, by the way, is an entire system erected on
the failure to see this distinction. Functional attributions are
always observer relative. There is no such thing as an intrinsic
function, in the way that there are intrinsic intentional states.
Natural kinds. This distinction between intrinsic intention-
ality and observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality might
seem less important if we could, as several commentators
(Minsky, Block, Marshall) suggest, assimilate intrinsic inten-
tionality to some larger natural kind that would subsume both
existing mental phenomena and other natural phenomena
under a more general explanatory apparatus. Minsky says
that "prescientific idea germs like 'believe' " have no place in
the mind science of the future (presumably "mind" will also
have no place in the "mind science" of the future). But even
if this is true, it is really quite irrelevant to my argument,
which is addressed to the mind science of the present. Even if,
as Minsky suggests, we eventually come to talk of our present
beliefs as if they were on a continuum with things that are not
intentional states at all, this does not alter the fact that we do
have intrinsic beliefs and computers and thermostats do not.
That is, even if some future science comes up with a category
that supersedes belief and thus enables us to place thermostats
and people on a single continuum, this would not alter the
fact that under our present concept of belief, people literally
have beliefs and thermostats don't. Nor would it refute my
diagnosis of the mistake of attributing intrinsic mental states
to thermostats as based on a confusion between intrinsic
intentionality and observer-relative ascriptions of intentional-
ity.
Minsky further points out that our own mental operations
are often split into parts that are not fully integrated by any
"self" and only some of which carry on interpretation. And,
he asks, if that is how it is in our own minds, why not in
computers as well? The reply is that even if there are parts of
our mental processes where processing takes place without
any intentional content, there still have to be other parts that
attach semantic content to syntactic elements if there is to be
any understanding to all. The point of the Chinese room
example is that the formal symbol manipulations never by
themselves carry any semantic content, and thus instantiating
a computer program is not by itself sufficient for understand-
ing.
How the brain works. Several commentators take me to
task because I don't explain how the brain works to produce
intentionality, and at least two (Dennett and Fodor) object to
my claim that where intentionality is concerned - as opposed
to the conditions of satisfaction of the intentionality - what
matters are the internal and not the external causes. Well I
don't know how the brain produces mental phenomena, and
apparently no one else does either, but that it produces
mental phenomena and that the internal operations of the
brain are causally sufficient for the phenomena is fairly
evident from what we do know.
Consider the following case, in which we do know a little
about how the brain works. From where I am seated, I can see
a tree. Light reflected from the tree in the form of photons
strikes my optical apparatus. This sets up a series of sequences
of neural firings. Some of these neurons in the visual cortex
are in fact remarkably specialized to respond to certain sorts
of visual stimuli. When the whole set of sequences occurs, it
causes a visual experience, and the visual experience has
intentionality. It is a conscious mental event with an inten-
tional content; that is, its conditions of satisfaction are internal
to it. Now I could be having exactly that visual experience
even if there were no tree there, provided only that some-
thing was going on in my brain sufficient to produce the
experience. In such a case I would not see the tree but would
be having a hallucination. In such a case, therefore, the
intentionality is a matter of the internal causes; whether the
intentionality is satisfied, that is, whether I actually see a tree
as opposed to having a hallucination of the tree, is a matter of
the external causes as well. If I were a brain in a vat I could
have exactly the same mental states I have now; it is just that
most of them would be false or otherwise unsatisfied. Now
this simple example of visual experience is designed to make
clear what I have in mind whf n I say that the operation of the
brain is causally sufficient for intentionality, and that it is the
operation of the brain and not the impact of the outside world
that matters for the content of our intentional states, in at least
one important sense of "content."
Some of the commentators seem to suppose that I take the
causal powers of the brain by themselves to be an argument
against strong AI. But that is a misunderstanding. It is an
empirical question whether any given machine has causal
powers equivalent to the brain. My argument against strong
AI is that instantiating a program is not enough to guarantee
that it has those causal powers.
Wait till next year. Many authors (Block, Sloman &
Croucher, Dennett, Lycan, Bridgeman, Schank) claim that
Schank's program is just not good enough but that newer and
better programs will defeat my objection. I think this misses
the point of the objection. My objection would hold against
any program at all, qua formal computer program. Nor does
it help the argument to add the causal theory of reference, for
even if the formal tokens in the program have some causal
connection to their alleged referents in the real world, as long
as the agent has no way of knowing that, it adds no intention-
ality whatever to the formal tokens. Suppose, for example,
that the symbol for egg foo yung in the Chinese room is
actually causally connected to egg foo yung. Still, the man in
the room has no way of knowing that. For him, it remains an
uninterpreted formal symbol, with no semantic content what-
ever. I will return to this last point in the discussion of specific
authors, especially Fodor.
Seriatim. I now turn, with the usual apologies for brevity,
from these more general considerations to a series of specific
arguments.
Haugeland has an argument that is genuinely original.
Suppose a Chinese speaker has her neurons coated with a thin
coating that prevents neuron firing. Suppose "Searle's
demon" fills the gap by stimulating the neurons as if they had
been fired. Then she will understand Chinese even though
none of her neurons has the right causal powers; the demon
has them, and he understands only English.
My objection is only to the last sentence. Her neurons still
have the right causal powers; they just need some help from
the demon. More generally if the stimulation of the causes is
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at a low enough level to reproduce the causes and not merely
describe them, the "simulation" will reproduce the effects. If
what the demon does is reproduce the right causal phenom-
ena, he will have reproduced the intentionality, which consti-
tutes the effects of that phenomena. And it does not, for
example, show that my brain lacks the capacity for conscious-
ness if someone has to wake me up in the morning by
massaging my head.
Haugeland's distinction between original and derivative
intentionality is somewhat like mine between intrinsic inten-
tionality and observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality.
But he is mistaken in thinking that the only distinction is that
original intentionality is "sufficiently rich" in its "semantic
activity": the semantic activity in question is still observer-
relative and hence not sufficient for intentionality. My car
engine is, in his observer-relative sense, semantically active in
all sorts of "rich" ways, but it has no intentionality. A human
infant is semantically rather inactive, but it still has intention-
ality.
Rorty sets up an argument concerning transubstantiation
that is formally parallel to mine concerning intrinsic and
observer-relative attributions of intentionality. Since the
premises of the transubstantiation argument are presumably
false, the parallel is supposed to be an objection to my
argument. But the parallel is totally irrelevant. Any valid
argument whatever from true premises to true conclusions
has exact formal analogues from false premises to false
conclusions. Parallel to the familiar "Socrates is mortal"
argument we have "Socrates is a dog. All dogs have three
heads. Therefore Socrates has three heads." The possibility of
such formal parallels does nothing to weaken the original
arguments. To show that the parallel was insightful Rorty
would have to show that my premises are as unfounded as the
doctrine of transubstantiation. But what are my premises?
They are such things as that people have mental states such as
beliefs, desires, and visual experiences, that they also have
brains, and that their mental states are causally the products
of the operation of their brains. Rorty says nothing whatever
to show that these propositions are false, and I frankly can't
suppose that he doubts their truth. Would he like evidence for
these three? He concludes by lamenting that if my views gain
currency the "good work" of his favorite behaviorist and
functionalist authors will be "undone." This is not a prospect I
find at all distressing, since implicit in my whole account is
the view that people really do have mental states, and to say
so is not just to ascribe to them tendencies to behave, or to
adopt a certain kind of stance toward them, or to suggest
functional explanations of their behaviours. This does not give
the mental a "numinous Cartesian glow," it just implies that
mental processes are as real as any other biological processes.
McCarthy and Wilensky both endorse the "systems
reply." The major addition made by Wilensky is to suppose
that we ask the Chinese subsystem whether it speaks Chinese
and it answers yes. I have already suggested that this adds no
plausibility whatever to the claim that there is any Chinese
understanding going on in the system. Both Wilensky and
McCarthy fail to answer the three objections I made to the
systems reply.
1. The Chinese subsystem still attaches no semantic content
whatever to the formal tokens. The English subsystem knows
that "hamburger" means hamburger. The Chinese subsystem
knows only that squiggle squiggle is followed by squoggle
squoggle.
2. The systems reply is totally unmotivated. Its only moti-
vation is the Turing test, and to appeal to that is precisely to
beg the question by assuming what is in dispute.
3. The systems reply has the consequence that all sorts of
systematic input-output relations (for example, digestion)
would have to count as understanding, since they warrant as
much observer-relative ascription of intentionality as does the
Chinese subsystem. (And it is, by the way, no answer to this
point to appeal to the cognitive impenetrability of digestion,
in Pylyshyn's [1980a] sense, since digestion is congnitively
penetrable: the content of my beliefs can upset my diges-
tion.)
Wilensky seems to think that it is an objection that other
sorts of mental states besides intentional ones could have been
made the subject of the argument. But I quite agree. I could
have made the argument about pains, tickles, and anxiety, but
these are (a) less interesting to me and (b) less discussed in the
AI literature. I prefer to attack strong AI on what its propo-
nents take to be their strongest ground.
Pylyshyn misstates my argument. I offer no a priori proof
that a system of integrated circuit chips couldn't have inten-
tionality. That is, as I say repeatedly, an empirical question.
What I do argue is that in order to produce intentionality the
system would have to duplicate the causal powers of the brain
and that simply instantiating a formal program would not be
sufficient for that. Pylyshyn offers no answer to the argu-
ments I give for these conclusions.
Since Pylyshyn is not the only one who has this misunder-
standing, it is perhaps worth emphasizing just what is at stake.
The position of strong AI is that anything with the right
program would have to have the relevant intentionality. The
circuit chips in his example would necessarily have intention-
ality, and it wouldn't matter if they were circuit chips or
water pipes or paper clips, provided they instantiated the
program. Now I argue at some length that they couldn't have
intentionality solely in virtue of instantiating the program.
Once you see that the program doesn't necessarily add
intentionality to a system, it then becomes an empirical
question which kinds of systems really do have intentionality,
and the condition necessary for that is that they must have
causal powers equivalent to those of the brain. I think it is
evident that all sorts of substances in the world, like water
pipes and toilet paper, are going to lack those powers, but that
is an empirical claim on my part. On my account it is a
testable empirical claim whether in repairing a damaged
brain we could duplicate the electrochemical basis of inten-
tionality using some other substance, say silicon. On the
position of strong AI there cannot be any empirical questions
about the electrochemical bases necessary for intentionality
since any substance whatever is sufficient for intentionality if
it has the right program. I am simply trying to lay bare for all
to see the full preposterousness of that view.
I believe that Pylyshyn also misunderstands the distinction
between intrinsic and observer-relative ascriptions of inten-
tionality. The relevant question is not how much latitude the
observer has in making observer-relative ascriptions, but
whether there is any intrinsic intentionality in the system to
which the ascriptions could correspond.
Schank and I would appear to be in agreement on many
issues, but there is at least one small misunderstanding. He
thinks I want "to call into question the enterprise of AI." That
is not true. I am all in favor of weak AI, at least as a research
program. I entirely agree that if someone could write a
program that would give the right input and output for
Chinese stories it would be a "great achievement" requiring a
"great understanding of the nature of language." I am not
even sure it can be done. My point is that instantiating the
program is not constitutive of understanding.
Abelson, like Schank, points out that it is no mean feat to
program computers that can simulate story understanding.
But, to repeat, that is an achievement of what I call weak AI,
and I would enthusiastically applaud it. He mars this valid
point by insisting that since our own understanding of most
things, arithmetic for example, is very imperfect, "we might
well be humble and give the computer the benefit of the
doubt when and if it performs as well as we do." I am afraid
that neither this nor his other points meets my arguments to
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show that, humble as we would wish to be, there is no reason
to suppose that instantiating a formal program in the way a
computer does is any reason at all for ascribing intentionality
to it.
Fodor agrees with my central thesis that instantiating a
program is not a sufficient condition of intentionality. He
thinks, however, that if we got the right causal links between
the formal symbols and things in the world that would be
sufficient. Now there is an obvious objection to this variant of
the robot reply that I have made several times: the same
thought experiment as before applies to this case. That is, no
matter what outside causal impacts there are on the formal
tokens, these are not by themselves sufficient to give the
tokens any intentional content. No matter what caused the
tokens, the agent still doesn't understand Chinese. Let the egg
foo yung symbol be causally connected to egg foo yung in any
way you like, that connection by itself will never enable the
agent to interpret the symbol as meaning egg foo young. To
do that he would have to have, for example, some awareness
of the causal relation between the symbol and the referent;
but now we are no longer explaining intentionality in terms of
symbols and causes but in terms of symbols, causes, and
intentionality, and we have abandoned both strong AI and the
robot reply. Fodor's only answer to this is to say that it shows
we haven't yet got the right kind of causal linkage. But what
is the right kind, since the above argument applies to any
kind? He says he can't tell us, but it is there all the same. Well
I can tell him what it is: it is any form of causation sufficient
to produce intentional content in the agent, sufficient to
produce, for example, a visual experience, or a memory, or a
belief, or a semantic interpretation of some word.
Fodor's variant of the robot reply is therefore confronted
with a dilemma. If the causal linkages are just matters of fact
about the relations between the symbols and the outside
world, they will never by themselves give any interpretation
to the symbols; they will carry by themselves no intentional
content. If, on the other hand, the causal impact is sufficient
to produce intentionality in the agent, it can only be because
there is something more to the system than the fact of the
causal impact and the symbol, namely the intentional content
that the impact produces in the agent. Either the man in the
room doesn't learn the meaning of the symbol from the causal
impact, in which case the causal impact adds nothing to the
interpretation, or the causal impact teaches him the meaning
of the word, in which case the cause is relevant only because it
produces a form of intentionality that is something in addi-
tion to itself and the symbol. In neither case is symbol, or
cause and symbol, constitutive of intentionality.
This is not the place to discuss the general role of formal
processes in mental processes, but I cannot resist calling
attention to one massive use-mention confusion implicit in
Fodor's account. From the fact that, for example, syntactical
rules concern formal objects, it does not follow that they are
formal rules. Like other rules affecting human behavior they
are defined by their content, not their form. It just so happens
that in this case their content concerns forms.
In what is perhaps his crucial point, Fodor suggests that we
should think of the brain or the computer as performing
formal operations only on interpreted and not just on formal
symbols. But who does the interpreting? And what is an
interpretation? If he is saying that for intentionality there
must be intentional content in addition to the formal symbols,
then I of course agree. Indeed, two of the main points of my
argument are that in our own case we have the "interpreta-
tion," that is, we have intrinsic intentionality, and that the
computer program could never by itself be sufficient for that.
In the case of the computer we make observer-relative
ascriptions of intentionality, but that should not be mistaken
for the real thing since the computer program by itself has no
intrinsic intentionality.
Sloman & Croucher claim that the problem in my thought
experiment is that the system isn't big enough. To Schank's
story understander they would add all sorts of other opera-
tions, but they emphasize that these operations are computa-
tional and not physical. The obvious objection to their
proposal is one they anticipate: I can still repeat my thought
experiment with their system no matter how big it is. To this,
they reply that I assume "without argument, that it is impossi-
ble for another mind to be based on his [my] mental process
without his [my] knowing." But that is not what I assume. For
all I know, that may be false. Rather, what I assume is that
you can't understand Chinese if you don't know the meanings
of any of the words in Chinese. More generally, unless a
system can attach semantic content to a set of syntactic
elements, the introduction of the elements in the system adds
nothing by way of intentionality. That goes for me and for all
the little subsystems that are being postulated inside me.
Eccles points out quite correctly that I never undertake to
refute the dualist-interaction position held by him and
Popper. Instead, I argue against strong AI on the basis of what
might be called a monist interactionist position. My only
excuse for not attacking his form of dualism head-on is that
this paper really had other aims. I am concerned directly with
strong AI and only incidentally with the "mind-brain prob-
lem." He is quite right in thinking that my arguments against
strong AI are not by themselves inconsistent with his version
of dualist interactionism, and I am pleased to see that we
share the belief that "it is high time that strong AI was
discredited."
I fear I have nothing original to say about Rachlin's
behaviorist response, and if I discussed it I would make only
the usual objections to extreme behaviorism. In my own case I
have an extra difficulty with behaviorism and functionalism
because I cannot imagine anybody actually believing these
views. I know that poeple say they do, but what am I to make
of it when Rachlin says that there are no "mental states
underlying . . . behavior" and "the pattern of the behavior is
the mental state"? Are there no pains underlying Rachlin's
pain behavior? For my own case I must confess that there
unfortunately often are pains underlying my pain behavior,
and I therefore conclude that Rachlin's form of behaviorism is
not generally true.
Lycan tells us that my counterexamples are not counterex-
amples to a functionalist theory of language understanding,
because the man in my counterexample would be using the
wrong programs. Fine. Then tell us what the right programs
are, and we will program the man with those programs and
still produce a counterexample. He also tells us that the right
causal connections will determine the appropriate content to
attach to the formal symbols. I believe my reply to Fodor and
other versions of the causal or robot reply is relevant to his
argument as well, and so I will not repeat it.
Hofstadter cheerfully describes my target article as "one
of the wrongest, most infuriating articles I have ever read in
my life." I believe that he would have been less (or perhaps
more?) infuriated if he had troubled to read the article at all
carefully. His general strategy appears to be that whenever I
assert p, he says that I assert not p. For example, I reject
dualism, so he says I believe in the soul. I think it is a plain
fact of nature that mental phenomena are caused by neuro-
physiological phenomena, so he says I have "deep difficulty"
in accepting any such view. The whole tone of my article is
one of treating the mind as part of the (physical) world like
anything else, so he says I have an "instinctive horror" of any
such reductionism. He misrepresents my views at almost
every point, and in consequence I find it difficult to take his
commentary seriously. If my text is too difficult I suggest
Hofstadter read Eccles who correctly perceives my rejection
of dualism.
Furthermore, Hofstadter's commentary contains the
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following non sequitur. From the fact that intentionality
"springs from" the brain, together with the extra premise that
"physical processes are formal, that is, rule governed" he
infers that formal processes are constitutive of the mental,
that we are "at bottom, formal systems." But that conclusion
simply does not follow from the two premises. It does not
even follow given his weird interpretation of the second
premise: "To put it another way, the extra premise is that
there is no intentionality at the level of particles." I can accept
all these premises, but they just do not entail the conclusion.
They do entail that intentionality is an "outcome of formal
processess" in the trivial sense that it is an outcome of
processes that have a level of description at which they are the
instantiation of a computer program, but the same is true of
milk and sugar and countless other "outcomes of formal
processes."
Hofstadter also hypothesizes that perhaps a few trillion
water pipes might work to produce consciousness, but he fails
to come to grips with the crucial element of my argument,
which is that even if this were the case it would have to be
because the water-pipe system was duplicating the causal
powers of the brain and not simply instantiating a formal
program.
I think I agree with Smythe's subtle commentary except
perhaps on one point. He seems to suppose that to the extent
that the program is instantiated by "primitive hardware
operations" my objections would not apply. But why? Let the
man in my example have the program mapped into his
hardware. He still doesn't thereby understand Chinese.
Suppose he is so "hard wired" that he automatically comes
out with uninterpreted Chinese sentences in response to
uninterpreted Chinese stimuli. The case is still the same
except that he is no longer acting voluntarily.
Side issues. I felt that some of the commentators missed
the point or concentrated on peripheral issues, so my remarks
about them will be even briefer.
I believe that Bridgeman has missed the point of my
argument when he claims that though the homunculus in my
example might not know what was going on, it could soon
learn, and that it would simply need more information,
specifically "information with a known relationship to the
outside world." I quite agree. To the extent that the homun-
culus has such information it is more than a mere instantiation
of a computer program, and thus it is irrelevant to my dispute
with strong AI. According to strong AI, if the homunculus has
the right program it must already have the information. But I
disagree with Bridgeman's claim that the only properties of
the brain are the properties it has at the level of neurons. I
think all sides to the present dispute would agree that the
brain has all sorts of properties that are not ascribable at the
level of individual neurons - for example, causal properties
(such as the brain's control of breathing).
Similar misgivings apply to the remarks of Marshall. He
stoutly denounces the idea that there is anything weak about
the great achievements of weak AI, and concludes "Clearly,
there must be some radical misunderstanding here." The only
misunderstanding was in his supposing that in contrasting
weak with strong AI, I was in some way disparaging the
former.
Marshall finds it strange that anyone should think that a
program could be a theory. But the word program is used
ambiguously. Sometimes "program" refers to the pile of
punch cards, sometimes to a set of statements. It is in the
latter sense that the programs are sometimes supposed to be
theories. If Marshall objects to that sense, the dispute is still
merely verbal and can be resolved by saying not that the
program is a theory, but that the program is an embodiment
of a theory. And the idea that programs could be theories is
not something I invented. Consider the following. "Occasion-
ally after seeing what a program can do, someone will ask for
a specification of the theory behind it. Often the correct
response is that the program is the theory" (Winston 1977, p.
259).
Ringle also missed my point. He says I take refuge in
mysticism by arguing that "the physical properties of
neuronal systems are such that they cannot in principle be
simulated by a nonprotoplasmic computer." But that is not
even remotely close to my claim. I think that anything can be
given a formal simulation, and it is an empirical question in
each case whether the simulation duplicated the causal
features. The question is whether the formal simulation by
itself, without any further causal elements, is sufficient to
reproduce the mental. And the answer to that question is no,
because of the arguments I have stated repeatedly, and which
Ringle does not answer. It is just a fallacy to suppose that
because the brain has a program and because the computer
could have the same program, that what the brain does is
nothing more than what the computer does. It is for each case
an empirical question whether a rival system duplicates the
causal powers of the brain, but it is a quite different question
whether instantiating a formal program is by itself constitu-
tive of the mental.
I also have the feeling, perhaps based on a misunderstand-
ing, that Menzel's discussion is based on a confusion between
how one knows that some system has mental states and what
it is to have a mental state. He assumes that I am looking for a
criterion for the mental, and he cannot see the point in my
saying such vague things about the brain. But I am not in any
sense looking for a criterion for the mental. I know what
mental states are, at least in part, by myself being a system of
mental states. My objection to strong AI is not, as Menzel
claims, that it might fail in a single possible instance, but
rather that in the instance in which it fails, it possesses no
more resources than in any other instance; hence if it fails in
that instance it fails in every instance.
I fail to detect any arguments in Walter's paper, only a few
weak analogies. He laments my failure to make my views on
intentionality more explicit. They are so made in the three
papers cited by Natsoulas (Searle 1979a; 1979b; 1979c).
Further implications. I can only express my appreciation
for the contributions of Danto, Libet, Maxwell, Puccetti,
and Natsoulas. In various ways, they each add supporting
arguments and commentary to the main thesis. Both Natsou-
las and Maxwell challenge me to provide some answers to
questions about the relevance of the discussion to the tradi-
tional ontological and mind-body issues. I try to avoid as
much as possible the traditional vocabulary and categories,
and my own - very tentative - picture is this. Mental states
are as real as any other biological phenomena. They are both
caused by and realized in the brain. That is no more myste-
rious than the fact that such properties as the elasticity and
puncture resistance of an inflated car tire are both caused by
and realized in its microstructure. Of course, this does not
imply that mental states are ascribable to individual neurons,
any more than the properties at the level of the tire are
ascribable to individual electrons. To pursue the analogy: the
brain operates causally both at the level of the neurons and at
the level of the mental states, in the same sense that the tire
operates causally both at the level of particles and at the level
of its overall properties. Mental states are no more epiphe-
nomenal than are the elasticity and puncture resistance of an
inflated tire, and interactions can be described both at the
higher and lower levels, just as in the analogous case of the
tire.
Some, but not all, mental states are conscious, and the
intentional-nonintentional distinction cuts across the con-
scious-unconscious distinction. At every level the phenomena
are causal. I suppose this is "interactionism," and I guess it is
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also, in some sense, '"monism," but 1 would prefer to avoid
this myth-eaten vocabulary altogether.
Conclusion. I conclude that the Chinese room has survived
the assaults of its critics. The remaining puzzle to me is this:
why do so many workers in AI still want to adhere to strong
AI? Surely weak AI is challenging, interesting, and difficult
enough.
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